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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation will attempt to define the moral 
obligations of healthcare administrators as based upon their 
claim to - and popular recognition of - professional status. 
It will be proposed that a social contract foundation offers 
the needed justification for groups such as healthcare 
administrators to be considered professionals, and for a clear 
defining of the existence and nature of their professional 
obligations. 
It is important to note that two key presuppositions will 
be made in this dissertation. The first presupposition is 
that professions do in fact have moral obligations. The 
second presupposition is that healthcare adrn.inistra tion may in 
fact be considered a profession. 1 
The first presupposition, that professions and their 
members have moral obligations, is crucial. This presupposi-
tion could be challenged by the claim that there are no unique 
or particular professional obligations; rather, those who 
claim professional status possess only the normal, i.e, 
commonly recognized, moral obligations generally associated 
with all other occupational roles or business positions in 
1The institution of profession will be examined and 
described in the next two chapters of this dissertation. 
2 
society. If no special obligations existed for professions 
and professionals, then there would be no need to study the 
professional obligations of health care administrators. 
However, in general conceptual thinking and common language 
usage it normally seems to be assumed that a central feature 
of professions and professionals is to possess some special 
obligations. Much of the literature found on professions and 
professional obligations assumes that special obligations do 
exist for professions and professionals. The claim that 
professions and their members have moral obligations therefore 
will not be argued for, but will be presupposed because it is 
found in popular conceptual thinking and common language usage 
and is presupposed in much of the literature on professions. 
The second presupposition is that healthcare administra-
ti on constitutes a profession. 2 If this group is not a 
profession, or if its members are not considered profession-
als, then the basis for determining their moral obligations 
fundamentally would be no different than determining the moral 
obligations for other particular occupational roles or 
business positions in society. 
The question of the status of healthcare administration 
2This dissertation will limit its study to healthcare 
administration in the United States. The term, "healthcare 
administrators," will be used to refer to the leaders of 
healthcare institutions in America. Who I have most in mind 
are hospital chief executive officers, chief operating 
officers, and hospital administrative executives in general, 
but also those same positions held in healthcare networks and 
healthcare alliances, i.e., systems with multiple institu-
tions. 
3 
as a profession has been debated in the literature, but there 
is now a general recognition, at least within the healthcare 
field, that it can and should be considered a profession. 3 
While some disputes remain in the literature regarding the 
degree to which healthcare administration may be considered a 
profession in relation to the "traditional" professions, such 
as medicine, law, and clergy, 4 those who are actually engaged 
in healthcare administration certainly consider themselves to 
be professionals. This perception of healthcare administra-
tion constituting a profession arises from the evolved 
complexity of administrating a healthcare institution requir-
ing what has now become an exclusive expertise, as well as 
from the common belief that healthcare institutions are not 
just businesses but are designed to serve the common good. 5 
Historically in our society, healthcare administration 
originated as a management position needed merely to coordi-
nate the "workplace" of physicians. As surgery was success-
fully developed, however, hospitals increased in size, 
technology, competition, and perceived importance to their 
3This point is developed in Janet Storch, "Hospital 
Administrators as Professionals: A Study of Occupational Role 
Identity," Hospital and Health Services Administration 34 
(Winter 1989): 507-523. 
4See, for example, Mary MacDonald, "Does Health Adminis-
tration Represent a New Form of ProfessionalisJt1? 11 Health 
Management Forum 3, no. 4 (Winter 1982): 10-18. 
5See, for example, Jerry Weaver, Conflict and Control in 
Health Care Administration (Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publica-
tions, 1975): 15-59. 
4 
communities, and administrative decision-making was gradually 
taken over from physicians by specially-trained lay people. 
In 1933 the American College of Hospital Administrators6 was 
formed, partially in an attempt to gain recognition as a 
distinct profession in itself. Medicine progressed with the 
development of antibiotics after World War II, and through the 
availability of Hill-Burton funds hospitals grew both in 
number and size; they developed interests and goals distinct 
from those of physicians, and the authority of administrators 
rose along with the managerial complexity and budgets of the 
institution. 
With the growth in health insurance and the development 
of Medicare and Medicaid funding in the 1960 's, hospitals 
burgeoned into big businesses. For the next two decades not-
for-profit institutions expanded and fiercely competed with 
one another and with the growing number of for-profit institu-
tions and corporations for the market share. At the same time 
there was a rapid growth in technology, with the corresponding 
employment of highly skilled and state-licensed personnel, and 
the emergence of complex information systems. The 1970 's 
introduced managed care, and the 1980's were marked by third-
party payer cost-containment measures such as cost caps, fixed 
reimbursement by diagnosis, and per diem reimbursement. 
Healthcare institutions responded with cost-cutting measures 
6This title was changed to the American College of 
Healthcare Executives in 1984. 
5 
through stricter utilization criteria and measurement of 
productivity and quality. The 1990' s have seen hospitals 
downsizing and merging or networking with other healthcare 
institutions and networks, initiating various forms of 
integration and collaboration seeking institutional survival 
in the face of shrinking reimbursement. 7 Administrating a 
healthcare institution has evolved into an extremely complex 
job requiring an unique blend of multiple skills and talents. 
Because of the nature of the service provided by health-
care institutions, however, healthcare administrators commonly 
have not been viewed solely as businesspeople, executive 
managers, or information analysts. Healthcare institutions 
have carried great symbolic and social siqnificance in our 
society, embodying our faith in science, technology, and 
expertise, and reflecting the values of altruism, social 
solidarity, and community spirit. 8 Healthcare administrators, 
by position of their leadership role, have been charged with 
the responsibility of facilitating institutional response to 
the fundamental human need of individual health and to the 
general societal concern for the health of the community. 
7For a good overview of the changing role of healthcare 
administrators, see Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and in 
Wealth: American Hospitals in the 20th Century (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989) 
8These points are developed in: In Sickness and in Wealth: 
American Hospitals in the 20th Century, 6; Bradford Gray, The 
Profit Motive and Patient Care: The Changing Accountability of 
Doctors and Hospitals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1991) 3; Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American 
Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982), Chapter 5. 
6 
Because of this responsibility, our society generally expects 
that health care administrators hold professional status and 
have professional obligations. In short, healthcare adminis-
trators consider themselves to be members of a profession and 
society treats them as such. 
Describing the moral obligations of healthcare adminis-
trators is undertaken in order to make an important contribu-
tion to the study of professional ethics in general, and to 
the ethics of healthcare administration in particular. 
Reflecting the evolving role of hospitals throughout this 
century, the role of healthcare administration has undergone 
many changes. 
It is not unlikely that the role of healthcare adminis-
tration will continue to evolve, as currently our country 
approaches the precipice of some type of healthcare reform, 
whose values, structure, and delivery have yet to be complete-
ly determined as of this writing. The literature in health-
care administration eloquently articulates the problems which 
have led to the national call for reform and calls upon health 
care administrators to exercise a leadership role in that 
reform. Unfortunately, however, this literature often tends 
to represent a defensive posturing, advocating or attempting 
to salvage the interests of healthcare institutions; further-
more, this literature can be criticized for failing to 
articulate the professional values of healthcare administra-
tors which would justify and identify their professional 
7 
obligations in the face of healthcare reform. 
I see this situation existing because the current 
literature addressing ethics in healthcare administration can 
be described, at best, as limited in quantity, incompletely 
developed, and either focusing merely on personal values and 
institutional standards with no identification of the role-
specific duties of healthcare administrators, or offering only 
generalized descriptions of ethical theories instead of 
providing a listing and prioritization of this role's central 
values, i.e., a hierarchy of "goods," to guide how healthcare 
administrators are to apply those theories when confronted 
with value conflicts and moral dilemmas. 9 Furthermore, 
current textbooks used in healthcare administration graduate 
programs barely mention the subject of ethics or of role-
specific professional obligations. 10 
This dissertation will attempt to provide a social 
contract foundation for the ethics of healthcare administra-
tors. It will be argued that this social contract foundation 
will help identify and prioritize the role-specific values and 
9This describes the only available textbook on the ethics 
of healthcare administrators: Kurt Darr, Ethics in Health 
Services Management (New York: Praeger, 1987). For a similar 
criticism of the teaching of healthcare administration ethics, 
see Deborah Tregunno, "Ethics and Hospital Administration," 
Health Management Forum 7 (Spring 1986): 58-69; Samuel Levey 
and James Hill, "Between Survival and Social Responsibility: 
In Search of an Ethical Balance (and Responses)," Journal of 
Health Administration Education (1986) 4, no. 2: 225-248. 
10See, for example, L.F. Wolper and Jesus Pena, Health Care 
Administration: Principles and Practices (Rockville, MA: Aspen 
Publishers, 1987). 
8 
obligations of healthcare administrators, thus offering 
assistance to the profession when its members are called upon 
in their institutional leadership role to make difficult moral 
decisions affecting their institution and the health concerns 
of their patients and community. 
In exploring the ethics of healthcare administrators this 
dissertation will utilize the seven categories of professional 
obligation developed by David Ozar. 11 These categories 
consist of: 1) identification of the chief client, 2) the 
ideal relationship with the client, 3) commitment to the good 
of the client, 4) central values of the profession, 5) com-
mitment to competence in the area of the profession's exper-
tise, 6) relationship with co-professionals, and 7) rela-
tionship with society at large. 
This dissertation consists of two parts with nine 
chapters. Part One develops the theoretical foundation of 
professions and professional obligations in general. Part Two 
applies the conclusions reached in Part One to identify the 
professional ethics of healthcare administrators. 
Part One consists of four chapters. Fol lowing this 
introduction, Chapter II argues that sociological theories 
fail to adequately define "profession" since they lack 
conceptual clarification and agreement regarding the meaning 
uDavid Ozar and David Sokol, Dental Ethics at Chairside 
(St. Louis: Mosby, 1994), 31-35. The eighth category listed 
here, titled "Education and Integrity," is not utilized in 
this dissertation. 
9 
of the term. Chapter III proposes that a "central instances" 
approach to defining "profession" is most compatible with the 
common language usage of the term. Chapter IV argues that the 
professional status and moral obligations of professional 
groups in general and of healthcare administrators in particu-
lar can be justified only if grounded in a set of mutual 
commitments of the sort that philosophers have imaged as a 
"social contract," namely, commitments between society and 
that group. 
Part Two consists of five chapters. Four different 
models or ways of understanding professions and their obliga-
tions which can be found in the literature are examined. The 
ethics of healthcare administrators is explored in these 
chapters utilizing the presuppositions of each model. 
Chapters V, VI, and VII examine what are called the Guild, 
Agent and Commercial models of professions. In each chapter, 
presuppositions of the particular model are identified, the 
concept of the profession of healthcare administrators is 
developed within the parameters of each model, the moral 
values and obligations of health care administrators from 
within the context of each model are examined, and lastly 
criticisms are raised citing weaknesses and inadequacies in 
the way each model addresses the professional status and 
professional obligations of healthcare administrators in light 
of the proposed social contract between society and this 
profession. 
10 
Chapter VIII argues that only what has been called an 
"Interactive" model of profession and professional obligations 
satisfies the requirements of the social contract. Presup-
positions of the Interactive model are defined, the concept of 
the profession of healthcare administrators within the 
Interactive model is explored, the moral values and obliga-
tions of health care administrators are examined, and lastly 
challenges to the Interactive model of professions and 
professional obligations are addressed. 
Chapter IX serves to summarize and offer conclusions on 
the main points of this dissertation. \ 
CHAPTER II 
DESCRIBING A PROFESSION: 
THE FAILURE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Undertaking the task of defining the professional 
obligations of healthcare administrators first requires that 
an understanding of the nature of profession be articulated in 
order to grasp the unique character of "professional" obliga-
tions. This is necessary so as to distinguish professional 
obligations from the moral obligations associated with other 
roles in society such as, for example, the moral obligations 
normally associated with being a parent or a citizen. Since 
professionals earn their livelihood by practicing their 
profession, defining the nature of profession also allows for 
professional obligations to be distinguished from the moral 
obligations normally associated with everyday (non-profession-
al) business transactions. 
This chapter will explore four different understandings 
or conceptual models of profession as found in the sociologi-
cal literature and utilized in the health care administration 
literature. These models will be briefly summarized and then 
critiqued. Each model offers a perspective on pertinent 
characteristics or traits that can be employed in a philosoph-
ical analysis of profession. It will be argued that each 
11 
12 
model, however, fails in its own attempt to define profession 
for two reasons. 
First, these different sociological "schools of thought" 
make different assumptions about the nature of profession and 
ask different questions about the make-up and purpose of 
professions; this results in a fundamental disagreement over 
their proposed essential features of a profession. Second, 
these sociological conceptions of professions are limited to 
the historical and cultural manifestations of 19th and 20th 
century occupational groups who were accorded professional 
status. The cultural context which shapes professions, 
however, is continually changing. Contemporary medicine, for 
example, as an occupational group no longer resembles socio-
logy's traditional image of it as a profession, and some 
groups which are commonly considered to be professions today 
do not resemble the current make-up of contemporary medicine 
nor previous cultural manifestations of medicine as an 
occupational group. Thus, if no occupational groups currently 
match the professional groups studied by sociology in the 
past, then it is unclear to what degree a contemporary 
occupational group must possess characteristics or traits 
associated with the professional groups of the past in order 
to be called a profession today, or what traits should be 
considered essential rather than accidental features or traits 
of a profession, and what criteria should be used to establish 
those essential features and traits. 
13 
Since sociology fails to conceptualize or define ade-
quately the nature of profession, social theorists are forced 
to merely adopt a definition of profession and remain faithful 
to that definition throughout their usage of the term. That 
approach cannot work here. If it may be assumed that the 
nature of professional obligation as we find it in health care 
administration is dependent upon the nature of profession, 
then arbitrarily adopting a definition of profession would 
result in identifying specific professional obligations of 
health care administrators based upon arbitrary group charac-
teristics that not everyone would agree on as the core of what 
should be considered professional. This would undermine the 
validity of the conclusions this dissertation will reach. The 
sociological accounts, therefore, are unable to adequately 
conceptualize or define the nature of professional obligations 
in general, and the professional obligations of health care 
administrators in particular. 
Four Models of Profession in the 
Sociological Literature 
The Functionalist Model 
Sociological approaches to the study of professions have 
viewed professions either in a positive or negative light. 
The positive approach to viewing professions has been called 
the Functionalist model. 1 In this view professions as 
1This term is used in John Kultgen, Ethics and Profession-
alism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 
Chapter 5. 
14 
occupational groups and professionals as members of those 
occupational groups are characterized by their special 
expertise and by their commitment to altruism in unselfishly 
addressing particular fundamental human needs or social 
concerns in society. 
In the Functionalist model the professions are viewed as 
enjoying a monopoly of expertise in their domain of authority. 
Members of society must come to them for help in addressing 
such fundamental human needs and social concerns as health, 
justice, and religious salvation. It is the vital importance 
of these fundamental needs and concerns to individual human 
life and to society at large, coupled with the exclusive 
authority of particular occupational groups to address those 
needs and concerns, which distinguishes professional work from 
other highly skilled activities. Furthermore, professionals 
confine themselves to providing means to their clients' or 
patients' ends. They promise not to exploit their clients' or 
patients' vulnerability for selfish gain, but rather to devote 
their expertise to address their clients' or patients' 
problems. It is also generally understood that all members of 
society have access to the professions' services. Thus 
professions serve as the best means to address specific 
fundamental human needs and social concerns. 
In the Functionalist model professionals base their 
15 
decisions on rationally grounded scientific principles, 2 yet 
they are called "practitioners" since their concern is to 
utilize their special skills and judgments for the solution to 
practical problems. Professional work therefore requires 
extensive intensive training and life-long dedication to 
insure an on-going development in professional skill and 
judgment. This results in a wide gap of knowledge between the 
professional and the client or patient. Combined with the 
profession's pledge to unselfish altruism, this allows 
professions to be granted monopoly over their knowledge and 
skill and to be assured of their autonomy in practice. 
Monopoly in competence is the foundation for prof es-
sional autonomy, the primary distinguishing characteristic of 
professions in the Functionalist model. A profession as a 
group is autonomous in that it is largely exempt from control 
by society and is left free to regulate the admission, 
training, standards, and behavior of its members; individual 
professionals are autonomous in that a profession's reins of 
control tend to be slack and the decisions of individual 
professionals are assumed to reflect their technical compe-
tence and professional commitment to unselfishness and 
altruism. Group monopoly over competence with resulting 
autonomy is maintained through standards of technical 
2Clergy base their pastoral decisions on psychological 
principles or traditions, and their theological perspectives 
on their religious traditions and the sacred writing associat-
ed with their religious traditions. 
16 
competence and codes of ethics, and maintaining such monopoly 
is argued to be the best means of assuring predictable high-
quality service in addressing the specific fundamental human 
needs or social concerns that gave rise to the professions. 
Professions therefore tightly control membership entry, 
provide the required extensive formal education, award a 
professional degree before allowing professional practice, 
exert control over practice and behavior through professional 
associations, and restrict evaluation of professional practice 
and behavior to fellow-professionals since only they possess 
the needed competence for such evaluation. 3 
The Functionalist model characterizes professions in an 
almost idealized way, and therein lies the weakness of the 
model. Occupational groups that are known as professions, and 
their individual members as well, often are not viewed as 
exhibiting these characteristics of the Functionalist model. 
What is proposed as a descriptive portrayal of profession 
comes across to many as more of a normative view of what the 
literature's authors believe professions should be. In the 
Functionalist model professions are assumed to be a force for 
the good and as the best means structured by society to 
3This Functionalist position is summarized from Emile 
Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, translated by 
Cornelia Brookfield (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957); 
T. H. Marshall, "The Recent History of Professionalism in 
Relation to Social Structure and Social Policy," The Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science V (1939): 325-340; 
Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, IL: 
The Free Press, 1954); A.M. Carr-Saunders and P.A. Wilson, 
The Professions (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933) . 
17 
address specific fundamental human needs and social concerns. 
But rather than rely upon empirical studies describing how 
occupational groups with professional status actually consti-
tute themselves and act, proponents of the Functionalist model 
tend to resort to idealistic descriptions of certain elite 
members of professions; the ideal characterization thus 
becomes the public image for all in the professional group. 4 
Criticisms of this Functionalist model of professions 
abound and arise from society's frequent negative experiences 
with professional groups and their members. Evidence of 
collective and individual self-interest within professions in 
the pursuit of income, status, and power repeatedly refutes 
the image of altruism and unselfish dedication to the clients' 
and patients' end as proposed by the Functionalist model. 
This is not to suggest that some professional individuals and 
at times some professional groups do not exercise personal 
disinterest or self-sacrifice, but rather that these qualities 
often are not present or self-evident. Efforts to preserve 
monopoly in competence are often perceived as a means to 
maintain income and status while minimizing competition. It 
does often seem that both professional individuals and groups 
tend to overvalue the importance of the service they provide 
and often appear strongly territorial in protecting and 
4This position is developed in Jeffrey Berlant, Profession 
and Monopoly: A study of Medicine in the United States and 
Great Britain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1975). 
18 
preserving their role against encroachments from other 
occupations. Efforts at self-regulation often seem to be 
self-serving, while codes of ethics lack strong accountability 
and enforcement and often seem designed to be self-protecting. 
There is little evidence of peer review of individuals' work. 
Professional services are maldistributed and are not available 
to all. There often is not a perceived obligation among 
professionals to serve those without the means to pay. 
Professional groups in general seem ineffectual in restraining 
their members' profit motives. It is also not uncommon to 
hear charges that professionals associate their technical 
expertise with a general sense of moral and intellectual 
superiority, which leads some professionals to exercise 
paternalistic or exploitive behavior and to advise and direct 
in areas beyond their field of expertise. In sum, it does not 
appear that the Functionalist model accurately portrays and 
characterizes professions as they are perceived by many in 
society; furthermore, in light of these many criticisms, it 
is not readily apparent that professions as understood within 
the Functionalist model are in fact the most effective 
societal means to address specific fundamental human needs or 
social concerns. 5 
Recognizing these weaknesses or discrepancies in the 
Functionalist model of profession, other sociological accounts 
5These points are raised in Kultgen, Ethics and Profes-
sionalism, Chapter 7. 
19 
in the past three decades have turned to describing and 
examining professions in a more negative light. Three differ-
ent approaches critical to the Functionalist account of 
professions can be identified in the sociological literature. 
They have been termed the Dominance, Deprofessionalization, 
and Proletarianization positions. 
The Dominance Model 
The Dominance position argues that an occupation is able 
to claim professional status when, for self-serving reasons, 
it succeeds in its efforts to gain control over the determi-
nation of the substance of its own work and subsequent control 
over the work of others in its domain. Unlike other occupa-
tions, a profession believes it may demand autonomy in 
practice and freedom from control by society because of its 
exclusive expertise and claim of trustworthiness based on its 
promised altruistic application of this exclusive expertise. 
Professions seek to develop institutional structures to 
protect themselves from external competition, intervention, 
direction or evaluation. Cultural status and public deference 
to the profession are promoted by the professions in order to 
help maintain these institutional structures which safeguard 
their professional status. 6 
Because of the financial and sociological rewards 
accorded to professional groups and their members, other 
6This position is developed in Elliot Freidson, Profes-
sional Dominance (New York: Atherton Press, 1970). 
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occupational groups strive to acquire the professional status 
achieved by the traditional professions of medicine, law, and 
clergy. These other occupational groups attempt to emulate 
these traditional professions by demonstrating that they, too, 
do reliable and valuable work - often establishing educational 
requirements, specific training programs, licensing proce-
dures, a code of ethics, a professional association - all the 
''exterior trappings" of the traditional professions. It is 
the hope of these other occupational groups that society will 
perceive them as possessing exclusive expertise and an 
altruistic service orientation and that they alone are best 
able to address some particular vital human need or social 
concern, and thereby recognize their claim to professional 
status and confer upon them through institutional structures 
some level of autonomy and self-regulation with the accom-
panying financial and sociological rewards. 7 
With limited social control over professions, the 
possibility always arises - and in fact, according to the 
Dominance model, the possibility should be expected to arise 
given the primary self-serving motivation of the occupational 
groups striving to achieve professional status - for profes-
sions to misuse their autonomy in practice to promote their 
own self-interests or personal gain. Most contemporary 
criticisms of the Functionalist model are examples of this 
7This is the premiss of Randall Collins, The Credential 
Society (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 131-138. 
21 
Dominance model of profession. 8 
The Dominance model's critical view of professions is 
carried even further, however, by some social theorists who 
have come to see the pursuit by occupational groups for 
professional status as the quest for the deliberate abuse of 
autonomy. These social theorists describe what they term the 
"professional project" as the effort by an occupational group 
to organize itself to gain a monopoly over a service and 
control of the market so as to develop a demand for the 
service in the form it alone provides. According to this 
perspective, the earliest professions in the 18th and 19th 
centuries were occupational groups seeking to attain recogni-
tion and to drive rivals from the market place by organizing 
associations that set exclusive standards, controlling entry 
into the group, sponsoring schools and standardized training, 
regulating practice, and all the while seeking to improve 
their image before their patrons and public for the sole 
purpose of acquiring and maintaining market control over the 
services they provide. The "professional project" is thus an 
attempt to translate scarce resources - special knowledge and 
skills that can address a specific fundamental human need or 
social concern - into social and economic rewards. According 
8See, for example, Ivan Illich, "Useful Unemployment and 
Its Professional Enemies," in Peter Wind, et al. , eds., 
Ethical Issues in the Professions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1989), 25-31; H. R. Moody, "Demythologizing 
the Professionals," Christianity and Crisis 31, no. 5 ( 5 April 
1971): 54-56. 
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to this perspective, professions aspire to portray an ideology 
of personal disinterest, self-sacrifice, and altruism solely 
for the purpose of achieving economic rewards and social 
gain. 9 
The Deprofessionalization Model 
Another model of profession found in the sociological 
literature that is critical of the Functionalist approach to 
understanding profession has been termed the Deprofessional-
ization model. This model agrees with the Dominance model 
that an occupational group is able to claim professional 
status when it gains control or autonomy in practice over its 
own work. The Deprofessionalization position argues, however, 
that the traditional autonomy of professions, idealized in the 
Functionalist model and criticized in the Dominance model, has 
eroded in the last few decades and that professions have 
become subject to the formalized and hierarchical controls 
imposed by society on all other occupational groups. The 
Deprofessionalization model argues that even the traditional 
professions have lost their autonomy due to their loss of 
monopoly in competence. In medicine for example, this has 
been brought about by computerization which systematizes 
diagnoses and allows for close scrutiny of individual physi-
cian practice by comparison with group norms or standardized 
9This position is argued in Magali Sarfatti Larson, The 
Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977). 
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procedures, a rise in public education and consciousness of 
health issues which lessens the exclusive expertise of 
physicians and which leads to greater challenging of their 
professional authority, increasing specialization within 
medical practice which makes for more interdependence and 
accountability between physicians and which creates a whole 
new group of non-professional technical experts, and the 
financial cost of medical services which has led to a demand 
for greater accountability of medical practice and for less 
reliance upon medical practitioners' professional commitments 
to disinterest, self-sacrifice, and altruism. The Deprofes-
sionalization model, therefore, argues that occupational 
groups once granted professional status have in recent times 
lost their monopoly in competence and thus can no longer 
justifiably claim autonomy in practice. 10 
The Proletarianization Model 
A third account critical of the Functionalist approach to 
profession is the Proletarianization position. This model 
10The Deprofessionalization position has been argued for by 
Marie Haug in numerous publications: "A Re-examination of the 
Hypothesis of Physician Deprofessionalization," The Milbank 
Quarterly 66, suppl. 2 ( 1988) : 48-55; "The Sociological 
Approach to Self-Regulation," in Roger Blair and S. Rubin, 
eds., Regulating the Professions (Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1980), 61-80; "Deprofessionalization: An Alternative 
Hypothesis for the Future," in Paul Balmos, ed., Professional-
ization and Social Change (Hanley, Great Britain: J.H. Brooks, 
1973), 63-79; "Computer Technology and the Obsolescence of 
the Concept of Profession," in M. Haug and J. Defry, eds., 
Work and Technology (Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc., 1977), 215-228. 
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agrees with the Dominance view of profession and with the 
Deprofessionalization position that the traditional autonomy 
of professions has eroded in recent times. The Proletarian-
ization position, however, is distinguished by its portrayal 
of professions losing their autonomy by becoming employees to 
large corporations. Increasingly now, according to the 
Proletarianization view, professionals are forced to "sell" 
their services and work for others. This model, dependent 
upon Marxist thinking, sees parallels between the proletarian-
ization of the craft worker in the nineteenth century through 
the destruction of the guild, the undermining of craft 
knowledge and skill by new industrial technology and manage-
ment, and the breakdown of the craft ethos of work, with what 
has been happening to professionals since the mid-twentieth 
century. 11 Three structural factors are cited which have led 
to most professionals now working for others. 
First, technological developments leading to the intro-
duction of complicated and expensive machinery in many forms 
of professional work have made it impossible for individual 
professionals to raise the necessary capital to own and 
control their own means of production. Second, with the 
expansion of professional markets and services, increasing 
centralized administrative mechanisms are needed to cope with 
the burdens of mass clientele. Third, large-scale public and 
11This model is developed in Vincente Navarro, "Profession-
al Dominance or Proletarianization? Neither," The Milbank 
Quarterly 66, suppl. 2 (1988): 57-75. 
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private capital has entered the professional market, reorga-
nizing professional work along the lines of the dominant 
centralized corporate economy. The result is that profession-
als have become employees working within a complex bureaucrat-
ic division of labor on fragments of projects coordinated and 
directed by others. Their knowledge is so specialized and 
narrowed that it no longer serves as a base of power or 
control. Because of this loss of autonomy, many empirical 
studies indicate professionals now express dissatisfaction and 
unhappiness with the evolution of their professional role. 12 
Some sociologists within the Proletarianization model shy 
away from Marxist terminology and thinking and describe the 
growing loss of professional autonomy in terms of "corporati-
zation". They point to forms of corporate control such as 
utilization and quality review, incentive pay structures, 
restrictions on practice patterns and the corporate organiza-
tion of practice, and the restructuring of the marketplace 
from solo or small-group providers to multi-institutional 
complexes. They argue that professionals compensate losing 
control over the product or "ends" of their work by trying to 
maintain control over the techniques or "means" of their work; 
what matters is not that one has autonomous control over one's 
12See, for example, Charles Derber, Professionals as 
Workers (Boston: G.K. Hall and Company, 1982). 
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work, but that one does one's work well. 13 
Three Criticisms of the Sociological 
Models of Profession 
The presence of these four contrasting and competing 
sociological models, i.e., Functionalist, Dominance, Depro-
fessionalization and Proletarianization models, in effect 
serves to muddle rather than clarify the sociological attempt 
to construct one definition or understanding of the nature or 
profession. Sociology has been unable to construct one 
paradigm model of profession. Three major criticisms then can 
be raised against turning to sociology for an understanding of 
profession. 
The First Criticism 
The first major criticism is that these four sociological 
models of profession presuppose that medicine, law and clergy 
are the "traditional" professions without explaining what 
structures or features of those occupational groups makes them 
prime examples of a profession. These three occupational 
groups are simply assumed to be professions, and their 
structures and features are then taken to be standard require-
ments for any occupational group to be granted professional 
status. But the structures and features vary between these 
traditional professions, and social theorists tend to value or 
13See, for example, Donald Light and S. Levine, "The 
Changing Character of the Medical Profession: A Theoretical 
Overview, The Milbank Quarterly 66, suppl. 2 (1988): 10-31. 
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emphasize different structures or features in these three 
professions without offering justifying reasons. As a result, 
there is lack of agreement between social theorists both 
within and between each of the four individual models regard-
ing how to identify which other occupational groups are 
professions, or which traits or qualities need be present in 
an occupational group in order for that group to be granted 
professional status. 
An illustration of the disagreement between models over 
the structure and features of profession is the Dominance 
model, studying what it views to be the "professional pro-
ject," excludes a number of groups claiming professional 
status such as European professions where expertise had never 
been formalized independent of the state, organization-based 
professions in America such as the armed forces and civil 
service, and the nursing profession which has accepted a 
particular subordinate and non-dominant role; these groups do 
not "fit in" with the position of the Dominance model which 
espouses that professions are market organizations attempting 
intellectual and organizational domination in their specific 
areas of service. In contrast, the Functionalist model and 
even the Deprofessionalization and Proletarianization models 
happily include these "excluded groups'' as professions since 
the structure and features of these occupational groups are 
not at odds with their perceptions of the functional framework 
of professions. 
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An illustration of the disagreement within models over 
the structure and features of profession is evidenced by the 
various lists of professional features proposed by social 
theorists within the Functionalist model of profession. One 
oft-cited social theorist, for example, lists the essential 
attributes of a profession as consisting of possessing a 
systematic theory of knowledge with specialized training, 
formalized organization with group culture, community sanction 
of group authority, and commitment to altruistic service and 
an ethical code.w As a result, oftentimes members of the 
"traditional" professions look with disapproval and disagree-
ment at the claims of other occupational groups to profession-
al status because those groups lack such "essential profes-
sional attributes," or at least do not have them to the same 
degree as do the "traditional" professions. For example, 
despite claims by healthcare administrators to professional 
status, the medical profession still generally tends to view 
them as no more than managers with administrative duties 
rather than possessing professional characteristics, values, 
and obligations. Yet healthcare administrators continue to 
insist that they, too, are professionals, and so may appeal to 
a different social theorist who identifies different "essen-
tial" professional attributes to validate or lend greater 
14Ernest Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession," in 
Bernard Baumrin and Benjamin Freedman, eds., Moral Responsi-
bility and the Professions (New York: Haven Publications, 
1983) , 18-32. 
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credence to their claim to professional status . 15 
The different social theorists, then, give greater or 
lesser weight to these above mentioned traits, or include 
different traits in their lists or even exclude some of those 
traits. Surveys of sociological attempts to define profession 
find that hardly any two theorists agree on a same set of 
traits. 16 
One result is that such discrepancies in professional 
trait-identification have led to a "scorecard" approach in 
what has been termed the "process of professionalization", in 
which other occupational groups try to emulate the traditional 
professions through the adoption of some of the features of 
those traditional professions such as the development of 
professional standards or a code of ethics. From this we are 
led to believe that the more features similar to the tradi-
tional professions these occupational groups possess, the more 
they "move up the ladder" from non-profession to semi-profes-
sion to full profession. As an occupational group moves 
through this "process of professionalization" by acquiring 
features similar to the traditional professions, they expect 
accompanying increased financial and social rewards whether or 
~see, for example, John Stoeckle and Stanley Reiser, "The 
Corporate Organization of Hospital Work: Balancing Profession-
al and Administrative Responsibilities," American College of 
Physicians 116, no. 5 (1 March 1992): 407-413. 
16Such discrepancies between theorists is shown in Morris 
Cogan, "Toward a Definition of Profession," Harvard Education-
al Review 23 (Winter 1953): 33-50. 
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not society itself views these groups as possessing profes-
sional status. Finally, focusing on an occupational group's 
features which are similar to the features of the traditional 
professions ignores the process by which that occupational 
group obtained those features; there is a failure in such 
accounts to distinguish between society granting professional 
status to particular groups as opposed to particular groups 
claiming professional status because they have taken on the 
features of other groups commonly considered to be profes-
sions . 17 
The attempts at analysis of professional status and 
professional obligations in the health care administration 
literature is also afflicted with the inability to articulate 
which group-structures or role-features may justifiably be 
characterized as professional. Various and sometimes differ-
ing features are identified or emphasized as exhibiting 
evidence of professional status. These features include 
specialized management and organizational skills peculiar to 
health care administration, development of the American 
College of Health Care Executives with specified objectives, 
moral obligations and a code of ethics, personal identifica-
tion with and ownership of various standards for measuring 
hospital or institutional success, and so on. Yet there is 
little agreement within this literature regarding which 
nThis third point is developed in more detail in Julius 
Roth, "Professionalism: The Sociologist's Decoy," Sociology of 
Work and Occupations 1 (1974): 6-23. 
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features are essential for cons ti tu ting the professional make-
up of heal th care administrators. 18 
Subsequently, much of the literature in health care 
administration adopts the "scorecard" approach in identifying 
which traits health care administrators possess which can be 
characterized as professional (e.g., credentials, associa-
tion, code of ethics, etc.) and which traits are non-profes-
sional (lack of clearly defined knowledge base and skills, 
standards for entry or maintenance of the right to practice in 
the field, self-regulation, etc.). The result is that there 
is admonishment over the existence of non-professional traits 
with corresponding suggestions for how to better acquire 
features similar to those possessed by the "traditional 
professions", or the claim that these "non-professional" 
traits actually represent a "new form of professionalism" . 19 
Furthermore, there is occasionally in the literature of 
health care administration the recognition that focusing on 
the supposed existing professional traits or the desire to 
acquire these supposed professional traits may well obfuscate 
the very reason why health care administration is commonly 
considered to be a profession today, namely, to administer the 
provision of health care resources to its own community and to 
18See, for example, James Summers, "Doing Good and Doing 
Well: Ethics, Professionalism, and Success," Hospital and 
Health Services Administration 29 (1984): 84-100. 
~see, for example, Mary McDonald, "Does Health Administra-
tion Represent a New Form of Professionalism?" Health Manage-
ment Forum 3, no. 4 (Winter 1982): 10-18. 
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society in general. In Chapter IV it will be argued that only 
a social contract foundation in which society benefits from 
the formation of professions may serve as the justification 
for an occupational group to be granted professional status. 
Some of the literature on healthcare administration, there-
fore, acknowledges that providing a health care system which 
is sensitive to the needs of those it serves is a more 
appropriate measure for the criteria of success in healthcare 
administration achieving professional recognition than the 
mere acquiring of characteristics or traits commonly associ-
ated with the traditional professions. 20 
The Second Criticism 
The second reason why the social theorists have failed in 
being able to construct one paradigm of profession is that 
each of the different sociological models of profession make 
normative assumptions about the institutional function or 
purpose of professions, and also assume different functions or 
purposes for professions. The Functionalist model views 
professions as a construct of society created as the best 
means to address fundamental human needs and social concerns; 
the three Conflict models, on the other hand, view professions 
as attempts by occupational groups to gain economic and social 
advantage through acquiring a monopoly on particular expertise 
wsee, for example, Marc Hiller, "Ethics and Health Care 
Administration: Issues in Education and Practice," The Journal 
of Health Administration Education. 2, no. 2 (1984): 147-192. 
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and through a mythic construct of altruism. 21 These social 
theorists, therefore, do not approach the study of professions 
untainted by normative biases concerning the function or 
purpose of the institution of profession they are attempting 
to describe. The Functionalist and the three Critical models 
of profession seem to be adopted by their different theorists 
not because they match empirical observations or because they 
lead to empirically confirmed generalizations, but because 
they provide a framework to articulate the theorists' norma-
ti ve intuitions. When certain value judgments are made, 
certain conceptual frameworks are adopted and other frameworks 
are rejected. Social theorists err in adopting a certain 
conceptual framework for viewing the purpose or function of 
professions and then arguing that theirs is the only true or 
objective viewing of professions.n 
Assuming different normative criteria for the function of 
professions contributes to the failure of social theorists to 
identify the nature of profession. The Functionalist model 
identifies professions as those groups which help people 
address fundamental needs like health or justice or religious 
salvation; the Dominance model identifies professions as 
21This point is argued in Lisa Newton, "The Origin of 
Professionalism: Sociological Conclusions and Ethical Implica-
tions," Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1 (1982): 33-
44. 
nFor elaboration on this criticism, see Kultgen, Ethics 
and Professionalism, 65-70. 
34 
those occupational groups which achieve autonomy in practice 
and control over their work and the work of others, and 
successfully obtain market control of their service; the 
Deprof essionalization and Proletarianization models identify 
professions as those groups which struggle to control diffi-
cult social relations while balancing autonomy in the practice 
of their work with the expected or dictated outcomes of their 
work. Whether or not a group can be considered a profession, 
a semi-profession, or on the road to becoming a profession 
differs between the four models based upon the perceived or 
developing function of the group. 
The Third Criticism 
The third criticism against turning to the accounts of 
social theorists for an understanding of profession is that 
sociological studies view the structure and function of 
professions through the 19-20th century American historical-
cultural perspective. 
There are two problems with this. First, while medicine, 
law, and clergy have long been considered the "traditional" 
professions, the historical-cultural context which shaped the 
particular structural formation of those occupational groups 
has now changed such that contemporary medicine, law and 
clergy do not resemble the traditional image of profession 
spawned by those occupational groups in the 19-20th centuries. 
Studies abound within the Deprofessionalization and Proletari-
anization perspectives exhibiting the many changes which have 
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occurred in "traditional" professional practice, e.g., group 
practice rather than solo practice, employment in corporations 
(with corresponding movements towards potential unionization) 
due to increased technological costs and to competition for 
clients and patients and for managed care contracts, increased 
emphasis upon practice guidelines, cost/benefit analysis, and 
peer review, and increased knowledge and decision-making by 
clients and patients. 23 Great care must be taken, therefore, 
not to draw conclusions about the nature of profession based 
on outdated presuppositions of what professions are or what 
they are supposed to look like. 
Secondly, some groups that are commonly considered to be 
professions today, such as healthcare administrators, do not 
resemble either contemporary versions of medicine, law and 
clergy or the traditional historical-cultural images of those 
groups. It serves no purpose to disqualify groups such as 
healthcare administrators from professional status simply 
because they do not fit the theories or perceptions by social 
theorists of what a profession is or should be if these 
theories or perceptions are based on a different time or 
23See John Stoeckle, "Reflections on Modern Doctoring," The 
Milbank Quarterly 66, suppl. 2 (1988): 76-91; Daniel Calla-
han, "Do Social Ethical Norms Apply to Professions?" in Louis 
Orzack and Annell Simcoe, eds., The Professions and Ethics: 
Views and Realities in New Jersey (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1982), 4-16; Margaret Brockett, "Profes-
sionalism or Unionism - The Therapists' Dilemma?" Canadian 
Journal of Occupational Therapy 52 (February 1985): 10-14; 
Robert Kanigel, "The Endangered Professional," John Hopkins 
Magazine (June 1988): 17-43. 
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place, when in fact many of these occupational groups are 
commonly considered by most people to be - and to act like -
professions. While the accounts of social theorists on the 
nature of profession may be of benefit from a historical 
perspective in understanding the development of particular 
occupational groups now afforded professional status, they are 
necessarily limited and inadequate in illuminating the 
conceptual meaning of profession as used in common discourse 
today. 24 
Conclusion 
Social theorists, therefore, cannot define or identify 
professions merely by their structures or features since those 
structures or features may evolve or change - and in fact 
should be expected to evolve and change - while the groups 
continue to be considered as professions. Furthermore, 
sociology lacks the conceptual foundation to distinguish 
between both essential and accidental features of profession 
and between descriptive and normative features of profession. 
This is because sociology largely fails to articulate philo-
sophically the functional premisses that directs the different 
theorists to focus on and value particular features in their 
~This point is argued in Marcus Hollander and Alan 
Campbell, "Conceptual Models of the Professions and Their 
Implications for the Professionalization of Health Administra-
tion," Healthcare Management Forum 3, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 21-
27. 
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studies. 25 
The best that social theorists can do, then, is to 
acknowledge their presuppositions concerning the functional 
nature or purpose of profession that guides their selection of 
a list of traits or attributes by which they attempt to define 
profession. But this will still - and always will - engender 
disagreement over the inclusion or exclusion and weight of 
importance given to particular traits or attributes, and will 
never satisfactorily resolve disagreement over "borderline 
cases" regarding particular groups and their professional 
status. 
If social theorists are incapable of effectively defining 
the nature of profession, therefore, then it must be concluded 
that they will be able to offer only minimal help in the 
effort to understand the nature of professional obligation in 
general and of health care administrators in particular. 
25This point is developed in Peter Wind, et al., eds., 
Ethical Issues in the Professions, 1-8. 
CHAPTER III 
DESCRIBING A PROFESSION: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 
The previous brief analysis of the sociological litera-
ture on professions shows that social theorists may off er a 
stipulative description of profession, but they are unable to 
provide a conceptual clarification of the term, "profession," 
such that its meaning can be understood in common language 
usage throughout changing historical times. It will therefore 
be proposed in this chapter that a more satisfactory philo-
sophical approach to describing the institution of profession 
is to identify occupational groups commonly considered in our 
society today to be professions and declare the popular image 
or common conception of those groups (and not necessarily 
those groups themselves as we know them today) to be "central 
instances" of professions. Even if there is no particular 
historical time or cultural context in which any of these 
occupational groups that we commonly accord with professional 
status perfectly embody the contents of the popular image or 
common conception of a central instance of profession, 
nonetheless by working with the popular image of these groups 
or the common conception of profession which these groups 
embody in ordinary language use, we can develop a clear and 
manageable description of a profession that makes sense of the 
38 
39 
many and varied common uses of the term, "profession." 
Adopting this "central instance" approach to the concept of 
profession will allow for a description of profession flexible 
enough to encompass most ordinary usage and focused enough to 
hopefully engender agreement over what will be proposed as the 
essential features of profession as the concept is used in 
popular imagery and common language. 
Wittgensteinian Approach to Conceptual 
Description of Profession 
Now, one possible philosophical approach - an alternative 
to the one to be proposed here - to describing profession is 
actually to forgo any hope of identifying essential features 
of profession, and instead compile a list of traits or 
attributes which have "family resemblances". Wi ttgenstein1 
advances this approach, proposing that there need not be any 
essential features which must always be included in our 
understanding of a concept, for example the concept of a 
"game." Instead there can be overlapping sets of character is-
tics or family resemblances among characteristics such that no 
one game has all the characteristics and no one characteristic 
is found in all the games. Applying this approach to the 
concept of profession, prominent (but not essential} features 
of occupational groups widely recognized as professions could 
then be listed as A, B, c, .... ,with no one single occupation 
1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1953}, i., para. 65-67. 
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displaying all the characteristics. Instead, the features 
cluster differently for different occupations, such as AB, BC, 
AC, 2 Thus any given occupational group claiming or 
attributed with professional status may have many but not all 
of the characteristics or traits understood to constitute the 
meaning of profession. 
The advantage to adopting this approach is two-fold. 
First, it offers a means out of the dilemma of trying to 
determine essential features characterized as necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the understanding of profession. 
Second, it explains the view that professions may be consid-
ered to be always developing and changing and that a def ini-
tion of profession should not become solidified around the 
traditional characteristics associated with medicine, law, and 
clergy. There is always the potential that new areas of 
knowledge conjoined with new possibilities for public service 
in addressing fundamental human needs or social concerns may 
develop in the future allowing for particular occupational 
groups to gain professional status while possessing some 
features or characteristics the same as, and/or some features 
or characteristics quite different from the traditional 
professions. It is conceivable that there will always be new 
contenders, therefore, for the status of profession with new 
2This use of the Wittgensteinian approach to the descrip-
tion of profession is also described in John Kultgen, Ethics 
and Professionalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1988), 58-59. 
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or different features or characteristics. For example, while 
surgery is considered today to be a paradigm of a profession, 
it was not always thought to be so; it emerged from barber 
shop origins and over time merged with medicine and developed 
into a profession in popular understanding. Describing a 
profession according to a family resemblance list of charac-
teristics or traits, therefore, allows for an evolving notion 
of profession which avoids becoming static and out-of-touch 
with developing conceptual thought and language use regarding 
the meaning of profession. 3 
Despite the attractiveness of the Wittgensteinian 
approach in describing profession, it nonetheless seems to be 
inadequate in two areas. It will be in response to these two 
inadequacies that a better means for determining the concept 
of profession will be proposed. 
First, arguments against sociology's approach to profes-
sion notwithstanding, it must certainly be acknowledged that 
our popular use of the term "profession" has in fact been 
significantly influenced by the particular historical and 
cultural forces in America and in English-speaking countries 
that shaped and gave rise to the traditional professions of 
medicine, law and clergy. 4 Sociology can be criticized, as 
3See R.S. Downie, "Professions and Professionalism," 
Journal of Philosophy and Education 24 (Winter 1990): 147-159. 
4This is also proposed in Eliot Freidson, Professional 
Powers: A study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowl-
edge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 32-35. 
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was seen in Chapter II, for extrapolating its conclusions 
about professions in general from its studies of these 
traditional professions in a limited historical-cultural 
period. Yet it cannot be ignored that a satisfactory concep-
tual understanding of profession must somehow allow these 
occupational groups to retain their professional status. 
To put it another way, if a current group claiming 
professional status was quite dissimilar in function or make-
up from our image of these traditional professions of medi-
cine, law and clergy, it would be difficult conceptually to 
meaningfully identify that occupational group as a profession. 
As opposed to the Wi ttgensteinian approach to conceptual 
description, this would mean that an occupational group needs 
to have some cluster of characteristics that bear some 
resemblance to our popular image or common conception of the 
traditional professions. Thus some basic or essential 
features of profession seem to be present in our popular image 
or common conception of those occupational groups which have 
been described as the traditional professions. 
The possible response to this claim from the Wittgen-
steinian perspective, however, could be to utilize the charges 
leveled against sociology and to argue that even contemporary 
medicine, law and clergy no longer resemble their traditional 
images, and that some occupational groups commonly considered 
to be professions today do not resemble contemporary medicine, 
law and clergy. 
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While there is some truth to both these claims, it may 
also successfully be argued that while we may question whether 
particular occupational groups are in fact professions, no 
such questioning occurs in regards to medicine, law and 
clergy. Even the Deprofessionalization and Proletarianization 
positions, which argue that these groups in their contemporary 
make-up no longer resemble their traditional structures, 
acknowledge that these groups are still commonly considered to 
be professions. It would be difficult to provide justifica-
tion for medicine, law and clergy to be called professions, 
for if they are not professions then the concept of profession 
would seem no longer to carry meaning. Though the current 
make-up of those groups has changed due to historical and 
cultural circumstances and their members no longer completely 
resemble the older image of the benevolent solo-practitioners, 
medicine, law and clergy are still commonly referred to as 
professions. Though their structures and features have 
changed over time, in common language usage they remain 
"professions par excellence. 115 These traditional profes-
sions, or at least the popular image or common conception of 
these professions, may then be called "central instances"6 of 
the concept "profession", that is, central instances of what 
is meant by "profession". 
5This term is borrowed from Revd. Dr. Nigel M. de s. 
Cameron, "The Seamless Dress of Hippocratic Medicine," Ethics 
and Medics 7, no. 3 (Autumn 1991): 43-50. 
6Professions and Their Ethics, Chapter 2. 
"Central Instances" Approach to Conceptual 
Description of Profession 
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All social theorists within the four models of profession 
as described in Chapter I, agree that the traditional profes-
sions of medicine, law and clergy are indeed professions. 
This is assumed and no proof is offered. All social theorists 
who attempt to identify characteristics or traits of profes-
sions do so by studying these traditional professions. 7 All 
social theorists who define "semi-professions" do so by 
placing those groups along a continuum with the traditional 
professions at one end. 8 Literature in health care adminis-
tration which inquires into the degree of their professional 
status also adopts the approach of comparing themselves and 
the features of their group with the traditional professions. 9 
Many other occupational groups within the field of health care 
adopt this very same approach; they compare themselves and 
the features of their occupational group to some particular 
7This is argued in Jack Behrman, Essays on Ethics in 
Business and the Professions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1988), 96-111. 
8See, for example, William Goode, "The Theoretical Limits 
of Professionalization," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., The Semi-
Professions and Their Organization (New York: The Free Press, 
1969), 266-301; Wilbert Moore, Professions: Roles and Rules 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), 4-5. 
9See, for example, Mary MacDonald, "Does Health Adminis-
tration Represent a New Form of Professionalism?" Health 
Management Forum 3, vol. 4 (Winter 1982): 10-18; Marc Hiller, 
"Ethics and Health Care Administration: Issues in Education 
and Practice," The Journal of Health Administration Education 
2, no. 2 (1984): 147-192; Harold Wilensky, "The Dynamics of 
Professionalism: The Case of Hospital Administration," 
Hospital Administration 7, no. 2 (1962): 6-24. 
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sociological appraisal of the significant features of the 
traditional professions, and place themselves somewhere on the 
continuum line with those at one end and themselves as being 
"somewhat like a profession" or a "semi-profession" . 10 
Presumably, all these social theorists begin their 
reflections in this way because this is how common usage and 
the popular image of professions view the matter. Their 
theories build on these most familiar ways of speaking and 
thinking, even when the resulting theories change or challenge 
those familiar ways. In this dissertation, however, the 
popular image will be more than an unstated starting point. 
The central instances approach to describing the concept of 
profession takes this widely accepted pattern of usage and 
builds on it explicitly. 
Medicine, law and clergy will be taken here as "central 
instances" of the concept "profession." This means that for 
an occupational group to be considered a profession, it must 
bear some resemblance to the popular image or common concep-
tion of these traditional professions. 
10See, for example, David Kaczmarek, "Material Management: 
Is It a Profession or Not?" Journal of Healthcare Material 
Management 8 (November-December 1990): 80-82; Ann Drummond, 
"The Professional Ethic,'' Radiology 52 (October 1986): 213-
215; Pamela Saha and Subrata Saha, "Ethical Responsibilities 
of the Clinical Engineer," Journal of Clinical Engineering 11 
(January-February 1986): 17-25; Betty Payne, "Professionalism 
and the Medical Record Practitioner," Journal of the American 
Medical Record Association 54, no. 3 (March 1983): 14-22; Ray 
Taurasi, "The Character and Spirit of a Professional," Journal 
of Healthcare Material Management 6 (October 1988): 62-63; 
Ellen Barton, "Risk Managers Still Building Professionalism," 
Hospital 64 (20 September 1990): 18, 46. 
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To satisfactorily utilize the "central instance" approach 
to describing profession, however, two issues must be ad-
dressed. To what degree must occupational groups resemble the 
popular image or common conception of the traditional profes-
sions, and what aspects of that image are critical for 
emulation? Addressing these issues leads to the second 
inadequacy in the Wittgensteinian approach to defining 
profession. It is conceivable that some occupational group 
may have the set of characteristics associated with profession 
of "A,C,D,E,F," yet by failing to have characteristic "B", be 
subject to serious questions about the justifiability of their 
professional status. These questions arise because character-
istic "B" is always found in the image of the traditional 
professions, which would thus imply that there are some 
essential features or necessary characteristics that must be 
present for an occupational group to commonly be considered as 
a profession. 
The failure of many social theorists and the source of 
their lack of agreement over identifying essential features or 
characteristics of a profession has been to concentrate on the 
structures or features of occupational groups claiming 
professional status. They focus on such features as possess-
ing particular standards for entry or maintenance in the 
field, exclusion of competitors, certification from their own 
schools, a professional association, standards for self-
regulation, a journal, a code of ethics, and so forth. 
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occupational groups attempting to emulate the traditional 
professions then seek to take on these visible characteris-
tics. The problem with focusing on these kinds of features is 
that many occupational groups may take on the external 
"trappings" of profession and yet still not be commonly 
considered to be a profession by society. 
Returning to the four different sociological models of 
profession, i.e. , Functionalist, Dominance, Deprofessionaliza-
tion and Proletarianization models, it can be acknowledged 
that each model does seem to focus on particular features of 
profession without which a working definition of profession 
would be incomplete. Though the Functionalist model may be 
idealistic, the popular image and common conceptual language 
usage of the term "profession" would seem to include some 
exclusive expertise applicable to some particular fundamental 
human need or social concern, and some appearance of selfless-
ness or reputation of promising or providing altruistic 
service to clients and patients' needs in order that an 
occupational group may be considered a profession. The 
Dominance model seems to reflect accurately the idea that 
professional groups and individuals have not always fulfilled 
the expectation or promise of selflessness and altruistic 
service, but rather often have been perceived as abusing their 
professional status or role for personal gain in income, 
status and power. Nonetheless it seems true that a working 
definition of profession would include some sense of relative 
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autonomy in practice as emphasized in the Dominance model of 
profession. The Deprofessionalization and Proletarianization 
models plausibly portray the contemporary lessening of 
autonomy in the practice of the traditional professions, due 
to increased knowledge and decision-making input from clients 
or patients and to increased employment status in place of the 
traditional solo practice. But there nonetheless remain in 
those two models some societal and institutional recognition 
of these occupational groups as professions, and a continued 
acceptance of some sense of autonomy in those aspects of 
professional practice where professional expertise is most 
necessary. 
Utilization of the "central instances" approach to 
describing the institution of profession would therefore best 
seem to capture the meaning of the term as it is found in 
popular imagery and common language usage. It also addresses 
the inadequacies in the approach of the social theorists to 
describing the institution of profession, i.e., their lack of 
clarity over the purpose of the institution of profession, and 
lack of agreement over the essential features of profession. 
A "central instances" approach to profession would propose 
that there are particular occupational groups which embody the 
meaning of profession, and who possess essential features 
without which those groups would not be considered profes-
sions. Central instances of profession, at least in popular 
imagery and language usage even if not perfectly actualized in 
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any one specific cultural/historical context, are medicine, 
law and clergy. 
What is proposed here, then, is rather than looking at 
features or characteristics of the so-called traditional 
professions, a better approach is to study how society 
structures exclusive expertise that is addressed to serving 
fundamental human needs or social concerns such as health, 
justice, or religious salvation. 11 When medicine, law and 
clergy are treated as central instances of professions, the 
essential features that constitute them as professions are not 
those features studied by social theorists, but rather are the 
features necessary for an occupational group to address 
fundamental human needs or social concerns in a way that most 
benefits society. It is from this perspective of understand-
ing the institution of profession that health care administra-
tion may stake its claim to professional status. 
Defining the Essential Features of Profession 
What then, are the necessary or essential features of 
profession? It is proposed here that there are four such 
essential features: exclusive expertise which addresses some 
particular fundamental human need or social concern, (rela-
tive) autonomy in practice, societal or institutional recogni-
tion, and obligations to clients and patients. 
11This way of expressing central instances of profession is 
adapted from Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions (Chica-
go: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 8-9, 315-326. 
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Exclusive Expertise 
The first essential feature of profession is exclusive 
expertise. It is expertise because it consists of knowledge 
and skill that is not commonly possessed by most members in 
society. The special skills of the professional are normally 
understood to include the theoretical or abstract knowledge 
justifying the skill as well as the skill itself. This 
distinguishes the professional from the scholar and from the 
technician. A scholar may possess theoretical knowledge, but 
need not know how to apply that knowledge to a craft. She may 
know why something works, but never be called upon to put that 
knowledge into practice. 12 A good automobile mechanic, on the 
other hand, may know how to fix cars, but would not normally 
be considered a professional unless he also knew a great deal 
about physics, chemistry, mechanics, etc., and could not only 
apply all this theoretical knowledge to his work but explain 
his work in full relation to relevant physical, chemical and 
mechanical principles. Then he would know not only that 
certain things work, but why they work. 13 Their possession of 
the theoretical knowledge along with the skill is what prompts 
us to say professionals "practice" their profession. It is 
12This description is drawn from D.G. Brown, "On Professing 
to be a Profession," Dialogue 25 (1986}: 753-756. 
13This point is developed further in Robert Sokolowski, 
"The Fiduciary Relationship and the Nature of Professions," 
Edmund Pellegrino, Robert Veatch and John Langan, eds., 
Ethics, Trust, and the Professions (Washington D.C.: George-
town University Press, 1991}, 26-28. 
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also what enables professions to recognize new problems before 
they encounter them in practice, to do a lot of the work of 
defining their own tasks, and to be innovative and creative 
when problems do arise in practice. 14 
This expertise is exclusive in that it cannot readily be 
learned except from the profession's own members. For 
example, one must learn how to be a physician from another 
physician; medicine cannot be taught by a layperson. 
Educational programs in healthcare administration identify 
thirty-four distinct areas of specialized knowledge and skill 
ranging from management, finances, medical and nursing 
practice, governmental regulations and community relations, 
all of which are required in the capable administration of 
healthcare institutions. While lay people may possess similar 
knowledge or similar skills in some of these areas, it is the 
combination of both knowledge and skills in all these particu-
lar areas and the ability to blend them in practice that 
distinguishes the unique expertise of healthcare administra-
tion.~ 
For every profession, this exclusive expertise is valued 
by society because it is used to address some fundamental 
14This point is developed further in Abbott, The System of 
Professions, 8-9. Paul Camenisch, Grounding Professional 
Ethics in a Pluralistic Society (New York: Haven Publications, 
1983), 25-27. 
15See Janet Thompson Reagan, "Practitioner Perceptions of 
the Knowledge and Skills Required for Successful Practice in 
Health Administration," The Journal of Health Administration 
Education 8, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 245-253. 
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human need or social concern like health, justice or religious 
salvation. Addressing these needs or concerns is thought by 
most persons in society to be extremely important, perhaps 
even essential, to their fundamental well-being, that is, 
necessary for the fully human and humane life of society and 
all its members. This exclusive expertise is valued by 
society to be the necessary means for society to address some 
particular fundamental human need or other social concern. 
Professions have not emerged to address all human needs, such 
as providing food for survival, but rather to meet those more 
complex needs and occasional crises which laypeople could not 
master for themselves, such as cure from illness, protection 
from injustice, or, in some faith traditions, forgiveness of 
sins. 16 
In our own society, healthcare administration until the 
last few decades was commonly viewed as only a management 
position charged with "housekeeping" duties, necessary only 
contingently so that physicians could conduct their vital 
work. In recent times, however, with the growth in the size 
of hospitals and with hospitals themselves now being viewed as 
essential to the delivery of healthcare, and with the corre-
spending responsibility for allocating large sums of increas-
ingly scarce financial resources for healthcare, the role of 
the healthcare administrator has not only been enlarged, but 
16This point is developed in Grounding Professional Ethics 
in a Pluralistic Society, 27-29. 
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is more highly valued. Healthcare administrators are now 
commonly viewed as essential actors in the provision of funda-
mentally needed healthcare to communities in our society. 17 
The acknowledgement by society that particular profes-
sions are needed does not mean that disagreement cannot exist 
over the best means for professional groups to address the 
fundamental need or societal concern that elicited their 
existence. This disagreement may exist within society, 
between society and a professional group, and within the 
professional group itself. For example, disagreement exists 
regarding whether the purpose of the legal profession is - or 
should be - to assure that justice is best served within 
society (substantive justice) or to assure that the interests 
of individuals in society be best served (procedural justice). 
Professions may also change in character and behavior as 
differing opinions regarding the best means for them to 
address some particular fundamental human need or social 
concern hold popular sway in different historical times. 
Many occupational groups also will never be able to claim 
full professional status because the service they provide is 
not considered by society to be vital enough or unattainable 
17See Marc Hiller, "Ethics and Health Care Administration: 
Issues in Education and Practice," The Journal of Heal th 
Administration Education 2, no. 2 (1984): 171. It must also 
be acknowledged, however, that in the coming years an increas-
ing amount of healthcare delivery will occur outside of the 
healthcare institutions. This will undoubtedly change the 
role of healthcare administration, with one potential outcome 
being a diminishment their professional status in our society. 
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elsewhere. Historically some occupations gain and then lose 
professional status based upon the value society places upon 
their expertise, e.g., medians and fortune-tellers might be 
said to have professional status in certain cultural or 
historical settings, but not in contemporary American culture. 
Clergy may be losing some of their professional status today 
as religious salvation is less a concern for many people or is 
felt to be achievable without the particular expertise 
possessed only by clergy. 
Relative Autonomy in Practice 
The second essential feature of profession is (relative) 
autonomy in practice. Social theorists within the Dominance 
framework argue that autonomy is the most critical feature in 
constituting an occupational group as a profession, citing 
control over the determination and evaluation of the technical 
knowledge used in their work as well as control over the 
social and economic terms of the work. 18 Indeed, autonomy in 
practice, with expected accompanying financial and social 
rewards, does seem to be the desire of many occupational 
groups who seek professional status. Furthermore, it is 
undoubtedly abuse of this autonomy by professions in the form 
of lax self-regulation in areas of competence and moral 
behavior, and in the involvement in public affairs proposing 
policies that are not beneficial to society but to the 
18See Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1970), 185-186. 
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professions themselves, which is the primary reason why 
professions in recent times have fallen into public disfavor 
with accompanying attempts at societal regulation. Yet this 
is only proper; professional autonomy is always granted by 
society and is always relative to the benefits which that 
autonomy will bring to society. 19 
Despite the potential for and actuality of abuses, it 
nonetheless remains true that professions are granted a larger 
degree of autonomy by society in the forms of control over 
work and insulation from lay judgment than are most other 
occupational groups. This can even result in a societally 
enforced monopoly in the area of their exclusive expertise. 
Physicians perhaps represent the paradigm of this professional 
autonomy and societally-enforced monopoly, though even this is 
changing as society seeks greater regulation in order to 
contain healthcare costs and to achieve greater benefit from 
the medical profession. Healthcare administrators exercise 
remarkable autonomy in their leadership role in the function 
of their healthcare institutions, yet even this autonomy is 
being increasingly tempered and conditioned by ongoing 
feedback from their boards, medical staff, and sponsoring 
organization. 
Professional autonomy traditionally is premised on the 
profession's exclusive expertise which claims that only fellow 
professionals understand and so are qualified to assess their 
19This point will be argued extensively in Chapter IV. 
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peers and to judge what is the appropriate application of 
their particular expertise. This autonomy resides with the 
profession and only indirectly with the individual profession-
al. Even though the individual professional claims to be and 
is certified as being competent to make decisions exclusive to 
her field of expertise, such decisions are always subject to 
the standards established by the profession as a whole. 20 It 
is disagreement over how this autonomy should be interpreted 
and over the role society ought to play in the determination 
of those standards which will constitute a primary difference 
in how the nature of the moral obligations of professionals 
will be understood within the Commercial, Guild, Agent, and 
Interactive models. 
Societal or Institutional Recognition 
A third essential feature of profession is societal or 
institutional recognition. Many occupational groups in our 
contemporary society claim professional status. This is often 
if not always the case because the claim to being a profession 
carries with it the desired benefits of some measure of 
relative autonomy in individual and group practice as well as 
increased rewards in reimbursement and societal status. An 
occupational group may not just claim professional status, 
however, in order to enjoy its accompanying benefits; it is 
society which grants that status to particular groups (with 
wThis point is developed further in Camenisch, Grounding 
Professional Ethics in a Pluralistic Society, 29-32. 
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its accompanying benefits) when the members of that society 
believe that doing so is in their own best interests, i.e., 
when they judge that particular occupational groups are the 
best means for addressing particular fundamental human needs 
or social concerns. 
Society grants professional status in one of two ways. 
The most common way is recognizing particular professions to 
be social ins ti tut ions. For example, an individual may 
perform a medical procedure but that would not make him a 
doctor. Even if he removed an appendix properly, he could be 
said to have properly performed a medical procedure but it 
could not be said he was "practicing medicine". That would 
require a societal recognition that he is a physician, and in 
our society it has been established that this requires stan-
dardized training and recognition of achievement by the 
profession itself, whose ability to recognize it must itself 
be supported and confirmed in many ways by the members of that 
society. One may "hang out his shingle" and call himself a 
doctor, but he would not be recognized by society as a doctor 
since he is not part of the social institution of medicine. 21 
There is a second way that society grants professional 
status as well. Not all professional groups require a visible 
formal structure, i.e. , possession of many of the common 
features identified in varying sociological studies as 
21This analogy is borrowed from Samuel Gorovitz, "Profes-
sions, Professors, and Competing Obligations," in Ethics, 
Trust, and the Professions, 177-178. 
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properly belonging to the professions. For example, most 
social theorists identify a structured group organization as 
an integral element in being considered a profession, yet the 
formal organization of the engineering profession is much more 
loosely structured than medicine or law, while the academic 
profession is marked by voluntary organizations that are very 
loosely structured. Even within a traditional profession like 
clergy, different structures exist along a continuum line from 
extremely organized (e.g., Catholicism) to moderately orga-
nized (e.g., Methodism) to very loosely organized ("store-
front" churches).n 
What counts is not the formal institution of profession, 
but that society recognizes that particular occupational 
groups possess exclusive expertise needed to address fundamen-
tal human needs or social concerns and grants them (relative) 
autonomy in practice. It is important again to emphasize that 
identification of a profession should not be confined to the 
historical and culturally limited perspectives of the social 
theorists considered in Chapter I. Society grants prof es-
sional status to different occupational groups structured in 
different ways at different times. While healthcare adminis-
tration presently lacks many of the visible features associat-
ed with the professions by the social theorists, this does not 
mean that society has not come to view this occupational group 
nsee Michael Bayles, "Professional Power and Self-Regula-
tion," Business & Professional Ethics Journal 5, no. 2 (1986): 
27-28. 
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as being a distinct profession.n 
Professional Obligations 
A fourth essential feature of profession, and what is of 
most concern to this dissertation, is the moral dimension of 
profession. It will be proposed that this moral dimension 
includes seven different categories of moral obligation that, 
taken together as a group, are unique to professional groups 
and their members. Analyzing the moral norms of professions 
may be conducted in a different fashion, but this particular 
set of seven categories seems to best facilitate this investi-
gation and lead us to the important elements of professional 
ethics. 24 
Before addressing these categories of professional 
obligation, it is important to note that it is normally 
assumed professionals possess good moral character, that is, 
that they are individuals of integrity and of general moral 
uprightness. While this assumption may seem somewhat quaint 
and even archaic today, it should be pointed out that possess-
ing a good moral character still remains a formal requirement 
in the licensure of physicians and lawyers in many states 
23This point is argued in Stuart Wesbury, "Heal th Care 
Management: The Profession," in Health Care Management; Where 
is It Going?: Report of the 1986 National Forum on Hospital 
and Health Affairs, Held at Durham, North Carolina, April 24-
26, 1986, 79-81. 
24These seven categories of the moral obligation of 
professions and their members will be drawn from David Ozar 
and David Sokol, Dental Ethics at Chairside (St. Louis: Mosby, 
1994), 31-35. 
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today. 25 Literature on ethics in health care administration 
is likewise filled with such exhortations as, "We must make 
integrity a way of life and act with unimpeachable charac-
ter, 1126 and, "We are guardians of ethics and social justice in 
the health care marketplace."n This presupposition of good 
moral character has recently received increased attention in 
the ethics programs developing in many of the schools training 
candidates for the professions. However, providing skills in 
ethical reasoning and theory cannot of itself motivate 
professionals to act in a morally upright fashion. 28 
~see Camenisch, Grounding Professional Ethics in a 
Pluralistic Society, 33. 
260. Kirk Oglesby, "Ethics and Hospital Administration," 
Hospital and Health Services Administration 30 (September-
October 1985): 43. 
nstuart Wesbury, "Ethics and the Health Care Executive: 
current Perspectives," Michigan Hospitals 22 (December 1986): 
17. 
28The relationship between moral character and professional 
obligation will not be addressed here, but has received 
attention in the literature on professional ethics. For a 
sampling of perspectives on this issue, see Albert Flores, 
ed., Professional Ideals (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 1988), 1-11; 
Edmund Pellegrino, "Character, Virtue and Self-Interest in the 
Ethics of the Professions," Journal of Contemporary Health Law 
and Policy 5 ( 1989) : 53-73; "The Medical Profession as a 
Moral Community," Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 
66, no. 3 (1990): 221-232; Albert Jonson and Andre Hellegers, 
"Conceptual Foundations for an Ethics for Medical Care," in 
Lawrence Tancredi, ed., Ethics of Health Care (Washington 
D.C.: National Academy of the Sciences, 1974), 3-20; Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress, "Virtues and Character," in 
Flores, Professional Ideals, 27-39; Gary Gaumer, "Regulating 
Health Professionals: A Review of the Empirical Literature," 
Milbank Quarterly 62, no. 3 (1984): 380-413; William Freder-
ick, "Embedded Values: Prelude to Ethical Analysis," in 
Patricia Werhane and Kendall D'Andrade, eds., Profits and 
Responsibility: Issues in Business and Professional Ethics 
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Identification of the Chief Client 
The first category of the moral obligation of professions 
and their members involves identification of the profession's 
chief client. This includes identification of the chief 
client when there are a set of persons or groups whose well-
being the profession and its members are committed to serving. 
The chief client of a physician is obviously her pa-
tient. 29 The matter is not so simple, however, for health-
care administrators. Among the various clients whose well-
being healthcare administrators are expected to be committed 
to serving are indi victual patients within the individual 
healthcare institution, the collective group of patients and 
their families within the individual healthcare institution, 
the community which the healthcare institution serves, the 
employees, the medical staff, and the institution's sponsoring 
(New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989; M.Vincenta Joseph, "The 
Ethics of Organizations: Shifting Values and Ethical Dilem-
mas," Administration in Social Work 7, nos. 3-4 (1983): 47-57; 
s. Douglas Beets, "Personal Morals and Professional Ethics," 
Business & Professional Ethics Journal 10, no. 2 (1991): 63-
84; Paula Eubanks, "Hospitals Probe Job Candidates' Values 
for Organizational 'Fit, 111 Hospitals 65 no. 20 (20 October 
1991): 36-37. 
29It must also be stated that a physician has multiple 
chief clients in this same category inasmuch as she has many 
patients to whose well-being she is committed. At any given 
moment, however, it is normally only one patient at a time who 
serves as that chief client. When there are multiple patients 
the physician must decide who becomes the chief client among 
the different patients given the severity of particular 
patient needs and her ability to address those needs. 
Nonetheless, her chief client almost always remains the 
individual patient. 
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organization or investor-owned corporation. 30 The sociologi-
cal theories which have almost exclusively studied the "tradi-
tional" professions of medicine, law and clergy, groups that 
have been viewed as having more clearly defined individual 
clients or patients, offer little help in identifying the 
chief client of professions such as healthcare administrators 
whose clients are largely made up of groups rather than 
individuals. As will be developed in Part Two, the identity 
of the chief client for health care administrators will vary 
depending upon which model of profession, i.e., the Commer-
cial, Guild, Agent or Interactive models, is adopted. 
Ideal Relationship with Chief Client 
The second category of the moral obligation of profes-
sions and their members is the defining of this relationship 
between the professional and the client or patient. The 
purpose of the relationship is to address the client's or 
patient's need in ways that the client or patient is incapable 
of doing himself. Satisfactorily addressing this fundamental 
human need will require both the professional and the client 
or patient to make a number of judgments and choices about the 
professional's interventions. For healthcare administrators, 
these judgments and choices have been treated in the different 
revisions over the years of the American College of Health 
30See James summers, "Doing Good and Doing Well: Ethics, 
Professionalism, and Success," Hospital and Health Services 
Administration 29 (March-April 1984): 84-100. 
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care Executives' Code of Ethics. These revisions reflect the 
emerging values and changing views of healthcare administra-
tors and society regarding the relationship of healthcare 
administrators with the patients and different client-groups 
to whose welfare they are committed to serving. 31 Once again, 
the nature of the professional obligations to clients or 
patients will vary greatly depending if the institution of 
profession is examined within the Commercial, Guild, Agent, or 
Interactive models. 
commitment to the Good of the Chief Client 
The moral dimension of profession is to a great extent 
understood to mean that professional groups and their members 
are committed to some good larger than their own self-inter-
est. Normally this is taken to mean that professionals are 
expected to possess a commitment to the welfare of their 
individual clients or patients and to society itself, and that 
their use of professional knowledge and skills will be 
significantly oriented towards the benefit of these other 
parties and not (only) toward the professional's own benefit. 
For example, it is understood that physicians have an obliga-
tion to act for the health good of individual patients, and 
that healthcare administrators have an obligation to act for 
31 Some of these revisions are explored in Richard Klein, 
"Service, Integrity, Leadership: A New Code of Ethics for 
Healthcare Executives," Healthcare Executive 2, no. 5 (Septem-
ber-October 1987): 51-53. 
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the health good of patients collectively.n 
This professional commitment to act in more than a self-
interested manner in promoting the good of clients or patient 
may be termed an "atypical moral commitment". 33 Professions 
and their members are involved in addressing a particular 
fundamental human need or social concern. Professionals work 
with clients or patients who are in a state of vulnerability 
or dependency, requiring for example a restoration to health 
to relieve physical suffering, or justice to restore lost 
freedom, goods or rights, or reconciliation with God to 
restore a meaningful existence. Clients or patients ordi-
narily lack the knowledge and skills to help themselves during 
a crisis or to address some highly valued human need. 
Furthermore, the relationship that clients or patients 
enter into with a professional is dependent upon trust in the 
professional's claim to exclusive expertise and to the 
professional' s pledge to use that expertise in the best 
interest of the client or patient. Those in significant need 
must trust that their vulnerability will not be exploited. In 
order to be helped, clients and patients often must "open up" 
confidential aspects of their lives, whether it be baring 
their bodies to physicians, their weaknesses to lawyers, or 
32See Barry Greene, "Alexander's Dilemma: Conflict Between 
Professionalism and Entrepreneurial ism in Heal th Services 
Administration," The Journal of Health Administration Educa-
tion 4, no. 4 {Fall 1986): 581-589. 
33This term is borrowed from Camenisch, Grounding Profes-
sional Ethics in a Pluralistic Society, p. 33. 
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their sins to clergy. They entrust themselves and basic 
components of their well-being to professionals. Those who 
approach professionals simply in need of their expertise, 
e.g., an architect to construct a new house, must still trust 
that their dependency upon the professional's expertise Will 
obtain for them the desired benefit without imposing any 
significant harm. In sum, therefore, the foundation for the 
professional' s "atypical moral commitment" is the societal 
expectation of the profession and its members to be committed 
to the welfare of their clients and patients and to society. 34 
Members of society take offense when they sense that 
professionals have utilized their exclusive expertise to 
promote their own interests to the detriment of their clients 
or patients. As a result, they hold professionals obligated 
to uphold their atypical moral commitment to promote the good 
of their clients or patients. Yet this obligation should not 
be viewed as imposed upon professions by society, but rather 
is part of the very identity of what makes an occupational 
group a profession. To become a professional knowing what 
society's expectations of such persons are is to place oneself 
under certain criteria which can be invoked to assess one's 
moral performance. The societal expectation of this atypical 
moral obligation is part of the societally defined role of 
34This is argued in Edmund Pellegrino, "What is a Profes-
sion?" Journal of Allied Health 12, no. 3 (August 1983): 168-
176. 
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profession. 35 
The careful articulation of the extent of this commit-
ment, for example, how much sacrifice it entails of the 
professional's own self interest and in regard to other social 
commitments external of the profession, and under what 
circumstances, is one of the most important ethical issues 
that a professional must wrestle with in daily practice. 
There are a number of ways to try to qualify this 
obligation of professions and their members to the welfare of 
clients or patients and to society. A "maximalist" interpre-
tation of this professional obligation would claim that 
professionals have an obligation to place the well-being of 
their clients or patients ahead of every other consideration, 
including their own interests and their obligations to others. 
While some professions may articulate this view and some of 
their members may be considered model professionals to the 
degree they emulate this interpretation, such behavior in our 
society would seem to be commonly considered heroic and 
supererogatory and not the required norm. In contrast, a 
"minimalist" interpretation would argue that professionals 
have only an obligation to consider the well-being of their 
clients and patients to be among their most important con-
cerns, but not given any specific priority over other 
concerns. Again, given the societal expectation of profes-
35This is argued in Camenisch, Grounding Professional 
Ethics in a Pluralistic Society, 34. 
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sional commitment to vulnerable and dependent clients or 
patients that contributes to our understanding of what it 
means to be a professional, something stronger than this 
interpretation seems warranted. 
A "parity" interpretation would propose that the profes-
sional is obligated to consider the client or patient's well-
being to be at least equal in importance to the professional's 
own well-being. While this approach has appeal, it allows for 
the possibility that the professional may use his position to 
advance his own well-being, e.g., conducting non-harmful but 
non-beneficial expensive procedures on the client or patient. 
The approach that best articulates what is commonly meant 
by professional obligation to the welfare of others is the 
"greater than self" interpretation. This view holds that the 
professional's commitment to the client or patient's well-
being is of greater ethical significance than commitment to 
their own well-being, providing that this obligation is 
limited to the fundamental purpose for the existence of the 
profession as applied to the client or patient's well-being 
and providing that there is no excessive risk or burden to the 
professional. The profession of medicine exists for the sake 
of benefiting the health of patients; a physician is consid-
ered obligated, therefore, to place greater ethical signifi-
cance on the health needs of her patient than on her own well-
being when treating a patient, for example, with an infectious 
disease, providing she is not exposed to excessive risk or 
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burden. There are limits to this greater than self" obliga-
tion, but the criteria which constitutes risk or burden to be 
"excessive" is always relative to changing historical and 
cultural norms. 36 
Central Values of the Profession 
If the nature of the atypical moral commitment and 
obligation of professionals is to be identified, then it is 
essential that the central values of particular professions 
are identified and prioritized. This constitutes the fourth 
category of moral obligation of professions and their members. 
Professionals are not considered obligated to bring about 
all aspects of their clients' or patients' well-being, but 
only those aspects of their well-being that are among the 
central values of their profession. As there is often more 
than one central value to a profession, those central values 
must be prioritized so that when a conflict emerges prohibit-
ing the honoring of all the central values there will still be 
a means to determine which values predominate. In given 
situations if there are no conflicts between the central 
values, then professionals would be obligated to all those 
aspects of a client or patient's well-being that are associat-
ed with the central values of their profession providing this 
does not constitute excessive risk or burden to the 
professional. 
36This discussion of limits has been based on Ozar and 
Sokol, Dental Ethics at Chairside, 80-84. 
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Identifying the central values of the healthcare adminis-
tration profession can be attempted only somewhat tenuously, 
since this is not an endeavor that is normally explored within 
this profession. The issue of central values is perhaps best 
approached by asking healthcare administrators what they value 
in their work, or, what they are trying to accomplish in the 
work they consider essential to their professional role. 
Members of society, who hold up healthcare administration as 
a profession, should also be asked what they value in the work 
of healthcare administrators. The following central values of 
the profession of healthcare administration, therefore, emerge 
as a combination of both values and valued tasks. These tasks 
are considered important (or "valuable") because of the values 
those tasks hope to bring about. The desired values which 
these tasks are meant to achieve will vary, however, in the 
Commercial, Guild, Agent and Interactive models of profession. 
For example, maintaining good relations with a medical staff 
is highly valued by healthcare administrators in all four 
models of profession, but (as will be shown in Part II) in the 
Commercial model of profession this is valued for the finan-
cial benefit returned to the institution, while in the 
Interactive model this is valued for the health benefits 
resulting to patients and the local community. 
It will be proposed here that there are five central 
values or valued tasks for the profession of health care 
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administration. 37 Among these are promoting the heal th of 
individual patients, promoting the health of the local 
community, assuring the financial viability of the healthcare 
organization, working to develop and maintain capable and 
effective management of employees and good relations with the 
medical staff, and maintaining institutional integrity, i.e., 
administrating according to the mission and values of the 
healthcare institution.D As will be developed in Part II, 
the prioritization of these central values for healthcare 
administrators will vary depending upon how the various 
clients of healthcare administrators are prioritized, i.e., 
37These central values, or a combination of values and 
valued tasks, are collected from surveying the literature of 
healthcare administration and informally interviewing a number 
of healthcare administrators. This list of five central 
values or valued tasks is not intended to be exhaustive or 
exclusive, but is an initial attempt to summarize and struc-
ture the values guiding the behavior of healthcare administra-
tors. 
38The literature from which these central values have been 
compiled and summarized include: Kurt Darr, "The New ACHE 
Code of Ethics," Hospital Topics 66, no. 1 (January-February 
1988} : 14-15; Leonard Fleck, "Evaluating Executive Ethics: Is 
the ACHE Code Enough?" Michigan Hospitals 24, no. 12 (December 
1988} : 13-18; Dennis Robbins, "Toward Integrated Clini-
cal/Administrative Ethics Policies in Healthcare," Michigan 
Hospitals 24, no. 12 (December 1988}: 19-22; Richard Klein, 
"Service, Integrity, Leadership: A New Code of Ethics for 
Healthcare Executives, " Healthcare Executive 2, no. 5 ( Septem-
ber-October 1987}: 51-53; Emily Freidman, "Searching for the 
Right," Health Management Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1987}: 3-6; 
David Kinzer, "Where is Hospital Leadership Coming From?" 
Frontiers of Health Services Management 3 (November 1986}: 3-
26; Kurt Darr, Beaufort Longest and Jonathan Rakich, "The 
Ethical Imperative in Health Services Governance and Manage-
ment," Hospital and Health Services Administration 31, no. 2 
(March-April 1986): 53-66; Dena Seiden, "Ethics for Hospital 
Administrators," Hospital and Health Services Administration 
28, no. 2 (1983}: 81-89. 
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determining the hierarchical order of the "chief clients," and 
depending upon how the nature of the professional-client 
relationship is viewed, i.e., whether the Commercial, Guild, 
Agent or Interactive model of profession is adopted. 
Commitment to Professional Competence 
The fifth moral category of professions and their members 
is the obligation to professional competence. Development and 
maintenance of exclusive expertise is fundamental to the very 
identity of a profession and professional. This category, 
therefore, is the commitment of the professional to be trained 
and remain updated in the publicly recognized standards of 
competence for her professional field. Minor failings in this 
obligation leave the professional open to criticism from her 
peers and possibly from her clients or patients. Significant 
failings in this obligation exposes the professional to 
possible discharge from the professional group with resultant 
loss of her professional status. 
Healthcare administration as an occupational group has 
grown into recognized professional status with corresponding 
responsibilities and obligations largely due to the advance-
ment in the size, complexity and technological advancement of 
healthcare institutions; more so than in the past, society 
now needs professional competence to successfully administer 
ins ti tut ions which have been created to serve fundamental 
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heal th needs. 39 
The obligation to competence is perhaps the easiest to 
describe in the abstract. A professional is obligated to 
remain competent in his field, to apply his competence to the 
client or patient's fundamental need, and to undertake only 
those tasks that are within his competence. But defining 
competence in actual professions is very complex. Determining 
what is sufficient or minimally adequate competence for an 
indi victual to be considered a member of a profession is 
normally - and almost by necessity - left to the profession 
itself since those outside the area of expertise are largely 
incapable of judging the satisfactory acquisition of that 
expertise. But determining what is sufficient or minimally 
adequate competence for an occupational group to be considered 
a profession is dependent both on the general availability of 
the competence or expertise to laypeople, i.e., society must 
recognize a particular occupational group as experts who 
determine the content of their expertise, and on the trade-off 
in benefits which society receives in designating professional 
status upon the group. This means that the profession must 
always be justifying to society what it considers to be 
NContrast the differing view of the professional status 
and responsibilities of health care administrators in two 
articles written twenty-two years apart: Harold Wilensky, "The 
Dynamics of Professionalism: The Case of Hospital Administra-
tion," American College of Hospital Administrators 7, no. 2 
(1962): 6-24; and, Marc Hiller, "Ethics in Health Care 
Administration: Issues in Education and Practice," The Journal 
of Health Administration Education 2, no. 2 (1984): 147-192. 
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sufficient or adequate competence for the admission of its 
individual members into its profession in order for society to 
continually grant professional status to those individuals. 
Relationship with Fellow-Professionals 
The sixth category of the moral obligation of professions 
and their members concerns the relationship between the 
members of the profession. This relationship is normally 
viewed as a blend of cooperation, 
relative amount of) accountability. 
competition, and (some 
Cooperation is entailed 
in that as an occupational group the granting of professional 
status both implies and requires that the group establish 
standards for education, entry into, and continuance with the 
group. Cooperation is also exercised in the group's commit-
ment to continuing development in its field for the sake of 
better addressing the good of its clients or patients in its 
own field of expertise. Yet the relationship between members 
of a profession is also marked by competition; physicians in 
the same specialty compete for patients and for referrals, 
lawyers compete for clients, and clergy do not normally refuse 
members from other churches joining their own parishes. 
Some sense of accountability is also implied in the 
relationship between members of a profession, yet this 
accountability is rarely actualized or is enforced only 
through subtle and implicit measures. Few physicians, for 
example, are ever held publicly accountable by their peers for 
not keeping up-to-date with the research literature or with 
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new developments in their field, yet it is not uncommon for 
the peers of a less competent physician to simply limit their 
referrals to that physician. Many professions write a code of 
ethics with the hope or claim that publicized standards of 
practice and conduct better assure accountability, but the 
standards which these codes contain are usually very broad and 
vaguely stated, and little mechanism is in place or is used 
for enforcement.~ 
As with other professions, the relationship between 
healthcare administrators seems to have changed over time 
depending upon the cultural environment shaping the provision 
of health care services. During the past few decades competi-
tion between healthcare institutions for healthcare dollars 
has shaped an acute sense of competition which is a signifi-
cant mark of the relationships between healthcare administra-
tors. Current times, however, have dictated that institution-
al survival is dependent upon a greater sense of collaboration 
40See Mark Frankel, "Professional Codes: Why, How, and with 
What Impact?" Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 109-115; 
Richard DeGeorge, Business Ethics (New York: MacMillan 
Publishing Company, 1982), 224-232; Kim Robert Clark, "The 
Implications of Developing a Profession-Wide Code of Ethics," 
Health Education Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1983): 120-125; Nathan 
Sidley, ed., Law and Ethics: A Guide for the Health Profes-
sional (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1985), 329-333; Kurt 
Varga, "Ethical Competence in Professional Ethics," Philosoph-
ical Studies in Education (1981): 74-79; Michael Davis, "The 
Moral Authority of a Professional Code," in J. Roland Pennock 
and John Chapman, eds., Authority Revisited: Nomos 29 (New 
York: New York University Press, 1987), 302-337; Jeffrey 
Hollway, "The Implementation and Maintenance of the HeSCA Code 
of Ethics," Journal of Biocommunication 17, no. 2 (1990): 22-
27. 
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between institutions, and this in turn has likewise effected 
a more collaborative attitude between healthcare administra-
tors. 
Relationship with Society at Large 
The seventh and last category of the moral obligation of 
professions and their members is their relationship as a group 
and as individual members with society at large, i.e., with 
persons who are neither co-professionals nor clients or 
patients, but who recognize the occupational group as a 
profession and who rely upon that profession to address a 
specific fundamental human need or social concern. This is 
one of the least studied aspects of professional obligation, 
largely because the traditional focus of professional obliga-
tion has been on the individual professional-client/patient 
relationship and because obligations to the larger society 
have normally been viewed as the responsibility of the 
professional group as a whole rather than the responsibility 
of individual members. 
Such limitations to the understanding of professional 
obligation toward society no longer suffice today. Until 
recently, for example, physicians were not to allow concerns 
about scarce or expensive medical resources on the macro-level 
to influence their treatment decisions for individual patients 
on the micro-level. Increasingly now, however, that approach 
is viewed as irresponsible and many different kinds of 
approaches to more thoughtful utilization of resources by 
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individual physicians have been proposed. 41 A similar shift 
in thinking has been occurring in healthcare administration. 
In the past, society was largely viewed by healthcare adminis-
trators as simply an entity that benefitted from and thus 
should fund healthcare in whatever way healthcare organiza-
tions deemed best. 42 Increasingly today, however, there 
exists the awareness that healthcare administrators have a 
social responsibility to provide not only high-quality but 
also cost-effective and community-directed healthcare; that 
is, that healthcare administrators are obligated to act in 
such a way so as to best serve their local community rather 
than (just) their own institution.~ Since the clients of 
healthcare administrators include not only individual patients 
but other groups both within and outside their institution, 
analyzing this last category of the moral obligation of 
professions and their members will be critical to the under-
standing of the professional ethic of healthcare administra-
tors. 
41See, for example, Terese Hudson, "Are Futile-Care 
Policies the Answer?" Hospitals and Health Networks 68, no. 4 
(20 February 1994): 26-32. 
42See, for example, Howard Zuckerman, "Redefining the Role 
of the CEO: Challenges and Conflicts," Hospital and Health 
Services Administration 34, no. 1 (1989): 25-38. 
43This is suggested in Samuel Levey and James Hill, "In 
Search of Basic Values," Health Progress 67, no. 5 (June 
1986): 51-53; D. Kirk Oglesby, "Health care Leaders - It's 
Time to Step Forward," Frontiers of Health Services Management 
8, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 34-36. 
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Conclusion 
Adopting a "central instances" approach to describing the 
institution of profession has allowed for the development of 
a clear and manageable description of profession that encom-
passes the ordinary usage of the term. It has been proposed 
that this description reveals the essential features of 
profession to be exclusive expertise, relative autonomy in 
practice, societal or institutional recognition, and the 
existence of seven categories of professional obligation. The 
following chapter will propose that what has been called a 
"social contract" serves as a justification for, and as a 
conceptual clarification of, these professional obligations 
for professions in general and for healthcare administrators 
in particular. 
CHAPTER IV 
SOCIAL CONTRACT: A FOUNDATION FOR PROFESSIONAL STATUS 
AND PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
In the previous two chapters the position has been 
proposed that a profession comes into existence in our society 
when an occupational group develops an exclusive expertise 
which society deems extremely valuable in the addressing of 
fundamental human needs or social concerns, and this occupa-
tional group is granted re la ti ve autonomy in practice in 
exchange for the benefit their service provides to society, 
coupled with the understanding that specific moral obligations 
will be expected of their profession and their members. 
Before the professional obligations of healthcare admin-
istrators may be examined, however, a justification for the 
existence of professional obligations and a conceptual clari-
f ication of the nature of professional obligations must first 
be given. This chapter will propose that this justification 
can be found in what has come to be known as the "social 
contract." 
This chapter will first give a brief overview of social 
contract thinking. This overview will be limited; the 
purpose of this dissertation is not to thoroughly analyze 
social contract thinking, but to develop an understanding of 
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the nature of professional obligation in general and of the 
professional obligations of healthcare administrators in 
particular based upon a social contract account of these 
obligations. It will be argued that the social contract 
referred to here is 
members of society, 
imaginary contract. 
the development of 
members in society 
not an actual signed contract between 
but neither is it a hypothetical or 
It is a means of conceptually explaining 
certain regulatory behaviors for all 
as well as for professions and their 
members. Four criticisms which attempt to undermine the 
notion of social contract will later be addressed. 
The second part of this chapter will argue that the 
social contract idea is implicit in our understanding of 
particular occupational groups as professions. Relative 
autonomy in practice is granted to professions by society, 
either explicitly through the development of social institu-
tions or implicitly through the societal tolerance for 
particular practice behaviors, in exchange for the benefit 
this provides to the society, i.e, the service the profession 
through its re la ti ve autonomy in practice provides to the 
common good and to individual members of society in addressing 
fundamental human needs or social concerns. In light of the 
social contract account, it will be argued that the primary 
purpose of professions is determined not by the professions 
alone, but by the ongoing dialogue between society and the 
professions. The professions receive benefits from society in 
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the form of social and financial rewards, but these benefits -
as well as relative autonomy in practice - can be taken away 
if society judges it no longer benefits from the services of 
a particular profession. 1 
The third part of this chapter will attempt to show that 
a social contract is implicit in the existence of professional 
obligations. It is not that these moral obligations exist 
because the professions and their individual members hope to 
receive relative autonomy in practice in exchange for this 
professed moral commitment, but rather that these profession-
specific moral obligations are voluntarily taken on in the 
sense that individuals join a profession knowing society has 
particular expectations of the values and role-behavior of 
that group. For the degree of the perceived obligation to 
practice those values and moral behaviors may be said to 
correlate to some degree to the risk of harm to clients or 
patients or to society in general should those professional 
values and moral behaviors not be practiced. The relative 
autonomy in practice granted to professional groups and their 
1Medical schools, for example, establish their own 
professional standards and are federally subsidized and tax-
exempt. Their autonomy in the practice of setting their own 
standards recently has been threatened, however, by charges 
that they fail to adequately train their medical students in 
such basic skills as cardiopulmonary resuscitation and other 
forms of emergency medicine, and the provision of their 
federal benefits has been questioned due to charges that their 
emphasis on training subspecialties rather than general 
medicine fails to address the growing sense in our society 
that physicians should be instrumentally involved in providing 
all Americans with some basic forms of healthcare. 
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members by society is relativized, regulated, and potentially 
taken back by society to the degree that society perceives 
professional groups as abusing or misusing that autonomy. 
Professional ethics, therefore, can never be determined by the 
professional groups themselves but only through the interac-
tion with society which establishes the values and expected 
role-behavior of the professional groups. 
The Idea of the Social Contract 
Overview of Social Contract Theory 
Justifying the existence and nature of professions and 
professional obligations on a social contract foundation 
utilizes a concept originally developed by political philoso-
phers to explain citizens' obligation to obey the law, and the 
limits of that obligation. This "social contract" was first 
used to describe a theoretical political contract which 
justified the moral weight of laws and actions of the state or 
government. 
Historically, the concept of the social contract was 
first advanced by Hobbes, Locke and then Rousseau, among 
others. Each described a society without a civil state or 
government, and then highlighted the benefits society received 
from its members agreeing through a "social contract" to have 
a civil state or government. 
Hobbes2 holds that without government human beings would 
2Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1948). 
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live in a condition, the "state of nature," a condition in 
which everyone is pitted against the other for their own self-
preservation or advancement with no power or authority to make 
peace among them. A social contract or common agreement is 
needed between the people and a sovereign who could (by 
monopolizing the power to enforce laws) maintain peace among 
the people to better advance their self-preservation and self-
interests. 
Locke3 views a group or people without government not as 
existing in a terrible condition, but as living in a tolerable 
though mildly unruly situation. People possess such natural 
moral rights as the right to property and freedom in this 
condition, but lack an efficient means to arbitrate their 
disputes and to protect their rights. To remedy this, people 
first establish "civil society'' and then negotiate an agree-
ment (social contract) among themselves to establish a 
government to protect their rights. This social contract or 
common agreement establishes duties and grants power to the 
government while protecting the rights of the people. 
Rousseau4 differs from Locke in viewing the creation of 
a social contract as the very coming together of individuals 
into society whereby they surrender their individual rights to 
3John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government and 
a Letter Concerning Toleration (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1948) . 
4Jean-Jacques Rosseau, The Social Contract (London: J.M. 
Dent, 1913). 
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the society to promote the common good of all. The welfare of 
the society as a whole constitutes the "general will" which is 
considered to be as important and as valuable as the desires 
and well-being of the individuals constituting the society. 
Perhaps the best known contemporary social contractarian 
is John Rawls. 5 He proposes that the elements of a just 
society are best determined by the theoretical agreement 
imagined in a social contract between people in an "original 
position" behind a "veil of ignorance." By this he means that 
we can best understand the standards to be used in judging 
appropriate conduct in our social lives together by imagining 
theoretical agreements between indi victuals who are free, 
rational, and self-interested but who lack knowledge of any 
specific content of their interests. This social contract is 
a conceptual means for determining standards of justice which 
theoretically are not bent to serve particular self-interests 
but rather can be agreed upon by all. 
No attempt will be made here to develop this notion of 
social contract in detail. It suffices to point out that 
social contract language has been used by many political 
theorists to describe the relationship between the members of 
society and their government. Three observations can be made 
5John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1971). 
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about this way of understanding this relationship. 6 First, 
social contract theory developed during a time of social 
change and reform. It has been used as a moral ideal higher 
than the law of the state against which the actions and even 
the existence of the state can be evaluated. Second, while a 
first reading of social contract thinking in political 
philosophy views people to be originally in a "state of 
nature" agreeing to create an organized society and govern-
ment, a second and more prevalent reading utilizes the social 
contract to define the terms of the relationship between 
society and the existing government. Third, while different 
variations exist in how the social contract is envisioned, all 
emphasize the consent of all the parties involved. Thus, all 
individuals in the Roussean "state of nature" must agree to 
form a society, and both the people of the society and the 
government that is established must agree according to Locke 
to the terms of their relationship, i.e., allowed and disal-
lowed behaviors, certain rights and duties, and so on. This 
consent assumes that all participants in the social contract 
enter the agreement willingly for their own personal benefit 
and gain. 
Social contract theory has typically been applied in 
social-political philosophy, but it has not been limited to 
6These observations are drawn from Thomas Donaldson, 
Corporations and Morality (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1982), 40-41; J.W. Gough, The Social Contract {Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1936), 130-143. 
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discussions of large-scale societal justice. Increasingly 
social contract theory has been applied to business and in 
organizational theory. 7 In the same way, social contract 
theory can be applied to the study of professions. Prof es-
sions can be understood to be social constructs arising from 
agreement both within the society, and between the society and 
the occupational groups accorded professional status by the 
society, for the express purpose of addressing specific 
fundamental human needs or social concerns such as health, 
justice, and religious salvation. 
Responses to Four Criticisms Raised Against 
the Idea of the Social Contract 
A number of criticisms have been raised against social 
contract theory. Four major criticisms will be discussed 
here. First, social contract theory is accused of lacking 
clarity or agreement over who actually constitutes "society," 
i.e., who enters into and makes up the terms of the social 
contract. It can be charged that the term "society," for that 
matter, has been used freely in the first two chapters of this 
dissertation without adequate definition or clarification. 
A second charge is that there is lack of clarity or 
agreement over what might actually constitute a mutual benefit 
or advantage such that "society," or the members of society, 
might reach some sort of agreement on and then develop 
7See, for example, Donaldson, Corporations and Morality; 
and Michael Keeley, A Social-Contract Theory of Organizations 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
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corresponding rights and responsibilities to protect the 
existence and continuation of that benefit. This second 
criticism rests on the premise that our society is marked by 
a pluralism of values such that it is impossible to reach a 
value-consensus regarding a particular benefit (outside of the 
freedom to choose whichever benefits are subjectively valued8) 
which could be agreed to in a social contract. 9 
The two remaining criticisms of social contract theory 
attack the supposed lack of reality or actual occurrence of 
the social contract. 10 The third criticism argues that no 
social contract that is rationally and freely agreed to and 
signed by all involved participants exists or has ever 
8This is meant to suggest that our society, with a primary 
emphasis on the value of freedom of choice, i.e., the value of 
choice itself, lacks agreement on any other values which might 
constitute a "good" for all members of our society. The claim 
is that there could never be agreement, therefore, on a 
benefit to be protected by the social contract outside of the 
protected freedom of individuals to value whichever benefits 
they individually choose. 
9This criticism is raised in Alasdair Macintyre, "Why Are 
the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble?" in W. Michael 
Hoffman, ed., Proceedings of the First National Conference on 
Business Ethics (Waltham, MA: Center for Business Ethics, 
Bentley College, 1977), 95-104; "Why is the Search for the 
Foundations of Ethics so Frustrating?" Hastings Center Report 
9 (August 1979): 20; After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1979) ; Christopher Morris, "Moral Con-
straints, Prisoners' Dilemmas, and the Social Responsibilities 
of Corporations," in Thomas Donaldson and Patricia Werhane, 
Ethical Issues in Business (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1979) 191-197. 
1
°These last two criticisms are drawn from John Kultgen, 
Ethics and Professionalism (Philadelphia: University of 
Philadelphia Press, 1988), 157-180; "Donaldson's Social 
Contract," Business and Professional Ethics 5, no. 1 (1986): 
28-39. 
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actually existed. But, the objection continues, an imaginary 
agreement is not an actual agreement, and imagination cannot 
be used to justify actual rights and responsibilities. 
Furthermore, even if the social contract is meant to refer to 
tacit (as opposed to imaginary) understandings between 
participants in a given relationship, as for example in a 
doctor-patient relationship, if the terms of that tacit under-
standing are never completely or adequately spelled out, there 
will always be disagreement concerning the terms of that 
contract and its implications for, for example, actual doctor-
patient relationships. 
The fourth criticism argues that even if the idea of a 
social contract is not of an actual written contract, but it 
is a conceptual means of explaining patterns of social 
behavior about which all participants in the agreement have 
common knowledge, it is still hard to explain how everyone in 
our society, with a pluralism of cultures, interests and 
values, could be fully aware of all the details and obliga-
tions imposed by such an abstract contract. For example, even 
if social contract language is employed to explain why 
pornography should be banned or its availability be made 
limited in our society, this still does not mean that everyone 
agrees on the criteria for establishing a common definition of 
pornography. Such a social contract, therefore, cannot be 
said to exist in a given society, e.g. , our own, if the 
details of that contract cannot be agreed upon or known by 
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all. 
Each of these four criticisms needs to be addressed. 
While the following responses to the criticisms perhaps do not 
completely blunt the full force of each criticism, together 
these responses nonetheless seem to carry enough weight to 
justify adequately the continued use of social contract theory 
as a way of explaining the existence and nature of profession-
al obligation in our society today. 
Response to the First Criticism 
The first criticism - that social contract theory too 
easily assumes a common understanding of the meaning of 
"society," i.e. , that the term is used without thorough 
clarification - is a serious charge and one that cannot be 
completely countered because the term has many uses. The term 
"society" can refer to an aggregate of individuals who make up 
that society, or it could refer to an entity that is more than 
the sum of those indi victuals and thus include families, 
religions, civic and cultural groups, etc., or possibly it 
could refer even to an entity composed of general or communal 
interests that are not directly parallel to or products of its 
individual members' interests, thus including interests such 
as nationalism or civic spirit. 
To respond to this criticism, it is helpful to point out 
that social contract theory is rooted in Western rational 
philosophical tradition with a corresponding emphasis upon 
individualism and the use of human reason. For purposes here, 
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then, the term "society" will be used to mean an aggregate of 
individuals who possess the capability of reason and discourse 
to deliberate and potentially to agree on particular services 
and the means of delivering those services which will best 
meet their individual and collective needs. 
It is acknowledged that much literature exists which 
criticizes this conception of society, and that such an 
emphasis upon human reason and discourse does not mean that 
individuals do not possess different values as well as 
different ways of perceiving occupational groups such as 
professions.u It will still be proposed here, however, that 
the term "society" can be used meaningfully to refer to the 
aggregate of individuals making up a human community. It will 
be assumed here that the capability of reason and discourse 
allows for the members of a community to work towards a 
consensual agreement on the best means to address fundamental 
human needs or social concerns such as health, justice, and 
religious salvation. 
Response to the Second Criticism 
The second criticism of social contract theory argues 
that the presence of moral pluralism and the lack of value-
11 see, for example, Michael Sandel, ed., Liberalism and 
Its Critics (New York: New York University Press, 1984); 
Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Lawrence 
Churchill, Rationing Health Care in America: Perceptions and 
Principles of Justice (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1987); and numerous other examples may be drawn from 
literature within the "Communitarian" tradition. 
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consensus among members of our American society results in a 
lack of agreement over what might constitute a benefit such 
that all the members of our society could reasonably discourse 
about that benefit and address it through a social contract. 
In hospital ethics committees, for example, moral dilemmas 
arise over just such disagreement about what constitutes a 
benefit to individual patients; e.g., the debate over provid-
ing or withholding a feeding tube to a permanently comatose 
patient is based to a great extent on the ongoing lack of 
consensus over the value of physical life void of cognitive or 
affective faculties. 
To respond to this second criticism of social contract 
theory, however, it can also be pointed out that a great deal 
of value consensus is present in our American society. For 
example, in the case above involving the hospital ethics 
committee, if the patient had advance directives stating she 
did not want resuscitative measures employed once she became 
permanently comatose, then in all likelihood no one would 
object to a "Do Not Resuscitate" order being given because of 
the value of her autonomy. Such an example of seemingly 
unanimous respect for patient autonomy in normal circumstances 
within a hospital setting is indicative of the fact that there 
exists in our society other examples of consensual agreement 
over other moral values and norms. This means that there 
actually does exist in our society a sufficiently widely 
accepted and substantive moral core to give significant 
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agreement on numerous values and benefits in the context of 
what could be called a social contract. For example, there is 
broad agreement even in our pluralistic society that a good 
life does not include being a victim of fraud or brutality, of 
being subjected to involuntary, unproductive pain, of being 
deprived against one's will of one's property, of being 
slandered, and so forth. Furthermore, there seems without 
exception to be a common belief that some goods exist such as 
health and justice which are fundamental or intrinsic human 
goods, i.e., goods that are essential to the "good life." The 
provision of these goods addresses fundamental human needs and 
thus are basic concerns of society, i.e., they are the concern 
of all members of a given community. It may therefore be 
concluded that there are a number of "goods" in which members 
of our society can agree to protect and promote in terms of 
what could be referred to as a social contract . 12 
Response to the Third Criticism 
The third criticism challenges the reality or actual 
occurrence of the social contract. It argues that no such 
contract literally exists, especially in written form, and 
that surmising a hypothetical contract from the perceived 
tacit understandings or value-consensus among the participants 
in an agreement fails since the details of such tacit 
uThis argument is developed at length in Paul Camenisch, 
Grounding Professional Ethics in a Pluralistic Society (New 
York: Haven Publications, 1983), Chapter 4. 
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understandings making up the supposed social contract are 
never adequately defined or spelled out. 
A successful response to this charge is to agree with the 
criticism but to insist that its presumed conclusion does not 
necessarily follow. A social contract by its very nature 
cannot - and indeed, should not - be thought of as an actual 
written contract among all participants in the agreement. 
Once negotiated and put into writing, this contract could then 
no longer lay claim to having status as a basic analysis of 
the moral foundation underlying the relationship between the 
participants, for then it would be only one more existing 
social arrangement among others which, in turn, would itself 
be subject to further moral evaluation. Existing social 
arrangements are not self-validating and thus cannot serve as 
their own moral justification. No written contract is fair or 
just simply because all parties. agree to the contract; it 
must always be justified by something beyond itself, thus 
always allowing for its potential revision as values and 
perspectives change over time. Even the American Constitution 
is not self-validating, but rather draws on the moral founda-
tion of a social acceptance of its norms, i.e. , a social 
contract in the sense employed here. The notion of social 
contract as utilized here can never take written form without 
losing its meaning and purpose; its lack of written form, 
then, affirms rather than denies its existential reality. 
The language of social contract is heuristic in the sense 
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that it does not describe a standard sort of contract but 
rather conceptualizes existing states of affairs, i.e., the 
common recognition by professionals and members of society 
that there are certain standards binding upon professionals. 
This is the nature of that which serves as a moral foundation 
or justification. Rights and obligations, liberties and 
duties, the common good, the general will, and other such 
fundamentally prescriptive concepts are all used heuristically 
to describe existing states of affairs in our society. 
The heuristic language of social contract can serve as a 
moral foundation given the premise that it is possible, and in 
fact is normally what happens, that people will appeal to some 
form of social contract when they are forced to justify the 
moral foundation of their position about some social matter. 
The social contract is dependent upon the image of reasonable 
people coming together in discourse in order to contract to or 
at least agree on a moral framework. In this coming together 
to discourse on a moral foundation, some participants would 
hope to identify a natural law or a divine law from God, 
others would hope to discover what an "ideal observer" would 
approve of, still others would seek to discern through 
rational processes 
Though participants 
an existing moral order, and so forth. 
are limited by their own historical-
cultural circumstances and most likely biased by their own 
self-interests and deeply-held values, the nature of discourse 
assumes that reasonable people eventually will seek to achieve 
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as close to an impartial point of view as possible through 
ongoing discussion and through a full consideration of 
everyone's interests. The social contract, then, is not a 
hypothetical construct drawn from tacit understandings or 
supposed value-consensus among participants, but is a heuris-
tic device trying to explain how any existing social arrange-
ment may be evaluated morally according to the criteria of 
whether all involved participants, through ongoing discussion 
and full consideration of everyone's interests, would grant 
approval to such an arrangement. 13 
Response to the Fourth Criticism 
The fourth criticism against social contract theory 
argues that even if it is acknowledged that the social 
contract is only a conceptual means of explaining patterns of 
social behavior, given the great membership size of our 
society with its corresponding pluralism of cultures, inter-
es ts and values, it would seem highly unlikely that the 
details and obligations articulated in an abstract social 
contract would be readily available to or known by every 
member of our society. Different people will often have 
different interpretations of the details and obligations 
13This response to the third criticism against social 
contract theory is drawn from Thomas Donaldson, "Fact, 
Fiction, and the Social Contract: A Reply to Kultgen," 
Business and Professional Ethics 5, no. 1 {1986): 40-46; 
Robert Veatch, "The Triple Contract: A New Foundation for 
Medical Ethics," in Peter Wind, et al., eds., Ethical Issues 
in the Professions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1989) I 67-75. 
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supposedly agreed to, thus undermining attempts to universal-
ize the supposed agreement into a social contract. For 
example, even if it is commonly agreed that professions and 
their members are expected to possess and exercise an atypical 
moral commitment to their clients or patients, many differ-
ences of opinion will continue to exist as to the exact nature 
of the specific obligations of that atypical moral commitment. 
The response to this last criticism will parallel in some 
respects the response offered to the second criticism, namely, 
that a close look at normal social discourse and exchange 
reveals a great deal of consensus on the details of proper 
behavior in general and on the specific obligations expected 
of specific professional groups and their members in particu-
lar. The relevant details of the social contract, therefore, 
conceivably can be known by most if not all (adult) members of 
a society. One way to reach this point is to articulate 
details in what has been called a "social rule. 1114 
A social rule describes patterns or standards of behavior 
for which there is a perceived obligation to conduct one's 
behavior according to that expected pattern or standard simply 
because that is what is expected in one's society. A social 
rule is not a social habit as when people act similarly, but 
14This notion of a social rule is first drawn from H.L.A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 50-
88. The concept is further elaborated on by David Ozar, 
Professions and Their Ethics: Foundations of Professional 
Obligation (Unpublished draft) . 
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conformity to the pattern has no special merits; violation of 
such social habits involve social disapproval because follow-
ing such rules is expected. Social rules exist, however, when 
there are insistent and imposing obligations demanding 
conformity to the rules and when the social pressure brought 
to bear upon those who deviate or who threaten to deviate from 
the rules is great. The rules supported by this serious 
pressure are thought important because they are believed to be 
necessary to the maintenance of social life or to some highly 
prized feature of it. 
Examples of such social rules include: the restriction 
of violence, the requirement of honesty or truth and of 
keeping promises, and parental protection for small children. 
These social rules are assumed to be so important and essen-
tial to society that they are commonly accepted and employed 
without further justification; these social rules are 
popularly considered to be self-justifying because it is 
understood or commonly agreed that the actions governed by 
these rules are essential for the society, or, to put it 
broadly, the actions governed by the social rules are justi-
fied because, "That's how we do things here." Social rules 
are therefore an essential part of the morality of a social 
group in that they define standards of behavior to which all 
members of the group are expected to conform. 
Social rules are present both internally and externally 
to professions. Internal social rules include some sense of 
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fraternalism or comradery, the normal refusal to publicly 
approbate a colleague's professional work, the maintenance of 
emotional distance from one's clients or patients, the 
portrayal of disinterest in personal gain, and so forth. 
Internal social rules may be reflected in the group's Code of 
Ethics, although most of them are not explicitly set down 
anywhere. 
Of greater interest here are the external social rules of 
profession. These social rules are determined by the society 
in which the professions exist. Violation of these rules by 
the profession or its members at best leads to charges of 
acting "unprofessionally," while at worst violation of these 
rules calls into question the very professional status of the 
occupational group. For example, if a given professional's 
behavior is perceived to be exclusively financially motivated 
with no evidence of an atypical moral commitment to the client 
or patient, then she may be accused of acting unprofessional-
ly. If the whole professional group is perceived as acting in 
this manner, then society may raise the legitimate question 
asking if this occupational group should still be considered 
a profession and granted relative autonomy in practice. Ex-
ternal social rules for professions arise from a particular 
cultural setting in which there is a clearly established view 
of a fundamental human need or social concern and for which a 
particular occupational group has been granted the exclusive 
practice to address this need or concern; when the desired 
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human or social good is not actualized in the way society 
envisioned, then the occupational group may be accused of 
acting unprofessionally or of no longer constituting a 
profession. 15 
The existence of social rules assures that many of the 
details and obligations that may arise from utilizing social 
contract theory as a moral foundation for given social 
arrangements can be, and in fact are commonly known, by most 
if not all (adult) members of a society. The existence of 
social rules within the social contract means that the members 
of society possess some common agreements over the appropri-
ateness of certain behaviors and over the importance of 
particular values. These behaviors and values are not 
necessarily absolute, but may vary between different societies 
and within the same society over time. An ongoing discussion 
among the participants of the society, and for our purposes 
here, between society and its professions, is always necessi-
tated so that the standards of expected behavior at a given 
time in that society are understood and articulated. 
The four criticisms against social contract theory have 
thus been shown unable to undermine the validity of drawing 
upon the social contract idea as an articulation of the moral 
15This argument has been adapted from Stanley Hauerwas, 
"Authority and the Profession of Medicine," in George Agich, 
ed., Responsibility in Health Care (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1982), 83-103; Michael Smith, "The 
Virtuous Organization," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 7, 
no. 1 {1982}: 35-42. 
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foundation of professional status and the moral obligations of 
professions in general and of health care administrators in 
particular. The second part of this chapter will now argue 
that the social contract idea is implicit in our understanding 
of particular occupational groups as professions. 
The Existence of Professions and the Idea 
of the Social Contract 
It has been proposed that professions should be under-
stood as occupational groups which possess exclusive expertise 
for addressing specific fundamental human needs or societal 
concerns. But the function and product of the professions and 
their members cannot exist simply because as occupational 
groups they insist that they alone possess the expertise to 
provide society with a needed service, and therefore that the 
society owes them a dominance in the market with the exclusion 
of all competitors for the service they provide. Instead, 
professions are granted re la ti ve autonomy in practice and 
dominance in the market by a society because that society 
views this structure as the best available means to benefit 
its members through addressing fundamental human needs and 
social concerns, and because that society has mechanisms in 
place to assure that its members will not be harmed by 
professionals abusing their autonomy or market dominance. 
Professions ultimately are accountable to society, then, 
though this accountability can be partially mediated through 
the government as established by the society. While it is 
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true that society lacks professional competence and the 
ability to adequately judge professional skills, society can 
judge the benefits brought to, or the harms wrought on, its 
members through the practice of professional skills and 
behaviors. This provides society with authority over the 
function and product of professions. To begin with, society 
maintains control over the professions and their members by 
judging the results of professional skills as either satisfac-
torily or inadequately addressing the specific fundamental 
human needs or social concerns that gave rise to the profes-
sions. Society does not assign areas of public action, 
welfare, or responsibility to any occupational group irrevoca-
bly; ultimately society (or its government) must say whether 
the public is being properly served, and those occupational 
groups given the exclusive right to serve the public in a 
particular way are held accountable to society. As an example 
of this, the literature for healthcare administrators is 
beginning to articulate a growing awareness that their 
institutions' provision of health care is a function granted 
by the community it serves, and increasingly by the society at 
large and its government which finances that healthcare. This 
means in turn that healthcare administrators are obligated 
first and foremost to meet the health needs and expectations 
of the communities they serve. 16 
16See, for example, Gary Filerman, "The President's Report: 
The Future of Medicine and Management Education," The Journal 
of Health Administration Education 9, no. 4 (Fall 1991):549-
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Once the institution of profession and each particular 
profession is understood as created by and accountable to 
society, an occupational group's claim to professional status 
must always be evaluated by a very straightforward question: 
Is this arrangement a good bargain for society? Does this 
particular social division of labor achieve an appropriate 
level of benefit to society at an acceptable cost? The degree 
to which this can be answered in the affirmative is the degree 
to which occupational groups are rightly granted professional 
status. 17 
What is often overlooked or taken for granted by the 
professions and their members is that society invests heavily 
in the development of professions. Massive amounts of money, 
both public and private, are regularly spent to fund profes-
sional education, to fund the research on which professional 
practice rests, to fund the institutions in which and the 
560; J. David Seay and Robert Sigmond, "Community Benefit 
Standards for Hospitals: Perceptions and Performance," 
Frontiers of Health Services Management 5, no. 3 (1989): 3-39; 
George Adams, "Communications as an Ethical Imperative," 
Michigan Hospitals 24 (December 1988): 34-35. 
·~his point is raised in Lisa Newton, "Professionaliza-
tion: The Intractable Plurality of Values,'' in Wade Robison, 
Michael Pritchard and Joseph Ellin, eds., Profits and Profes-
sions: Essays in Business and Professional Ethics (Clifton, 
NJ: Humana Press, 1983), 23-36; Allen Buchanan, "The Physi-
cian's Knowledge and the Patient's Best Interest," in Edmund 
Pellegrino, Robert Veatch and John Langan, eds., Ethics, 
Trust, and the Professions (Washington D.C.: Georgetown Uni-
versity Press, 1991), 93-112; James Gaa, "A Game-Theoretic 
Analysis of Professional Rights and Responsibilities," Journal 
of Business Ethics 9 (1990) :159-169. 
102 
structures through which much professional activity occurs, 
and now more than ever before to fund specific individual 
client or patient demands for professional services. These 
unearned or only partially earned benefits are given by 
society to professions and their members so that individuals 
can become professionals and carry on their professional 
activity. Healthcare institutions are the beneficiaries of 
financial gifts, benefits and tax-exemptions which are 
bestowed upon them by society, and healthcare administrators 
are thereby charged with exercising responsible stewardship of 
these gifts and benefits for the sake of society. 18 Thus, in 
accepting such gifts and benefits, professions and their 
members should understand that they also accept the corre-
spending obligation to use those gifts and benefits in a 
manner consistent with society's intentions in giving them. 
Should professions object that the intention of such 
financial benefits is for the sake of clients and patients and 
not for the sake of the professions themselves, this only 
furthers the argument; the fundamental intention of society 
in such fundings to professions is ultimately to benefit those 
citizens in the society needing professional services. 
Professions are accountable to society to assure that their 
services which are funded to a great extent by society do in 
fact benefit society. If society does not benefit from such 
18This is argued in Frank Marsh and Mark Yarborough, 
Medicine and Money (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 29-30. 
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funding of professional services, then it has every moral 
right to control or regulate the professions until the desired 
benefits are acquired, or else remove their funding and thus 
diminish the professional role and status of that occupational 
group. 19 
Much of the criticism of professions found in contempo-
rary literature charges not only that professionals have 
fallen short in fulfilling their expected atypical moral 
commitment to clients and patients, but that the current make-
up and function of particular professions no longer provides 
the desired benefit to society warranting the granting of 
relative autonomy to these occupational groups. There seems 
to be a tendency among many professions and their members to 
believe that professions are entities unto themselves, i.e., 
that the primary function and duty of a profession is to 
practice its exclusive expertise regardless of its effect on 
or cost to society. It is as if some professionals take their 
market-monopoly so much for granted they forget their relative 
autonomy in practice is a privilege given in exchange for a 
public benefit. 
It is always important to distinguish between a profes-
sion and its function, i.e, the services it provides. The 
function may always be needed in human society, for the 
19This is argued in Paul Camenisch, "On Being a Profession-
al, Morally Speaking," in Bernard Baumrin and Benjamin 
Freedman, eds., Moral Responsibility and the Professions (New 
York: Haven Publications, 1983), 42-60. 
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provision of such services as healthcare, justice, or reli-
gious salvation will most likely always be needed by human 
beings. However, the cluster of practices and relationships 
arising from the function or the provision of needed services 
at a given time and place which constitutes a particular 
occupational group as a profession can be diminished or 
destroyed if society no longer perceives that occupational 
group to be providing the desired benefit adequately or at an 
appropriate "cost" to the society, or if a better means of 
providing those services can be achieved. 
Physicians now face just such a challenge in emerging 
societal regulations of their practice, e.g. the development 
of diagnostic regulations and clinical pathways, the formation 
of the National Practitioner Data Bank by Congress to track 
physicians with possible problems of competency, and limiting 
physician ownership of healthcare facilities, to name just a 
few. Healthcare administrators face this same challenge in 
emerging societal responses and regulations to skyrocketing 
health care costs, e.g., managed care, fixed reimbursements 
per diagnosis, and third-party payer alliances which are 
facilitating the merging of healthcare institutions into large 
alliances, also to name just a few. All of these changes are 
contributing to a loss of certain aspects of autonomy in the 
practice of medicine and healthcare administration. Societal 
oversight of professions may diminish their autonomy in 
practice - which, from the perspective of many professionals, 
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also diminishes their professional status when society judges 
that it no longer benefits from the granting of certain 
aspects of autonomy in practice with corresponding institu-
tional structures to particular occupational groups. 20 
Professions are thus accountable to society for their 
very existence. By maintaining some authority over the 
function and product of professions, society may establish, 
maintain, diminish or take away the professional status of 
particular occupational groups. The existence of professions 
is thus determined by what can be called a social contract 
between society and the occupational groups to which it 
accords professional status. 
The Existence of Professional Obligations and the 
Idea of the Social Contract 
The third section of this chapter will now argue that the 
contents of the ethics of professions are also established 
through an ongoing dialogue between society and the prof es-
sions. By helping to determine the professional norms and 
role-specific duties of the professions and their members, 
society possesses a second means to establish, maintain, 
diminish or take away the professional status of occupational 
wFor other examples of this increased societal regulation 
of the professions, see Jacques Barzun, "The Professions Under 
Siege," Harpers 257 (1978) :61-68; Jean LeMee, "Educating the 
Professional," Main Currents 31 (1975): 88-94; Fredric 
Wolinsky, "The Professional Dominance Perspective, Revisited," 
The Milbank Quarterly 66, suppl. 2 {1988): 33-47; David 
Mirvis, "Physicians' Autonomy - The Relation Between Public 
and Professional Expectations," The New England Journal of 
Medicine 328, no. 18 (6 May 1993): 1346-1348. 
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groups. The existence and content of the professional norms 
is thus determined by what could be called the social contract 
between society and the occupational groups to which it 
accords professional status. 
Society preserves the rightful authority to help deter-
mine the role-specific duties and to maintain some control 
over the behaviors of professions and their members in three 
ways. First, the atypical moral commitment of the profession-
al to the client or patient is expected and required of 
professions and their members in order for these occupational 
groups and their members to be granted (and to be allowed to 
maintain) the status of profession; if this atypical moral 
commitment is perceived to be lacking, the very status of the 
occupational group and their members as constituting a 
profession is called into question. 
Secondly, professions are granted certain kinds of 
relative autonomy in practice in exchange for the benefit this 
provides to society, e.g. , physicians are granted professional 
status with accompanying autonomy in practice in exchange for 
the health benefits this brings to society. Professions and 
their members are therefore obligated to promote the benefit 
their occupational group provides to society in ways that will 
serve the interests of society and not (merely) their own 
interests. 
Thirdly, the norms of professional behavior which shape 
professionals' conduct with individual clients or patients are 
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partly limited and determined by the common moral norms of the 
society, i.e., the professional norms must be consistent with 
the moral principles and values present in the society which 
first created or promoted the professions and to which the 
professions are ultimately accountable. In addition, via the 
ongoing dialogue between the society and the professional 
group, the remaining details of the norms are adjusted to the 
society's changing needs and conditions, e.g., the formerly 
acceptable norm of paternalistic behavior in medicine has in 
recent decades been replaced by the norm of patient informed 
consent. The remainder of this chapter will develop these 
three ways in which the content of the ethics of professions 
and their members are determined by society. 
The existence of particular moral obligations is 
essential to our understanding of profession 
In Chapter II it was argued that the atypical moral 
commitment of professions and their members (as described, 
even if in idealistic terms, in the Functionalist approach to 
profession) constituted an essential feature of our under-
standing of profession. The justification for identifying 
this atypical moral commitment to clients or patients as an 
essential feature of profession is sometimes historically 
based upon the religious origin of the meaning of the term, 
"to profess." 
The term "to profess" is cited as initially referring to 
nuns and monks prior to the Middle Ages who professed to live 
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the Christian virtues in a manner higher than the common norm. 
These professed religious in their monasteries and convents 
became known for providing essential services to their society 
such as education, healthcare, and alms for the poor while 
living a virtuous lifestyle of self-denial and penance. In 
time the professed male religious founded the first universi-
ties and educated their fellow professed religious (and 
eventually laypeople as well) in medicine, law, and divinity, 
which came to constitute the first (and for many, the "tradi-
tional") professions. The contemporary expectation of prof es-
sions and their members that they possess an atypical moral 
commitment to their clients or patients is traced by some 
authors as originating in the exemplary lifestyle of Christian 
virtue portrayed by these early professed religious. 21 
Citing the religious origin of professions cannot of 
itself, however, constitute a justifying claim explaining the 
atypical moral commitment expected of professions and their 
members. It would be fallacious to assume that the religious 
origin of professions is determinative of their present 
structure and significance to our American society. Different 
layers of meaning have been added to our concept of prof es-
sion, and the nature of profession must now be studied as it 
is commonly understood in normal language usage. What is 
21 See, for example, Dennis Campbell, Doctors, Lawvers, 
Ministers: Christian Ethics in Professional Practice (Nash-
ville: Abingdon, 1982); Darrell Reeck, Ethics for the Profes-
sions: A Christian Perspective (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publish-
ing House, 1982). 
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still noteworthy is that it would seem that an atypical moral 
commitment like that expected of the professed religious 
centuries ago is still expected today of our professions and 
their members, albeit in a different form. 
A better approach to justifying the atypical moral 
commitment of professions and their members as constituting an 
essential feature of our understanding of profession is to 
argue that the service provided by the exclusive expertise of 
the professions which addresses specific fundamental human 
needs or social concerns is so important to society, and that 
the consequences of abuse of that exclusive expertise are so 
serious, that society must demand accountability from the 
professions and their members on how their relative autonomy 
in the practice of their exclusive expertise is exercised. It 
may be argued that society is willing to grant the professions 
relative autonomy in their practice because society entrusts 
to the expected atypical moral commitment of the professions 
and their members the well-being of its members, and trusts 
that the professions and their members will not abuse their 
relative autonomy in practice solely for their own self-
aggrandizement or to the harm of society. 
Much of the recent literature on professional ethics 
adopts a critical approach towards professions and represents 
a growing mistrust of the supposed fiduciary relationship 
between professionals and clients or patients. Increasingly 
professionals are accused of misusing their autonomy in 
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practice when they act paternalistically, or when they 
exclusively promote the primary value of their profession even 
if that may not be the primary value in their client or 
patient's life. They are also accused of abusing their 
autonomy and failing to exemplify an atypical moral commitment 
to their clients or patients when their professional practice 
is perceived as primarily existing to promote their own 
financial and social welfare. Much of the literature on the 
ethics of healthcare administrators is keenly sensitive to 
these criticisms, and examines how healthcare administrators 
may preserve their atypical moral commitment, for example, to 
patients, while still seeking the financial good of their own 
institution (with presumably corresponding personal rewards 
for themselves) . 22 
The exact nature of the professional's atypical moral 
commitment, i.e., the professional's role-specific duties, may 
well vary and change over time as society develops new concep-
tions or understandings of what ought to be the proper moral 
behaviors of professionals. These differences will be 
reflected as the four different models describing the profes-
sional-client/patient relationship, i • e • I Guild, Agent, 
Commercial and Interactive models, are explored. Explaining 
how professional obligations in general are grounded in a 
nFor example, see Marc Hiller, "Ethics and Health Care 
Administration: Issues in Education and Practice," The Journal 
of Health Administration Education 2, no. 2 (1984): 147-192. 
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social contract is a lot easier than determining the exact 
content of those obligations. This will require careful 
reflection on the ongoing dialogue and ever evolving agreement 
among the members of society and between society and the 
professions over the exact nature of the professional atypical 
moral commitment of each profession. 
Relative Autonomy in Professional Practice is Granted 
in Exchange for Benefits to Society 
The second way in which society exerts control over the 
behavior and role-specific duties of professions and their 
members is requiring that the professions promote the benefit 
which they are designed to address in ways that will best 
serve the interests of society rather than their own inter-
ests. It is this dimension of the social contract which seems 
least emphasized in the literature on professional ethics, and 
yet which has involved great abuses and which has resulted in 
increasing reaction from society seeking measures to control 
and regulate the professions. 
The profession of medicine may serve as a good example 
here. This profession evolved to address society's health 
needs. In America the medical profession has been revered for 
its conquests of diseases and illnesses, and healthcare now 
accounts for almost one-sixth of our country's national 
expenditures; yet there is strong political movement afoot to 
drastically overhaul our healthcare system to better serve the 
needs of our society. A growing consensus is emerging in our 
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society that our present healthcare system is too expensive 
and serves too few, and that the social priority of medicine 
should not be focused on prolonging life but on helping all 
the members of society achieve a higher standard of health. 
Yet the medical profession as a whole has not been at the 
forefront calling for change in our healthcare system or 
offering credible potential solutions that will better benefit 
the provision of healthcare to all members of our society. As 
a result, many people now see the medical profession as part 
of the healthcare problem rather than as part of the solution, 
and consequently urge measures which would bring about greater 
control and regulation over the medical profession. 
Professions are granted relative autonomy in practice 
because the services they provide are deemed by society to 
serve the common good, i.e., professional services are viewed 
as offering the best benefit to society over all other 
potential structures or possible means of providing that same 
benefit. In speaking of the "common good" of society, 
however, two problems arise. First, the sense of the common 
good that animates judgments within the professions, i.e., the 
common good as envisioned by professionals, tends to be 
specific to the benefit provided by each profession rather 
than some sort of global notion of net aggregate utility 
across society. In other words, professions and their members 
tend to promote the specific service their profession provides 
over all other values, especially because that is the area of 
their expertise. 
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Conflicts can therefore arise between 
professions and society regarding the nature of the common 
good and the place of the profession's service within the 
society's values and its conception of its common good. For 
example, the medical profession and healthcare administrators 
in our country have traditionally focused on (with a corre-
sponding application of society's resources) crisis interven-
tion and acute care in meeting the perceived health care needs 
of society instead of advocating and focusing on preventive 
health care or caring modalities for chronic illnesses, which 
are two health values increasingly espoused in our society 
today. current movements in healthcare reform toward these 
newer directions are thus encountering a less than enthusias-
tic response from physicians and hospitals. 
A second problem in defining the "common good" of society 
arises in that the professional commitment to the common good 
has traditionally been interpreted as the commitment of the 
professional to the individual client or patient and not to 
the good of society at large. For example, a physician may 
prolong the life of an irreversibly insensate patient at 
immense public cost, or a lawyer may ardently defend and win 
acquittal for a child-molester who then returns possibly to 
threaten more children in society. 
The popularly-accepted justification for the expected 
professional's willingness and even commitment to act in the 
defense or promotion of individual interests, despite an 
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apparent cost to the common good, is that the social practice 
which creates those professional commitments to individuals 
and not to society at large is, on balance, deemed more 
preferable to a social arrangement within which the profes-
sional abandons that commitment to the individual client or 
patient whenever the common good seems imperiled by strict 
fidelity to the individual's good. In other words, it is 
generally agreed that concerns on the "macro" level should not 
dictate professional's decisions on the "micro" level, since 
the danger of subjective application of those "macro" concerns 
is too great. For example, medical care might be withheld 
much earlier from non-paying insensate patients under the 
guise of preserving expensive medical treatments, or an 
innocent man might be denied a fair trial because no lawyer 
believes in his innocence. 
On the other hand, it is generally acknowledged that 
there are limits to each professional' s commitment to the 
individual client or patient; it is rare, however, for that 
point to be clearly defined where the common good should take 
priority over individual interests and this sort of standard 
then guide professional action. The professional obligation 
to promote the common good is part of the exchange with 
society, however, for society grants re la ti ve autonomy in 
practice to the professions and their members in exchange for 
the overall benefit this provides society. It would thus be 
incumbent upon professionals to temper their traditional 
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near-absolute commitment to the individual client or patient 
with a greater sense of their commitment to the common good. 23 
Perhaps the best way for professionals to exercise their 
obligation to promote the common good of society is to 
proactively engage in public discourse over the nature of the 
services or benefits promoted by their professions. Our 
society has grown culturally dependent upon the professions as 
custodians and interpreters of many of the more most basic 
values which address our fundamental needs and societal 
concerns, values such as health, procedural justice, civil 
liberties, academic knowledge, economic prosperity, and even 
equity in the distribution of social benefits and burdens. 
These values tend to be largely addressed in our society 
through government and corporate policies, which in turn 
require moral reflection and perspective about the ends and 
values that our societal institutions should serve and the 
justifiable means to achieve those ends. 
Professionals, then, are in a unique leadership position 
to help the society reflect on and articulate the best means 
to achieve the well-being or common good of its people. 
23This position is developed from Samuel Gorovitz, "Profes-
sions, Professors, and Competing Obligations," in Ethics, 
Trust, and the Professions, 177-192; Nancy Jecker, "Inte-
grating Medical Ethics with Normative Theory: Patient Advocacy 
and Social Responsibility," Theoretical Medicine 11, no. 2 
(1990): 125-139; Frank Marsh, "Health Care Cost Containment 
and the Duty to Treat," The Journal of Legal Medicine 6, no. 
2 (1985): 157-190; Robert Veatch, "Allocating Health Resourc-
es Ethically: New Roles for Administrators and Clinicians," 
Frontiers of Health Services Management 8, no. 1 (1991): 3-29. 
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Rather than pursing their own advantage or position as special 
interests groups seeking to promote their services for their 
own benefit, and rather than pursuing merely the value of 
their own profession over all other values in society, 
professionals are called upon, by nature of their commitment 
to the common good, to help society develop and maintain the 
means and structures to guarantee its safety, the integrity of 
its basic institutions and practices, and the preservation of 
its core values. In our own liberal society those core values 
would seem to include governance by law, freedom, protection 
from injury, equality of opportunity, privacy, and social 
welfare. Other core values may be identified or may emerge in 
time. 
Professionals would thus be considered obligated not 
merely to promote the primary value of their own profession 
and the best interests of their individual clients or 
patients, but to take a leadership role in engaging in public 
discourse over the best means and structures to promote the 
common good as relating to their own field of expertise. 
Medicine, therefore, should help raise the fundamental 
questions about what it means for human beings to have good 
health and how health relates to human welfare. The legal 
profession ought to call attention to where the law needs 
reform and where justice could be better implemented. 
Healthcare administrators should conscientiously help communi-
ties decide which healthcare needs in each community should be 
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addressed and in what priority, as well as discerning the best 
means and resources to address those needs.M 
Professional Conduct is Shaped by Societal Norms 
The third way in which society partly limits and deter-
mines the behavior of professionals is to evaluate the moral 
norms of professionals in light of the moral principles and 
values commonly held in the society. It is this aspect of 
professional morality which seems to receive the most atten-
tion in the literature on professional ethics. 25 
~This position is developed from Bruce Jennings, Daniel 
Callahan and Susan Wolf, "The Professions: Public Interest and 
Common Good," Hastings Center Report 17 (February 1987): 3-11; 
Michael Bayles, Professional Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 
1981), 16-29; William Werpehowski, "The Professions: Voca-
tions to Justice and Love, in Francis Eigo, ed., The Profes-
sions in Ethical Context: Vocations to Justice and Love 
(Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1986), 1-24; Richard 
Wade, "Corporate Ethics for Hospitals," Michigan Hospitals 26, 
no. 3 {1990): 40-41; James Summers, "Closing Unprofitable 
Services: Ethical Issues and Management Responses," Hospital 
and Health Services Administration 30 (1985): 8-28; Joseph 
Peters and Ronald Wacker, "Strategic Planning: Hospital 
Strategic Planning Must Be Rooted in Values and Ethics," 
Hospitals 56, no. 12 (16 June 1982): 90-98. 
~Much of the literature on professional ethics describes 
this issue as a conflict between "professional role morality" 
and "ordinary morality." The latter term is a misnomer, 
however, for three reasons; ordinary morality is often 
interpreted in an unduly simplistic and absolute way, as in 
suggesting it is always wrong to lie or to harm another. 
Secondly, there are a variety of moral theories that conceiv-
ably could contest for the term, "ordinary morality," and 
thirdly, much of what passes for ordinary morality actually 
constitutes various other forms of role moralities, e.g., a 
professional may also be a spouse, a parent, a citizen, etc., 
with each role containing its own specific obligations. The 
term "ordinary morality" will here be used to convey a sense 
of commonly accepted moral principles and values - most 
particularly the principle of client or patient autonomy, 
i.e., the right to be fully informed and to choose or refuse 
118 
The popular argument against this position states that 
professionals, by virtue of their exclusive expertise and 
institutionally-protected role, have rights and duties that 
are unique to their professional positions and which may 
differ from or even be contrary to the rights and duties 
commonly found in societal morality. Infringing on the moral 
rights of clients or patients is sometimes argued to be 
justified on the grounds that this infringement actually 
contributes to or results in the ends desirable to the 
professions and to society. 26 For example, role-differenti-
ated behavior for physicians might justify lying to the 
patient if the physician believed the truth would have a 
significant detrimental effect on the health of his patient. 
The physician's primary professional obligation to the 
patient's health might be held to outweigh his normal moral 
obligation to truth-telling and respecting patient autonomy. 
A lawyer might be justified in withholding client-information 
professional help in accordance with one's wishes and values, 
since it is this principle which seems to always be the major 
source of conflict in the literature with professional role-
differentiated morality. 
usee, for example, Benjamin Freedman, "A Meta-Ethics for 
Professional Morality," Ethics 89 (1978): 1-19; "What Really 
Makes Professional Morality Different: Response to Martin." 
Ethics 91 (1981): 626-630; Monroe Freedman, Lawyers Ethics in 
an Adversary System (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975); 
"The Problem of Writing, Enforcing, and Teaching Ethical 
Rules: A Reply to Professor Goldman," Criminal Justice Ethics 
3 (1984): 14-16; Charles Freid, "The Lawyer as Friend: The 
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation," in Patrick 
Keenan, Patrick, ed., Teaching Professional Responsibility 
(Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1979), 813-842. 
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from the court, even if this meant the obstruction of justice 
or the harm to another person, since the lawyer's obligation 
to promote the client's interests take precedence over all 
other moral values. 
The attempts to justify a strongly role-differentiated 
morality (in which role-obligations can easily "trump" 
ordinary morality) are to a great extent not compatible, 
however, with the terms of the social contract which has been 
discussed. In this social contract, professions are estab-
lished as constituting the best means to address particular 
fundamental human needs or social concerns. Thus the role-
specific duties regarding interactions between professionals 
and lay people normally are limited and guided by the commonly 
accepted moral values and norms present in that society which 
helped give rise to the professions, because society cannot 
easily create professions with contrary moral values and norms 
that are not held by the society. 27 
It must be acknowledged, however, that the terms of the 
social contract may allow in some instances digressions from 
"ordinary morality" if those digressions are viewed as less 
significant than the value promoted by the professional 
27This point is argued in Veatch, "The Triple Contract: A 
New Foundation for Medical Ethics," 67-75; Alan Gewirth, 
"Professional Ethics: The Separatist Thesis," Ethics 96 
(1986): 282-300; Alan Goldman, "Professional Values and the 
Problem of Regulation," Business and Professional Ethics 
Journal 5, no. 2 (1986): 27-39; The Moral Foundations of 
Professional Ethics (Savage, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publish-
ers, 1980); Mary Mahowald, "Are Codes of Professional Ethics 
Ethical?" Health Matrix 2, no. 2 (1984): 37-42. 
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service. For example, a physician may elect to offer a 
placebo to a suffering patient, or to withhold "bad news" from 
a patient until she judges the patient to be capable of 
receiving the information; in both cases she defends her 
apparent violations of ordinary morality, i.e, respect for 
patient autonomy, on the grounds that in these cases she 
judges her professional obligation to beneficence, i.e, to act 
in the best interests of the patient, to outweigh her ordinary 
obligation to respect patient autonomy. Similarly, a · ,awyer 
may harangue a rape victim and disclose her past sexual 
history for the benefit of aiding the case of his client; in 
this case, the conflict between valuing procedural justice and 
valuing substantive justice makes it unclear if he has 
unjustifiably violated the mores of "ordinary morality." 
For purposes here, however, two points will be acknowl-
edged. First, since society has established, through the 
social contract, the existence of professions and therefore 
reserves the authority to define the nature of the moral 
values and norms of the professions, then normally profession-
als should not be excused for violating the moral values and 
norms of society. 
Secondly, when circumstances occur such that the role-
specif ic duties of professionals obligates them, in their 
judgment, to act in ways that outside of their professional 
role they would judge to be wrong, then a serious problem 
arises negatively impacting the moral character of the 
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professional. This issue cannot be fully addressed here; for 
now it suffices to say that there are times when the profes-
sional experiences moral conflict and suffers resultant "moral 
costs" as a result of perceived conflicts between "ordinary 
morality" and the role-specific duties established by society 
for his or her profession. When apparent violations occur, 
the authority remains with society - and not with the profes-
sions alone - to determine if the digressions from "ordinary 
morality" are less significant than the value promoted by the 
professional service. This determination will most likely 
never be exact, unanimous, or absolute, and the degree of 
tolerance for divergence from ordinary morality will vary 
depending upon the degree of the perceived violation, the 
amount of resultant harm occurring due to the violation, and 
the importance granted at any one particular time to the moral 
value or norm that has been violated.n 
For purposes here, when the professional' s atypical moral 
commitment to clients or patients seems to require some sort 
of role-differentiated behavior, this will be understood in a 
limited fashion to mean only that the professional is expected 
to undertake an intensification of specific values commonly 
found in society. The professional emphasis upon particular 
~This position is developed from Gerald Postema, "Moral 
Responsibility in Professional Ethics," in Profits and 
Professions, 37-63; Bernard Williams, "Professional Morality 
and Its Dispositions," in David Luban, ed., The Good Lawyer 
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 259-269; R.S. Downie, 
Roles and Values (London: Methuen & Co., LTD., 1971), 121-145. 
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values found in "ordinary morality" is sometimes deemed 
necessary for the fulfillment of the professional tasks. For 
example, the value of confidentiality is intensified in almost 
all professional practice. This allows the patient to bare 
his body to the physician to be healed, his personal life to 
the lawyer to obtain justice, and his soul to the priest in 
seeking salvation. Because of the value of the service 
offered by the professions, breaches in confidentiality in 
professional practice are taken much more seriously than when 
they occur in normal human relations. 
Similarly, much of the literature on professional ethics 
argues that the moral principle of beneficence marks perhaps 
the most distinguishing characteristic of professions and 
professional obligations.~ Writers within the Critical 
approach to professions, however, view an intensification of 
beneficence as merely a supererogatory duty of professionals, 
and cite the moral obligations of professionals to be no more 
than "ordinary" moral constraints with the provision that 
professionals utilize all means available to them for the 
benefit of their client or patient.M An analysis of the role 
29See, for example, Edmund Pellegrino, "Toward a Recon-
struction of Medical Morality: The Primacy of the Act of 
Profession and the Fact of Illness," Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 4 (1979): 32-56; Joseph Ellin, "Special Profes-
sional Morality and the Duty of Veracity," Business and 
Professional Ethics 1, no. 2 (1982): 75-90. 
30See, for example, Susan Wolf, "Ethics, Legal Ethics, and 
the Ethics of Law," in The Good Lawyer, 38-59; R.S. Downie, 
"Professional Ethics," Journal of Medical Ethics 12, no. 2 
(June 1986): 64-66. 
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of beneficence in professional practice will be undertaken in 
Chapter VII. 
To conclude this section of the chapter, then, there are 
three ways in which society determines the content and 
normative function of professional ethics within the social 
contract. It is important to add, however, that the role-
specific duties of professionals as constructed by society in 
the social contract should not be viewed as standards or 
obligations imposed upon professionals. Rather, the role-
specific duties of professionals are part of the societally-
defined understanding of what it means to be a professional. 
Being a professional involves a specific set of commitments 
and duties by the very nature of being a professional. To 
become a professional knowing what society's expectations of 
such persons are, is to place oneself under certain criteria 
which can be invoked to assess one's moral performance of that 
role. Publicly committing oneself as a professional and 
receiving societal recognition of professional status commits 
oneself to the role-specific duties required by society of 
that professional position. By joining a profession, there-
fore, an individual commits oneself to - and can justifiably 
be evaluated by - the moral norms established by society for 
that professional position. 31 
31This is argued in Camenisch, Groundinq Professional 
Ethics in a Pluralistic Society, 34-35; Tibor Machan, "Ethics 
and the Regulation of Professional Ethics," Philosophia 
(Israel) 13 (1983): 337-348; Karen Lebacqz, Professional 
Ethics: Power and Paradox (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1985), 
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Conclusion 
The existence of professions and the determination of the 
content and normative function of professional ethics is thus 
the result of a social contract. Again, this contract is not 
a written or formal document, but is a conceptual means of 
explaining the social arrangement establishing professions and 
their ethics. In Part II, four different models of the 
professional-client/patient relationship currently espoused in 
the literature on professional ethics and in the literature on 
the ethics of hospital administrators will be explored and 
evaluated within the framework of the social contract. It 
will be argued that the first three models, i.e., Guild, Agent 
and Commercial models, all fail to satisfy the criteria 
established by this social contract; only the Interactive 
model of profession and professional ethics will be found to 
be acceptable within the terms of the social contract. 
32-45; Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, A Philosophical 
Basis of Medical Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1981) ' 192-243. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ETHICS OF HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATORS 
IN THE GUILD MODEL OF PROFESSION 
This chapter will attempt to identify the moral obliga-
tions of healthcare administrators as conceived in the guild 
model of professions. The term, "guild model," is used as a 
theoretical construct to understand - or to give one interpre-
tation of - historically developed characteristics of profes-
sion. The guild model will be the first of four models or 
perspectives through which the professional ethics of health-
care administrators will be examined. 
Presuppositions of the guild model will be first identi-
fied. Characteristics of the medieval guilds and of the later 
professional associations which left a historical imprint on 
the development of professions in our own country will be 
briefly described in order to clarify the model. 
In the second part of this chapter the guild-like 
characteristics that are still found in professions today and 
that contribute to our understanding of "professionalism" and 
to the notion of "acting professionally" will be examined. It 
will be proposed that there are five guild-like characteris-
tics which may be discerned in our popular conception of 
profession today: 1) A preparatory liberal education followed 
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by a professional education which consists of theoretical 
knowledge coupled with hands-on practical application of that 
knowledge; 2) An ongoing commitment to excellence in one's 
professional field, with a common understanding that the final 
intellectual authority on professional expertise resides 
within the professional group; 3) A commitment to apply the 
exclusive expertise of the profession in a parental or 
paternal manner for the good of the client or patient; 4) An 
allegiance and accountability primarily to one's professional 
peers resulting in a defensive posture toward outside nonpro-
fessional interference in professional matters, because only 
the professional group is competent to select, train, creden-
tial and discipline members of the profession; 5) An aristo-
cratic or "gentlemanly" behavior in the general conducting of 
one's professional life. 
The major part of this chapter will then attempt to 
identify the moral obligations of healthcare administrators as 
these would be understood within the guild model of profes-
sion. This will be done by examining the seven categories of 
professional obligation: l} identification of the chief 
client, 2) ideal relationship with the chief client, 3) 
commitment to the good of the chief client, 4) central values 
of the profession, 5) commitment to competence, 6) ideal 
relationship with fellow professionals, and 7) ideal rela-
tionship with society at large. 
The final section of this chapter will critique the 
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concept of profession and professional obligation as under-
stood within the guild model. It will be argued that the 
guild model, despite contributing important characteristics to 
our popular understanding of profession, would not be an 
acceptable model of professional obligation for healthcare 
administrators within the social contract between society and 
this profession. First, the type of near-absolute autonomy in 
professional practice with accompanying paternalistic rela-
tions with clients or patients that is requisite within the 
guild model of profession runs counter to our contemporary 
practice of social democracy in general and to the increasing 
emphasis given to the autonomy of clients or patients in their 
relationship with professionals in recent years. Second, and 
contributing to the trend just Eentioned, professions which 
have attempted to exercise the type of guild-like autonomy in 
professional practice historically have often been character-
ized as misusing or abusing that autonoEy to promote their own 
interests to the detriment of society. Third, in the guild 
model of profession problems inherent in the practice of self-
regulation greatly limit professions proEoting the best 
interests of clients or patients or of society in general. In 
sum, since clients and patients do not benefit proportionately 
to the degree of autonomy in professional practice presupposed 
under the guild model of profession, it is therefore unreason-
able for society to "contract" with professions according to 
the presuppositions of the guild model of profession. 
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Presuppositions of the Guild Model of Profession 
The term "guild" as used here takes its meaning from the 
medieval guilds and from the professional associations which 
emulated critical characteristics of the medieval guilds. 
Historically, the first guilds were groups of craftsmen or 
artisans who banded together in European towns between the 
eleventh and thirteenth century. These groups developed 
required steps in training and credentialing for becoming a 
member of the guild; these served both to mark the develop-
ment from apprenticeship to the mastering of the craft and 
also to restrict competition in each group's marketing of 
their craft. 
With the rise of the European universities in the 
thirteenth century, what came to be known as "professional 
associations" of teachers and students, or "guilds of learn-
ing," most of whose members were persons of high prestige and 
honor due to their aristocratic birth and inherited title and 
wealth, began to cluster around specific fields of study such 
as medicine and law. These laypeople joined the clergy who 
were already involved in those disciplines as well as in the 
fields of theology and philosophy. Provision of a "liberal 
education," that is to say, an education fit for a gentleman 
that was based more on classical culture than on practical 
skills, distinguished these professional associations or 
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"learned guilds" from the "collllnon man's" craft-guilds. 1 
In the following centuries, the evolving occupational 
groups of medicine, law and clergy retained many of the 
characteristics of these early guilds and associations. 
Though the crafts and learned guilds were accused of market 
abuse and were subsequently abolished in Europe in the late 
eighteenth century, their characteristics of brotherhood, 
cooperation, solidarity, examining, licensing, monitoring 
specific areas of knowledge, and an attitude of expertise 
survived in many of the workers' cooperatives or associations. 
Philosophical justification for the value of these associa-
tions was offered by Hegel, who viewed the family and these 
workers' guild-like associations as constituting the two basic 
moral roots for state and society. Hegel observed that in 
large modern states the individual rarely has an opportunity 
for direct involvement in public matters and state affairs; 
but through membership in an association the individual was 
able to become involved in public ethics and public policy. 2 
The value of worker cooperatives and, among the more learned 
of what came to be called professional associations, was that 
such groups or "collective persons,," were more powerful, 
1This early history of professions is discussed Magali 
Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), 3-4; Marie Haug, "The 
Sociological Approach to Self-Regulation," in Roger Blair and 
Stephen Rubin, ed., Regulating the Professions, (Lexington, 
MA: D.C. Health and Company Lexington Books, 1980), 61-62. 
2G.F.W. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right~ trans. T.M. Knox 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press~ 1952),, secs. 250-256. 
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longer lasting,and more stable than individuals, that they 
bound together individuals with common interests, and that 
they combined common values, goals and expertise which enable 
individuals to produce more goods and achieve more goals than 
if they acted alone. 3 
These sorts of professional associations also developed 
in America in the 19th century. By this time science in this 
country had come to epitomize the very essence of intellectual 
authority. The validity of expertise was determined by what 
could be called "peer review.~ This was understood to mean 
that a scientific practitioner must expose his work to review 
by peers for judgment, and that none but his peers were 
entitled to judge him. This established a "cmmnunity of the 
competent" which was to serve as the final arbiter of authori-
ty in establishing scientific truths within the professional 
associations through a consensus of capable investigators. 
This development in turn reinforced the difference between the 
expertise of the professional and the laypersons served by the 
professional, namely, that since the professional has knowl-
edge and practical experience that their patients or clients 
lack, then the judgment of the professional should dominate in 
3This is discussed in Hans-Martin Sass, "Professional 
organizations and Professional Ethics: A European View," in 
Edmund Pellegrino, Robert Veatch and John Langan, ed., Ethics, 
Trust, and the Professions (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1991), 263-270. 
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all decisions relating to that expertise. 4 
Characteristics of the Guild Model of Profession 
Much of the contemporary literature in sociology which 
studies the professions tends to identify existing professions 
by their guild-like characteristics. 5 The second part of this 
chapter will propose that there are five principal guild-like 
characteristics that contribute to the popular understanding 
of what it means to be a member of a profession or to "act 
professionally". 
The first guild-like characteristic refers to the type of 
education expected of a professional. Since professionals 
"practice" their trade and make their living by providing 
needed services to their clients or patients, a practical 
education involving "hands-on" learning and apprenticeship or 
internship modeled after the original guilds of artisans is 
required. Yet, possibly due both to the influence of the 
early "guilds of learning" from which the "traditional" 
professions of medicine, law and clergy emerged and to the 
4This point is examined in Thomas Haskell, "Professionali-
zation as Cultural Reform," Humanities in Society 1 (1978): 
103-114. 
5See, for example, Kenneth Lynn~ ed., The Professions in 
America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965); Amitai 
Etzioni, ed., The Semi-Professions and Their Organization 
(New York: The Free Press, 1969); Randall Collins, The 
Credential Society (New York: Academic Press, 1979); Howard 
Vollmer and Donald Mills, ed., Professionalization (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Ronald Cross and Paul 
Osterman, ed., The New Professionals (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1972). 
132 
belief in our country that science is the basis for intellec-
tual authority, professionals today are generally expected to 
also possess the theoretical background and justification for 
their practical knowledge. Professionals are expected to know 
both how to accomplish something and why it works. As argued 
in Chapter II, the popular image of one who is trained only in 
practical knowledge is that of technician, while the one who 
possesses only the theoretical knowledge is a scholar. It is 
the combination of the two that is generally required in our 
popular understanding of professions and professionals. 
The early guilds of learning historically were also made 
up almost exclusively by the nobility or gentry. Trained in 
the classics and with an extended education in liberal arts, 
these members of the early professional associations were 
known for their ability to think broadly and to speak elo-
quently on a wide variety of issues. Even today, part of what 
could be termed the "professional image" includes a sense of 
being "cultured" and generally knowledgeable on a wide range 
of issues. But a broad liberal education has a practical 
application as well; though most professional knowledge has 
a scientific basis, the practice or application of that 
knowledge has long been considered an art and a good liberal 
arts education has often been viewedr therefore, as beneficial 
to successful professional practice. Even though much 
professional training is highly specialized today, this 
popular association of professional with broad understanding 
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and liberal training persists. Healthcare administrators, for 
example, require broad education in business and management 
principles, finances, and healthcare delivery, yet success in 
their job is dependent upon their ability to apply their 
theoretical knowledge in day-to-day practice. 6 
A second guild-like characteristic which seems to 
influence our popular understanding of profession is the 
obligation of the professional to excellence in his or her 
field, that is, to ongoing competence in professional skill. 
With continued advancements or developments in scientific 
knowledge, in law, in theology, or in other matters directly 
pertaining to professional practice, standards of competence 
increase with the professions. A profess ion a 1 who hasn't 
bothered to keep up with developments in his professional 
field is viewed as irresponsible, since he may not provide an 
available benefit to a client or patient and may in fact even 
cause harm through his insufficient knowledge or skill. If 
this happens on a wide-spread basis, i.e., many members of a 
given profession do not keep up with developments within their 
field of expertise, their very professional status then 
becomes threatened as clients or patients seek out other means 
to address their needs. A professional is expected to remain 
competent as a matter of good faith to his or her commitment 
as a professional. 
6This perspective is also suggested in Larson, The Rise of 
Professionalism, 3-8, 80-103. 
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The service provided by the professions traditionally has 
been understood to be the only available means (or the primary 
means) to assist people when they require assistance in 
addressing fundamental values such as health, justice or 
religious salvation. Professionals are therefore required to 
maintain and continually grow in their area of exclusive 
competence in order to maintain market control of their needed 
services. For healthcare administrators facing a highly 
competitive and rapidly changing healthcare delivery system, 
ongoing growth in their area of expertise is required not only 
for their own job and institutional survival, but for the very 
maintenance of their professional role and market control over 
their services. 
Furthermore, it is understood in the guild model of 
professions that the criteria for determining professional 
competency can be established only by the profession itself. 
Even if professionals are employed by nonprofessionals, the 
professions are left relatively free to develop their own 
special areas of knowledge and to determine what are profes-
sionally acceptable practices. Though professionals today 
increasingly find the quality of their services measured by 
third-party payers, those measurements still tend to be 
determined by fellow professionals employed by the third-
parties. Professional associations or societies establish the 
criteria for professional competency as well as the standards 
for accreditation for the professional schools training the 
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candidates of their own profession. Professional knowledge 
and the criteria determining quality professional service, 
therefore, ultimately is controlled by the professional group, 
and not by the individual practitioners and not by society at 
large (except as it recognizes, supports or tolerates the 
expertise of the professional group). 7 
The third characteristic that can be associated with the 
guild model of profession is the professional's commitment to 
apply the exclusive expertise of one's profession in a 
parental or paternal fashion for the good of the client or 
patient. The professional commitment to excellence in one's 
field of expertise is conjoined with the comroitment to use 
professional services in a personally disinterested manner for 
the benefit of the client or patient. 
There is an elegant anonymity in this coJIUili tment of 
professional trustworthiness. If a person, for example, were 
to become sick away from home and go to a hospital emergency 
room, he can trust the doctors and nurses since they are 
certified members of professions who can, prima facie, be 
taken as willing to abide by the norms of their professions. 
This would not be the same case if one's car broke down away 
from home; there one is dependent on the personal integrity 
of the automobile mechanic rather than being able to rely on 
7George Agich, "Professionalis][I and Ethics in Health 
Care," The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 5, no. 3 (1980): 
186-199; Eliot Freidson, Professional Dominance (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1970), 81-84. 
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any group-norms of his occupation. But in the hospital a 
patient can trust in the competency and personal disinterest 
of his caregivers simply because they are professionals. 8 
This special trust exists because of the unique nature of 
the relationship between professions and society. The 
individual client or patient has significant needs which she 
cannot address. Professions arise if, as occupational groups, 
they come to possess the exclusive expertise to address those 
needs. Healthcare institutions were developed to address the 
health needs of communities, and healthcare administrators 
have grown into professional status due to their unique 
ability to capably manage these highly complex healthcare 
institutions which benefit the health needs of our society. 
The commitment of the professional to the good of the 
client or patient is not entailed by the moral status of the 
individual client or patient or even from the collective moral 
status of society. Rather, it derives from one's membership 
in the profession and from the promises made when accepted 
into the profession, which in turn exists for the principle 
purpose of addressing specific fundamental human needs or 
social concerns. The professional commitment to the good of 
the client or patient is logically required and practically 
expected solely and precisely because the professional is a 
8For further development of this point, see Robert 
Sokolowski, "The Fiduciary Relationship and the Nature of 
Professions," in Ethics, Trust, and the Professions, 23-39; 
William Goode, "The Librarian: Fro:ro Occupation to Profession?" 
The Library Quarterly 31, no. 4 (1961): 306-318. 
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member of that profession. 
In the guild model professions promise to direct their 
exclusive expertise to address fundamental needs of laypeople 
who are uninformed and unskilled in the means to help them-
selves. Laypeople know only if they are physically hurting, 
if they have run afoul of the law, or if they are estranged 
from God. It oftentimes takes professionals 1 however, to 
determine what exactly is the cause or root source of their 
need and how best to address those needs. Conseguently the 
clients or patients are oftentimes dependent upon the profes-
sional' s expertise and become the passive and grateful 
recipients of the essential services provided by the profes-
sional as a representative of his or her profession. 
Essential to the guild model's understanding of the 
relationship between the professional and the client or 
patient is the inevitability of professional paternalism. 
While paternalism may carry negative overtones in today's 
society, it is unavoidable in the quild model professional-
client/patient relationship because of the professional' s 
exclusive expertise and the correspondinq ignorance, helpless-
ness or need of the client or patient. The guild model 
attempts to justify paternalism in the professional-client/ 
patient relationship. 
First, because of her exclusive expertise~ a professional 
possesses relevant knowledge which her client or patient 
lacks. She is thus better able to perceive the advantages and 
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disadvantages of alternative treatments or causes of actions 
and consequently has a certain amount of authority and 
responsibility for such decisions. For example, the patient 
may know he has stomach pains in the emergency department, but 
it is the physician who has the knowledge to determine the 
cause of the pain and to decide on an appropriate means to 
restore the patient to health. The patient seeks emergency 
healthcare, but it is the physician who is best equipped to 
decide what is appropriate care. A community may recognize 
the need for providing obstetrics services to the poor, but it 
is the healthcare administrator who best knows how those 
services may be delivered. 
Second, clients or patients who, for example, approach 
the traditional professions of medicine, law or clergy for 
help may do so partially because they experience their 
autonomy as threatened or diminished by their illness, by 
legal threats, or by spiritual despair. These deficits, 
combined with a potentially strong sense of accompanying 
anxiety and dependency, prohibit the full exercise of their 
autonomy. They may need the professional to direct their 
care, their legal help, or their spiritual lives to restore 
their sense of lost autonomy. There are times, therefore, 
when clients or patients have to trust in the expertise and 
judgment of professionals, which, when exercised in a parental 
or paternal manner, serves to restore their lost or diminished 
sense of autonomy. 
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Third, because the services provided by professionals 
address human needs that are oftentimes fundamental to people, 
professionals are sometimes allowed to exercise judgment 
regarding what is in the best interests of the clients or 
patients. For example, requiring an unwilling patient to 
undergo painful physical therapy following a knee replacement 
is beneficial to that patient. Implementing clinical pathways 
for individual patients in an age of reduced reimbursements 
may help assure the long-term presence of a needed healthcare 
institution in a given community, even if this forces the 
initially unwilling community to develop structures for caring 
for the sick outside of the healthcare institution. The guild 
model presumes that human beings, as individuals and as 
members of a community, normally desire that threats or 
limitations to their fundamental well-being be addressed in 
the best way possible, which, according to the guild model of 
profession, normally occurs through the means offered by the 
professional. Consequently, for these three reasons, in the 
guild model of profession paternalism is a natural feature of 
the professional-client/patient relationship. 9 
A fourth set of characteristics of profession associated 
with the guild model is primary allegiance and accountability 
9This is also discussed in Michael Bayles, Professional 
Ethics, 2d ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1989), 74-76; Marilyn Peterson, At Personal Risk {New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 11-49j Wade Robison, "Subordi-
nates and Moral Dilemmas," Business and Pro:fessional Ethics 
Journal 10, no. 4 {1991): 3-22. 
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to one's professional peers, with an accompanying defensive 
posture toward outside interference, since only the profes-
sional group has the competency to select, train, credential 
and discipline members of its own profession. While some 
economic competition exists between members of the same 
profession in a sheltered market, a sense of fraternity and 
collegiality reminiscent of the medieval guilds tends to exist 
among the professions in the guild model. This is reflected 
in practice in a number of ways. 
Members of the same profession tend to offer comparable 
pricing for their services (and, until recently, in the 
forbidding of advertising for their individual services) which 
supposedly reduces competition and the incentives of material 
interest. Protecting their income not only from internal 
competition and also disallowing outside competition from non-
professionals is presumed to enable professionals to focus on 
"working well" and on gaining the approval and respect of 
their colleagues through the capable practice of their 
professional expertise. Thus, their evaluation of their own 
and each other's work is based on contemporary conceptions of 
genuine quality and not on cost or even outcome; these latter 
criteria are typical of non-professional 111odes of measurement. 
Professionals in the guild model believe that their 
expertise is so exclusive that members of society are too 
ignorant to offer input of any value to the knowledge or 
proper functioning of their professional practice. Physicians 
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tend to react negatively to third party payer interference in 
their treatment decisions, and many healthcare administrators 
view their boards and trustees as failing to fully appreciate 
how a capably-run heal th care institution should function. 
Professionals in general tend to exhibit resentful defensive-
ness with corresponding group posturinq for mutual self-
protection in the face of attempts by nonprofessionals in 
society to interfere with their internal practices. Criticism 
by professionals of their own peers is rare since there is a 
presumption among professionals that their colleagues are 
persons of integrity and competence and that they are governed 
by the internal controls inculcated durinq their professional 
training. 10 
The fifth characteristic of profession found in the guild 
model is what could be called aristocratic or "gentlemanly" 
behavior in the conducting of one's professional practice. 
While this is somewhat of a minor feature compared to the 
10Analysis of this characteristic can be found in the 
following sources: Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and 
Civic Morals, trans. Cornelia Brookfield (Glencoe, IL: The 
Free Press, 1954), 4-24; Eliot Freidson, "The Centrality of 
Professionalism to Health Care," Jurimetrics Journal 30 
( 1990): 431-445; Professional Dominance, 96-104; James 
Weaver, "Affirming Physicians' Professionalism Against the 
Destructive Influence of Private Third Party Relations," North 
Carolina Medical Journal 52, no. 11 (1991): 587-589; Stephen 
O'Connor and Joyce Lanning, "The End of Autonomy? Reflections 
on the Postprofessional Physician,~ Health Care Management 
Review 17, no. 1 {1992): 63-72; Alden Haffner, "Professional-
ism in Optometry," Journal of the American Optometric Associa-
tion 57, no. 4 {1986): 275-278; Stephen Rubin, "The Legal Web 
of Professional Regulation," in Regulating the Professions, 
29-43. 
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previous four categories of guild-like characteristics, this 
last feature does play a part in what could be called the 
professional image or mentality. The early professional 
associations were composed of aristocrats of high birth and 
title, educated in liberal arts and in the classics, who were 
therefore expected to conduct themselves in a manner above the 
behavior of the common class. Combined with a serious study 
of the sciences, a commitment to excellence in their profes-
sion and a pledge to personal disinterest in promoting the 
good of their client or patient, professional behavior in the 
guild model can be characterized by what could be called a 
"gentlemanly" behavior, i.e, qualities such as integrity, 
confidentiality, and a commitment to quality in the provision 
of their professional services, as well as traditional 
behavioral traits associated with the English gentry class 
such as seriousness, aloofness, and remaining unruffled in the 
face of pressures or demands. These "gentle:manly" qualities, 
combined with the professional attitude of paternalism toward 
the good of the client or patient, has contributed to the 
development of the popular meaning of "acting professionally," 
or "professional etiquette."LL 
These five characteristics or categories of characteris-
tics that derive from the medieval guilds and early 
11This characteristic is suggested, but not elaborated on, 
in Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, 61-63; Eliot Freid-
son, "The Theory of Professions: State of the .Art," in Peter 
Wind et al., eds., Ethical Issues in the Professions. (Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), JB-49. 
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professional associations, and that survived in the European 
workers' associations in the following centuries and in the 
early development of the American profess ions, are still 
significant in our popular understanding of the meaning of 
profession today. In the third part of this chapter, the 
implications of these guild-like characteristics for profes-
sional conduct will be developed into an account of the moral 
obligations of healthcare administrators as understood 
according to the guild model of profession. 
Professional Ethics of Healthcare Administrators 
in the Guild Model of Profession 
Identification of Chief Client 
The ethics of healthcare administrators will be analyzed 
throughout this study by means of the seven categories of 
professional obligation described in Chapter III. The first 
category is identification of the chief client of healthcare 
administrators as understood according to the guild model of 
profession. This is a more difficult task than when engaged 
in studying the "traditional" professions where the identity 
of the chief client is self-evident, e.g., the physician and 
his patient, the lawyer and her clientJ the priest and his 
parishioner or congregation. Unlike all other healthcare 
professionals whose chief client consists of individual 
patients, in the guild model of profession the chief client of 
the healthcare administrator - by nature of the exclusive 
expertise which has brought professional status to healthcare 
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administration, namely, the ability to utilize a unique blend 
of multiple skills and talents to administrate a highly 
complex institution designed to serve a community's health 
needs - is not the collection of individual patients, but 
rather is the healthcare institution itself. 
The professional role of healthcare administration has 
evolved because of the societal response in creating and 
promoting healthcare institutions to address the healthcare 
needs of individual patients. But healthcare administrators 
have very little contact or involvement with actual patients, 
and never directly take part in the actual provision of 
healthcare which is the very function of their institution. 
Their relationship with individual patients is very distant 
and exercised only through layers of management and employees. 
In the guild model of profession, patients become the passive 
recipients of the highly technical healthcare offered by a 
variety of professionally-skilled personnel under the manage-
ment and structures developed or administered over by the 
healthcare administrator. The only input healthcare adminis-
trators require from patients comes from patient satisfaction 
surveys, from which they can learn what are the popular 
features of their institution which they can market to the 
community and what are the problem areas in their institution 
which require their expertise to address. Patient suggestions 
or recommendations are dismissed since they cannot "grasp the 
big picture" and cannot understand what is involved in 
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administrating a complex healthcare institution. 
Patients who are sick or hurting come to healthcare 
institutions when they lack the means to address their health 
problems. The healthcare institution, with the healthcare 
administrator at its head and as its public representative, is 
generally expected in our American society to act in the role 
of service to the community in addressing the healthcare needs 
of indi victual patients. 12 The healthcare administrator is 
commonly held responsible for assuring that the healthcare 
institution is designated for and publicly committed to the 
healthcare needs of patients, and that it concentrates and 
makes available those resources that a person from that 
community needs when sick or hurting with the promise that the 
institution will assist the sick person to regain his lost 
health and autonomy to the maximum degree possible. The 
healthcare institution, with the healthcare administrator 
understood to possess a considerable amount of decision-making 
authority, may also be expected to make its services available 
12In referring to the "healthcare institution acting", what 
is meant here is the moral agency of the group of healthcare 
workers whose collective decisions and actions represent the 
healthcare institution and are expected to be undertaken in 
the interests of the individual patients. There has been 
considerable philosophical debate about the idea that institu-
tions act as unitary agents and can therefore have at least 
some of the features of individual human agents attributed to 
them. In defense of this view, see Larry May and Stacey 
Hoffman, eds., Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of 
Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Savage, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1991) ; Thomas DonaldsonJ Corporations and 
Morality (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982); Peter 
French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984). 
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to all in the community and to not compromise patient care -
at least urgent patient care - over concern for cost-contain-
ment measures, and also to not profit unjustly in offering 
treatment for patients' needs.D 
Capably organizing and managing a complex healthcare 
institution requires an exclusive expertise which has given 
rise to the profession of healthcare administration. In 
regards to individual patients and to the local community, the 
healthcare administrator represents the profession's response 
to facilitate the healthcare institution's reasonable provi-
sion for the highest quality healthcare possible to meet their 
health needs. 
In regards to physicians, management and employees, the 
healthcare administrator alone possesses the necessary 
business and management skills to optimally facilitate the 
delivery of their healthcare services within the healthcare 
institution to individual patients and the local community. 
In regards to the sponsor of the healthcare institution, the 
healthcare administrator is best gualif ied to assure that the 
sponsor's interests and values are respected in the function 
of the healthcare institution. 
In the guild model of profession~ therefore, the chief 
client of healthcare administrators - whose welfare they are 
13These points are drawn from Edmund Pellegrino and David 
Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), 244-265; Frank Marsh and Mark 
Yarborough, Medicine and Money (New ~ork: Greenwood Press, 
1990), 30-32. 
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committed to promoting - is the healthcare institution itself. 
Only healthcare administrators possess the exclusive exper-
tise, i.e., the necessary knowledge, training, and experience, 
to capably and efficiently direct and operate the highly 
complex healthcare institution. It is not uncommon to hear 
healthcare administrators, viewing their role from the 
perspective of the guild model of profession, to claim that 
their primary responsibility and professional obligation is to 
promote the good of their healthcare institution. 
For all other healthcare professionals, therefore, the 
healthcare institution is only a means (a facility with needed 
technology) for providing their professional services to their 
chief client, namely, 
administrators alone, 
the individual patients. 
by virtue of the nature 
Healthcare 
of their 
exclusive expertise, have as their chief client the healthcare 
institution itself. 
Ideal Relationship with Chief Client 
The ideal relationship of the healthcare administrator 
with its chief client, the healthcare institution, is a rather 
peculiar relationship for two reasons. First, administrating 
a complex and highly technical healthcare institution requires 
a great number of highly specialized skills which the health-
care administrator could not hope to personally possess. 
Secondly, many of the employees of healthcare institutions 
either consider themselves to be or are co11llnonly considered by 
society to be professionals as well. 
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In dealing with the first issue, then, it is critical 
that the healthcare administrator surround herself with both 
highly competent and loyal individuals who make up the 
administrative team or council. It is imperative that the 
healthcare administrator be able to rely upon these individu-
als for their expertise and for their commitment to the 
healthcare institution. With their input the healthcare 
administrator, who remains the final authority and decision-
maker in the guild model, will best be able to make capable 
decisions on highly complex matters of management and business 
to best promote the welfare of the healthcare institution. 
In regards to the second issue, managing professionals 
who are directly involved in patient care requires a delicate 
balancing of allowing those professionals control over the 
content of their work while the healthcare administrator yet 
maintains control over the terms of their work. In other 
words, professionals such as nurses, respiratory therapists, 
anesthetists, and so forth, and even physicians, possess an 
exclusive expertise in their own field which should be 
honored, e.g., nurses know best how nursing care should be 
provided. These professionals, however, are focused almost 
exclusively on the benefit their services provide to their own 
individual patient. The healthcare administrator, by virtue 
of his responsibility to promote the good of the institution 
as a whole, must provide mechanisms for oversight and regula-
tion so that it is the institution and the fulfillment of the 
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institution's responsibility to all its patients which 
ultimately benefits through the services of the professionals 
it employs. There may well always be tensions existing, then, 
between the healthcare administrator and the professionals 
employed by the institution over issues such as staffing and 
capital expenses because these different professionals have 
different chief clients, but those decisions must always be 
made by the healthcare administrator because she alone has the 
exclusive expertise and responsibility to judge what is best 
for the healthcare institution. 
Commitment to the Good of the Chief Client 
The third moral category is commitment to the good of the 
chief client. The healthcare institution exists to address 
the fundamental healthcare needs of the members of a local 
community. The profession of healthcare administrators exists 
to address the societal need for healthcare institutions to be 
operated as capably and as efficiently as possible. In the 
guild model of profession healthcare administrators, by virtue 
of being members of this profession, undertake the responsi-
bility to promote the good of their chief client, the health-
care institution. 
Healthcare administrators may be said to understand the 
"good'' of the healthcare institution in four different ways. 
First, a good institution is one that is achieving its 
purpose. A healthcare administrator, then, is obligated to 
utilize her administrative skills to promote high quality care 
150 
for patients throughout the institution. Second, a good 
institution is one that has effective and productive employ-
ees. A healthcare administrator, then, is obligated to 
promote, develop, maintain, and improve the institutional 
structures to facilitate the provision of quality care, and to 
develop the skills and attitude of the healthcare workers so 
that they are able to function at the fullest extent of their 
capability. Third, a good institution is one that is known 
for its integrity and fidelity. A healthcare administrator, 
then, is obligated to always act in a morally upright manner 
and to assure that ethical decisions are made on both the 
clinical and institutional levels. Fourth, a good institution 
is one that is financially solvent. A healthcare administra-
tor, then, is obligated to exercise astute business skills and 
to make appropriate decisions to best assure the healthcare 
institution will survive and thrive. 14 
The professional obligation of the healthcare adminis-
trator to promote the good of her chief client, the healthcare 
institution, takes priority over other moral obligations which 
exist with the other clients of healthcare administrators, 
including their own employers. 15 That is, many healthcare 
14Should conflicts arise in attempting to fulfill all four 
of these professional obligations, the healthcare administra-
tor may then appeal to the hierarchy of central values of 
healthcare administration which will be examined next in the 
fourth category of professional obligation. 
15See pages 62-63 for a listing of the client-groups of 
healthcare administrators. 
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administrators feel a tension in their atypical moral commit-
ment to their institution due to particular pressures which 
may be laid upon them by their institution's sponsor, owner, 
or shareholders, e.g, to consistently show a positive bottom 
line regardless of impact on patient care, or to always 
possess favorable relations with the medical staff regardless 
of any repercussions this may have with employees. Should the 
healthcare administrator succumb to pressures from her 
employer and oblige such requests, then she has violated the 
professional obligation to promote the good of her chief 
client, which in the guild model of profession is understood 
to be the healthcare institution. 
For healthcare administrators within the guild model of 
profession, to maintain their claim to professional status 
they must have developed the understanding with their institu-
tion's sponsor, owner, or shareholders that while they will 
work to represent whatever mission or interests those groups 
may have, the primary obligation that healthcare administra-
tors possess by nature of being members of their profession is 
to promote the good of their chief client, that is, their 
healthcare institution. To do otherwise is to destroy their 
professional status and to consign them into being no more 
than business managers operating under the direction or whim 
of their boss who signs their paycheck. 
Central Values of the Profession 
The fourth category of professional obligation is the 
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identification and prioritization of the central values of the 
profession. Most of the decisions of healthcare administra-
tors are inherently value-laden and involve choices between 
conflicting values. A careful analysis of the role of 
healthcare administrators reveals five fundamental or central 
values of this profession. Four of these values are directed 
towards promoting the good or well-being of the healthcare 
institution, as previously identified in the third category of 
professional obligation. The fifth value, which is the health 
of the community, is a value related to and yet distinct from 
the well-being of the healthcare institution. It is important 
not only to identify these central values but to rank them in 
a hierarchic scheme to assist healthcare administrators in 
determining which values can and should have a determinative 
role in ethical decision-making. It is proposed that these 
five value considerations dominate the ethical reflection of 
healthcare administrators, and that the proposed hierarchic 
scheme of values can and should direct healthcare administra-
tors' deliberation when faced with value-conflicts. 16 
16As the role of healthcare administration continues to 
develop with changes rapidly occurring in the provision of 
health care, i.e., a decline in the number of patient days in 
an acute care setting, and a rise in the number of patients 
utilizing rehabilitation and outpatient treatment centers or 
requiring home assistance or institutional care for chronic or 
debilitating illnesses, the central values of the healthcare 
administrator may likewise continue to evolve. But the 
emphasis upon particular values in the hierarchy of central 
values will most likely remain constant as defined within each 
of the four models of profession examined here in Part Two, 
despite developments and shifts within healthcare institu-
tions. 
153 
The hierarchical ranking of these central values of 
healthcare administrators will differ for each of the four 
models of profession used to study the profession of health-
care administration in Part Two. This is because each model 
develops a different understanding of profession, each with a 
different emphasis upon particular values. In the guild model 
of profession, it is proposed that the central values of 
healthcare administrators can be identified and prioritized in 
a hierarchic scheme (with 11 1 11 as the highest central value and 
the rest in descending order of priority) as follows: 
1. Effective and capable management of employees, 
and good relations with the medical staff 
2. Institutional integrity 
3. Financial viability of the organization 
4. Health of individual patients 
5. Health of the community 
The first value on the hierarchic scheme for healthcare 
administrators in the guild model of profession is the 
existence of effective and capable management of employees, 
and good relations with the medical staff. The primary skills 
of healthcare administrators are management and business 
skills, which constitute the nature of the exclusive expertise 
which society expects in its healthcare institutions, and for 
which healthcare administrators as the profession designed to 
meet this expectation has developed. 17 As a result, health-
care administrators in the guild model of profession apply 
17For a sample listing of these skills, see Terry Cooper, 
The Responsible Administrator: An Approach to Ethics for the 
Administrative Role (San Francisco: Jessey-Bass, 1990}, 222-
235. 
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their exclusive expertise so that the healthcare institution 
may function to its fullest capability. This means that the 
activities of healthcare administrators are primarily geared 
towards promoting the essential or highly valued qualities of 
a good healthcare institution, namely, effective and capable 
management of employees, and good relations with the medical 
staff. Without these qualities, the healthcare institution 
could not provide the healthcare expected by society. 
These valued qualities together constitute the most 
important central value for healthcare administrators in the 
guild model of profession since they can be brought about only 
by healthcare administrators. These qualities of a good 
healthcare institution, therefore, are not merely valued 
instrumentally for the sake of promoting the health of 
patients. While it is presumed that the application of the 
exclusive expertise of healthcare administrators will promote 
the health of individual patients in the healthcare institu-
tions, developing and facilitating effective and capable 
management of employees and good relations with the medical 
staff are the qualities or tasks most highly valued by 
healthcare administrators in the guild model of profession 
since only their exclusive expertise can bring them about, 
regardless of the overall impact on the health of individual 
patients. It is the healthcare institution which is the chief 
client of healthcare administrators in this model, and whose 
well-being they are committed to pro~oting. These qualities 
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which are necessary for a healthcare institution to function, 
then, have intrinsic and not just instrumental value for 
healthcare administrators in the guild model of profession. 
Two further points need to be mentioned. First, working 
with effective and capable management and employees not only 
contributes to the healthcare administrator being able to 
exercise good management and business skills, but is also to 
a great extent dependent upon the good management skills of 
the healthcare administrator. 
Second, good relations with the medical staff can be 
expressed in various ways. Earlier in this century the 
success of the healthcare administrator was often directly 
correlated to his positive or negative relations with the 
medical staff. In recent times, however, the "balance of 
power" has shifted and healthcare administrators now exert 
considerable control over the practice and behavior of 
physicians in their institutions. 18 Currently, however, as 
physician-hospital alliances are being formed in response to 
the evolution of managed care and capitation reimbursement, 
healthcare administrators and physicians now find that they 
must work closely together as equa 1 partners for mutual 
benefit in the alliance. 
The second central value in the hierarchic scheme is 
18For a brief summary of these changes, see Rosemary 
Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 341-344; 
Philip Boyle, "Outcome Data and Ethics: Getting Doctors to Pay 
Attention," Health Progress 73, no. 4 (1992): 70-71. 
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institutional integrity. This means that the healthcare 
administrator must be committed to the mission of the health-
care institution, that is, to the reason or the purpose for 
the existence of the healthcare institution. When anyone 
assumes leadership of an organization or corporation it is 
understood that that person is not representing his or her own 
interests nor other individuals' interests, but rather using 
prudent judgment to further the best interests of the organi-
zation or corporation. For healthcare administrators this 
means that a fundamental central value, with a corresponding 
professional obligation, is to pursue the good or well-being 
of their institution. Healthcare institutions are expected by 
society to benefit the patients they serve. In the guild 
model, the healthcare administrators' role in providing this 
benefit is determined not so much by the quality of the 
healthcare provided to patients but by the successful and 
capable operation of the institution. 1<> 
Promoting institutional integrity, however, ranks as only 
the second central value in this hierarchic scheme. This is 
because in the guild model of the profession, the professional 
knows what is best for his chief client. Normally the 
healthcare administrator exercises a relatively autonomous 
19This point is exhibited in Chuck Meyer, "Sin Boldly: 
Ethical Issues of DRGs," Hospital and Health Services Adminis-
tration 31, no. 3 (1986): 83-90j Jirn Summers, "Managers Face 
Conflicting Values," Journal of Healthcare Material Management 
7, no. 5 (1989): 89-90; M. Dean Jellison, "As I See It," 
Trustee 36, no. 11 (1983): 46. 
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role in acting to promote the value of effective and produc-
tive management of employees and good relations with the 
medical staff for the purpose of promoting the mission of the 
ins ti tut ion. But there are times when the hea 1 thcare adminis-
trator judges that what is best for the healthcare institution 
may require a re-direction of its mission or purpose. For 
example, the healthcare administrator may judge that an acute 
care hospital should evolve into a long-term care facility due 
to its inability to compete in its former market, or that a 
community hospital should change into a for-profit healthcare 
institution to greater assure its ability to survive or 
prosper. In other words, the miss ion or purpose of the 
institution may have to change for the benefit of the institu-
tion, and this re-direction is to a great extent brought about 
by the healthcare administrator who, in the guild model of 
profession, is best equipped to judge what is best for the 
institution. 
The third central value in the hierarchic scheme is the 
financial viability of the healthcare institution. This is an 
important value to healthcare administrators because without 
institutional financial viability, individual healthcare 
administrators would lose their jobs and be afforded no 
occasion or resource to practice their exclusive expertise. 
While it should be acknowledged that there is pressure on 
healthcare administrators to make this value the predominant 
one in their hierarchic scheme of values due to increased 
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competition between healthcare institutions with greater 
financial risks than ever before, 20 in the guild model of 
profession this value still ranks lower than the two values 
listed above. The exclusive expertise of the healthcare 
administrator which has been developed in response to the 
societal concern for the provision of institutional healthcare 
is the capable and efficient administrating of healthcare 
institutions. Just as physicians, lawyers and clergy in the 
guild model of profession are traditionally expected to put 
the healthcare, justice or religious needs of their individual 
patients or clients above any financial considerations, so too 
are healthcare administrators expected to value their work 
with management, employees, and physicians and the purpose or 
mission of their institution above financial considerations. 
This does not mean that acting to maintain the financial 
viability of the institution is not important. It does mean, 
however, that if the healthcare institution can financially 
survive or prosper only by compromising on its purpose or 
mission to the detriment of its ability to allow its staff and 
physicians to exercise their professional roles, then it 
becomes no more than a profit-maximizinq business and the role 
of the healthcare administrator loses its professionals status 
and instead requires only a good businessperson. 
20And it could be presumed that this pressure is even 
greater on the administrators of for-profit healthcare 
institutions, whose primary purpose as an institution is to 
offer a favorable financial return to investor and stakehold-
ers. 
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The fourth central value is the health of the individual 
patients in the healthcare institution. This lower ranking 
reflects the facts that patients do not constitute the central 
client of the healthcare administrator and that administrators 
have little actual contact with patients in their day-to-day 
functioning. In the guild model of profession patients are 
the passive recipients of highly technical healthcare deliv-
ered by highly skilled personnel in an extremely complex 
healthcare institution. While these institutions exist to 
address the healthcare needs of patients, the healthcare 
administrator is most concerned with and primarily responsible 
for the capable and effective operation of the institution. 
It is assumed that this indirectly results in benefits for the 
health of individual patients, and all management and business 
practices should be conducted with this in mind. Neverthe-
less, concern for their needs cannot directly take priority 
for the healthcare administrator over the needs of the 
healthcare institution for whose benefit and welfare he or she 
is ultimately responsible. 
The value of the health of individual patients is even 
placed below the value of good relations with the medical 
staff for the reason that the quality of individual patients' 
medical care may be allowed to be compromised - on occasion, 
and with the provision that the compromise is not significant-
ly harmful to individual patients - for the sake of maintain-
ing overall good relations with physicians~ for this is judged 
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to be in the best interests of the healthcare institution. 
The health of individual patients ranks lower than 
institutional integrity, for the healthcare administrator may 
elicit change in the purpose or mission of the institution for 
the benefit of the institution, even if this brings about an 
overall net negative effect on the health of individual 
patients. The health of individual patients also ranks lower 
than the financial viability of the institution. While the 
long-term care of particular er i tical or chronically ill 
patients may impose a financial burden on the institution, 
such occurrences cannot happen frequently or at great unreim-
bursed expense to the institution without severely compromis-
ing its ability to exist and to provide healthcare to the 
community at large. Unprofitable services, then, may justifi-
ably be discontinued to protect the welfare of the healthcare 
institution regardless of the benefit those services had 
provided to individual patients. 
The fifth and last central value in the hierarchic scheme 
is the health of the community. This is valued by the 
healthcare administrator since it has been the impetus for 
society to develop healthcare institutions, and because the 
health of the community directly interacts with the nature of 
the health of individual patients who utilize the services of 
the healthcare institution. For example, poverty, adolescent 
pregnancies, or the presence of infectious diseases within a 
local community may significantly impact and determine the 
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type of healthcare offered by a healthcare institution. 
Nonetheless, the value of the health of the community ranks 
lowest in the hierarchic scheme since it exists outside the 
actual operation of the healthcare institution. While the 
health needs of the community may indirectly affect the 
purpose or mission of the institution and have a significant 
effect on its financial viability, the health welfare of the 
community is distinguishable from the normal functioning of 
the healthcare institution itself whose welfare the healthcare 
administrator is primarily committed to promote. The health-
care administrator practices his exclusive expertise to 
address the health needs of the community, but never in any 
way that will be of detriment to the healthcare institution 
itself. All services that promote the health of the community 
are offered because their provision is judged to also benefit 
the healthcare institution. 
Commitment to Competence 
Moving beyond the central values, the fifth category of 
professional obligation is the commitment to competence. For 
healthcare administrators, the practice of capably and effec-
tively operating the complex healthcare institution begins 
with education in healthcare administration, but is to a great 
extent learned only through experience. An aspiring health-
care executive candidate must then be willing to exercise a 
number of different leadership roles within an organization in 
order to gain that needed experience. Like the competence for 
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physicians and lawyers which is maintained through learning of 
new medical treatments or developing case law, ongoing 
competence for healthcare administrators is maintained by 
continual study of and exercise in developing management and 
business techniques and by regular evaluation and feedback 
from private healthcare management consultants and by institu-
tional evaluators such as the Joint Commission for the 
Accreditation of American Health Organizations. 
Relationship with Fellow-Professionals 
The sixth category of professional obligation is the 
ideal relationship with fellow healthcare administrators. The 
general relationship among members of professions has been 
described earlier in the fourth characteristic of profession 
within the guild model. In a number of ways healthcare 
administrators resemble this description. Healthcare adminis-
trators train and credential their own members. While 
utilizing advisory boards at their healthcare institutions, 
they generally are reluctant to allow "outside" input into 
their decision-making. They rarely criticize their peers (in 
public) and almost never hold one another accountable to their 
Code of Ethics. 21 Yet in one significant way healthcare 
administrators do not reflect the guild model of profession in 
21 see Kurt Darr, "Administrative Ethics and the Health 
Services Manager," Hospital and Health Services Administration 
29, no. 2 (1984): 120-136; Deborah Treguno, "Ethics and 
Hospital Administration," Health Management Forum 7 (1986): 
58-69. 
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their relationship with one another. The collegial relation-
ship expected of professionals in the guild model is to a 
great extent absent among healthcare administrators. While 
overt expressions of mutual respect and role-familiarity may 
exist at gatherings of healthcare administrators, their 
relationship is largely characterized by a sense of competi-
tion. This seems due to the fact that their healthcare 
institutions, whose welfare they are committed to promote, vie 
with one another for market share and for access to increas-
ingly limited reimbursement. Healthcare administrators, then, 
are not above aggressively competing with one another, and 
even attempting to drive one another's institution out of 
business and thereby potentially eliminating the job of a 
fellow-professional.n 
Relationship with Society 
The seventh category of professional obligation is the 
ideal relationship of healthcare administrators with society 
at large. This obligation within the guild model of profes-
sion is fairly minimal. The profession of healthcare adminis-
trators in the guild model does not believe it has contracted 
with society for its own existence, but rather views its role 
as an occupational group and its status of profession as 
having arisen in response to the societal need for the 
22This is suggested, al though in 
Hofmann, "Business Ethics: Not an 
Executive 2, no. 5 (1987): 22-24. 
limited form, in Paul 
Oxymoron," Healthcare 
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administration of its complex healthcare institutions. The 
relation of the profession to society is a one-way relation-
ship in the guild model. The profession of healthcare 
administration owns the exclusive expertise and graciously 
offers it to facilitate the societal need for institutional 
healthcare delivery. Laypeople in society are largely 
untrained in the knowledge and skills of healthcare adminis-
tration, and therefore are unable to determine the proper 
tasks and norms of ethical behavior of healthcare administra-
tors. Attempts by society to restrict or regulate the 
professional practice of healthcare administration are 
intrusions into the proper functioning of this professional 
group. 
Critique of the Guild Model of Profession 
for Healthcare Administrators 
The guild model of profession remains a popular image 
among many members of the traditional professions of medicine, 
law and clergy. Its description of profession, which to a 
great extent draws from the Functionalist understanding of 
profession, would seem to reflect a favorable image of 
profession as often found in our society today. For three 
reasons, however, it is not likely that this guild model of 
profession has ever been seriously embraced by healthcare 
administrators. 
In the first place, the guild model of professions to a 
great extent seems to presuppose an image of professionals as 
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solo-practitioners tending to individual clients or patients 
and bonded together as a group for the determination of the 
criteria and norms of their professional practice. The role 
of healthcare administrators, however, is integrally linked to 
institutions and to the responsibility of managing or adminis-
trating groups of people rather than individual clients or 
patients. Furthermore, the development of their role and of 
their professional association for establishing criteria and 
norms for professional practice has occurred only in recent 
times, and this has been marked by increased competition 
between healthcare institutions and healthcare administrators 
rather than by the development of any guild-like characteris-
tics for this profession. 
In the second place, the rise of healthcare administra-
tion as a profession has also occurred to a great extent at 
the same time that the Functionalist view of profession with 
its guild-like characteristics has been falling into disfavor 
due to the growing popularity of the Critical views of 
profession within the sociological literature. Thirdly, the 
development of healthcare administration as a profession has 
been occurring roughly at the same time that belief in client 
or patient autonomy, i.e., the right of clients or patients to 
choose or refuse particular aspects of professional services 
in accordance with their own wishes and values, has been 
taking root, thereby discrediting and discouraging efforts of 
any profession to adopt guild-like modes of service provision 
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which could be interpreted as paternalistic. 
current efforts in the literature to articulate the 
ethics of healthcare administrators, however, still consis-
tently propose adherence to some sort of professional ethics 
which invoke images of a guild notion or model of profession. 
In the fourth section of this chapter, however, three criti-
cisms of the guild model of profession will be raised arguing 
that this model should be rejected as the foundation for 
determining the professional status and the nature of profes-
sional obligations for healthcare administrators on the 
grounds that this model would not be acceptable to the members 
of our society, i.e., society would not agree to contract with 
healthcare administrators according to the characteristics and 
norms understood to exist within the guild model of profes-
sion. 
First Criticism 
The guild model of profession tends to adopt or justify 
a paternalistic relationship between the professional and 
client or patient. Three arguments were raised earlier 
attempting to justify paternalism in the guild model. In 
addressing these arguments, it is important to distinguish 
between strong and weak forms of paternalism. Strong pater-
nalism consists in the overriding of the competent wishes and 
choices of another. Weak paternalism occurs when an action is 
taken in the best interests of another who cannot for some 
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reason give a fully informed directive. 23 The value of 
patient or client autonomy is currently so strong in our 
society that the exercise of strong paternalism over competent 
adults is generally considered to be seriously objectionable. 
Weak paternalism generally is justified in our society, 
however, providing that the "best interest" of a client or 
patient is judged on a "reasonable person" standard, that is, 
the benefit brought about by weak paternalism reflects what a 
reasonable person would most likely desire. Only the third 
argument that was raised earlier to justify paternalism, i.e. 
the example of requiring the unwilling and not fully competent 
patient to undergo physical therapy after a knee replacement, 
is acceptable according to weak paternalism. 
The other two arguments attempting to justify profes-
sional paternalism fail, however, for they are versions of 
strong paternalism. First, the argument that clients or 
patients often lack the knowledge or skills to capably choose 
what is best for them which obliges them to a passive role in 
their relationship with professionals and to oftentimes rely 
on professionals to make their decisions for them, is not 
necessarily an accurate portrayal of clients and patients. To 
use medicine as an example, patients possess subjective values 
besides their value for health which they incorporate into 
their decisions regarding proposed medical treatments. These 
DThis distinction is articulated in Edmund Pellegrino and 
David Thomasma, For the Patient• s Good (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 7. 
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subjective values are important components in a patient's 
decision, and knowledge of these values and of the weight 
patients give to these values are not included in the exper-
tise of the physician. Similarly, for healthcare administra-
tors, the management, employees and physicians at a healthcare 
institution cannot be viewed as the passive recipients of the 
healthcare administrator's exclusive expertise. Instead, they 
possess knowledge, skills and experience which can contribute 
to the effective operation of a healthcare institution. An 
open and ongoing give-and-take of ideas and opinions and a 
consensual "buy-in" of administrative decisions by management, 
employees and physicians would seem to best serve the health-
care institution. The exclusive expertise of the healthcare 
administrator must then include the ability to facilitate this 
process and to incorporate the results of this process in 
administrative decision-making. 24 
Second, the argument that clients or patients who seek 
professional help may oftentimes be highly anxious and 
dependent and require professionals to paternalistically make 
some decisions for them in order to have their autonomy 
restored, is a practice that must be severely limited to avoid 
ready tendencies to abuse client or patient rightful exercise 
~This criticism is adapted from arguments raised in David 
Ozar and David Sokol, Dental Ethics at Chairside (St. Louis: 
Mosby, 1994), 45-49; "Patient's Autonomy: Three Models of the 
Professional-Lay Relationship in Medicine,~ Theoretical 
Medicine 5 (1984), 63; Michael Bayles, "Against Professional 
Autonomy," National Forum 58 (Summer 1978): 23-26; Profes-
sional Ethics, 2d. ed., 76-77. 
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of their own autonomy. It is true that some clients and 
patients acquiesce to professionals and to the mystique of 
professionalism, and if this is done so willingly, then the 
professional response in deciding for such clients or patients 
would seem to embody an acceptable form of weak paternalism. 
But a strong case can also be made that the highly anxious and 
somewhat dependent client or patient does not require pater-
nalism at all from the professional, but rather the practice 
of beneficence in order to restore her lost or limited ability 
to exercise her autonomy.~ 
While many patients who come to healthcare institutions 
are somewhat anxious and potentially dependent upon the 
expertise and good-will of the professionals addressing their 
healthcare needs, this fact in and of itself does not justify 
a paternalistic relationship towards them on the part of 
healthcare professionals, or, for purposes here, on the part 
of healthcare administrators. Individual patients still have 
valuable contributions to offer regarding the capable and 
effective operation of healthcare institutions. While they 
may not be privy to the intricate workings of these complex 
institutions, they are keenly aware of how the workings of the 
institution positively or negatively affect them on a personal 
basis. Furthermore, society funds the existence of healthcare 
institutions through payments for services, charitable 
25This will be developed in the Interactive model of 
profession in Chapter VIII. 
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contributions and restriction of taxes. Society, then, 
naturally evaluates the structure and function of healthcare 
institutions in light of their meeting the health needs of the 
members of society. The claim of healthcare administrators 
within the guild model that they possess the exclusive 
expertise to best provide institutional healthcare to society 
is wrong; it is more proper to state that their expertise is 
in knowing how best to devise the means to provide the kind 
and amount of healthcare society decides it wants. 
Second Criticism 
A second major difficulty with the guild model of profes-
sion is that experience does not bear out professionals' claim 
to a supposed ongoing commitment to excellence, nor is it 
necessarily true that the final intellectual authority for 
professions should rest solely with themselves. From a social 
contract perspective, there are two problems with the profes-
sions' claim or promise to excellence. 
First, while it is undoubtedly true that many profession-
als are dedicated to the welfare of their clients or patients 
and are committed to ongoing professional development so that 
they may offer the best possible professional care or service, 
sociological studies within the Critical view of professions 
also cite either the perception of, or examples of, profes-
sional behavior that is driven by proprietary values and self-
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interest. 26 Healthcare institutions, with healthcare adminis-
trators at their helm, have come under much criticism in the 
last two decades for allowing the market to shape healthcare 
delivery in such a way that the healthcare institutions profit 
regardless of the overall effect on the health of the communi-
ty .27 
Within the conditions of the social contract, if society 
perceives that the professions are not fulfilling their 
promise to an ongoing commitment to excellence in the provi-
sion of their services but instead are abusing their authority 
and autonomy in practice for their own self-aggrandizement, 
then society reasonably views its arrangement with the profes-
sions in a negative light as not benefitting the members of 
society. Recent interest in removing the tax-exempt status 
26For examples of sources citing perceptions of profession-
al self-interest, see Jethro Liebermann, The Tyranny of the 
Experts (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 1970); Ivan 
Illich, Disabling Professions (London: Marion Soyars, 1977); 
For sources citing examples of professional self-interest in 
the medical profession, see M. Waldholz and W. Bogdonich, 
"Hospitals That Need Patients Pay Bounties for Doctors' 
Referrals," Wall Street Journal (1 March 1989): Al, AG; W. 
Bogdonich, and M. Waldholz, "Doctor-Owned Labs Earn Lavish 
Profits in a Captive Market," Wall Street Journal (27 February 
1989): Al, A4; R. L. Rundle, "How Doctors Boost Bills by 
Misrepresenting the Work They Do," Wall Street Journal ( 6 
December 1989): Al, AS; D. A. Hyman, and J. V. Williamson, 
"Fraud and Abuse: Setting the Limits on Physicians' Entrepre-
neurship," New England Journal of Medicine 320, no. 19 (1989): 
1275-1278. 
vFor example, see Bradford Gray, The Prof it Motive and 
Patient Care (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991}; 
Stanley Wohl, The Medical Industrial Complex (New York: 
Harmony, 1984); Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of 
American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982), Chapter 5. 
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from healthcare ins ti tut ions has largely arisen from the 
perception in some circles that healthcare institutions 
increasingly are run by their administrators as a business 
seeking financial return to benefit the institution, rather 
than as charitable organizations existing to serve the health 
needs of the community. If society judges its members are not 
benefiting from the existence of particular professions like 
healthcare administrators, then society will more strictly 
regulate those professions and professional authority and 
autonomy in practice will be diminished or removed. This is, 
in fact, what seems to be happening to many of the professions 
today. 28 So the guild model's one-sided view of expertise and 
its consequent rejection of "outsiders'" judgment of profes-
sional performance is not a viable way to conceive of the 
profession of healthcare administration under any reasonable 
interpretation of the social contract regarding its ethical 
standards. 
There is a second problem from a social contract perspec-
tive with the professions' claim to excellence in their field 
of exclusive expertise. Even if professionals honor this 
claim with integrity and fidelity, the result is not that they 
pursue the societal notion of the good that first brought 
28See, for example, "The End of Autonomy? Reflections on 
the Postprofessional Physician," 63-72; I. F. Norstrand, 
"Takeover of the Medical Profession by Nonphysicians," New 
England Journal of Medicine 314, no. 6 (1986): 390; G. Ritzer 
and D. Walczak, "Rationalization and Deprofessionalization of 
Physicians," Social Forces 67, no. 1 (1988): 1-22. 
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about the professions, but rather that they tend to focus on 
and promote the profession's own notion of that good. For 
example, throughout this century the evolution of the medical 
profession and of hospitals has centered around the dramatic 
cure of diseases within an acute care setting; to a great 
extent this was supported and financed by our society. In 
recent times, however, our society is beginning to value 
preventive care and the treatment of debilitating or chronic 
illnesses, yet our medical profession and our healthcare 
ins ti tut ions remain woefully unprepared to address these 
needs. Medical schools continue to train specialists and 
healthcare institutions continue to provide costly high-
technological care, even though this may well not address the 
healthcare needs nor reflect the healthcare values perceived 
to exist in our society today. 
The problem with the commitment to excellence in the 
professions, then, as understood within the guild model of 
profession, cannot be corrected merely by recruiting better 
applicants, improving their training or calling upon greater 
efforts at self-regulation; the problem cannot be eradicated 
by the professions themselves. Professionals naturally commit 
themselves, with the best of intentions, to a career based on 
a specific conception of the nature of their work, and this 
conception cannot be overcome merely by appeal to ethical ded-
ication to the good of society since professionals sincerely 
believe their conception of the nature of their work is the 
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only proper way to serve the good of society. The conception 
of professional excellence, then, cannot be determined by the 
profession alone, but must be tempered by administrative or 
bureaucratic mechanisms that stress accountability to the 
societal conception of that group's professional excellence. 
The guild notion of commitment to excellence in the healthcare 
administration profession is therefore, from a social contract 
perspective, inherently flawed. 29 
It is also not necessarily true that the final intellec-
tual authority for determining excellence in the professions 
should rest with the professions themselves. Many occupation-
al groups have arisen with such titles as ~paraprofessionals" 
or "semi-professions" who possess much of the same exclusive 
expertise as the traditional professions and, in fact, have 
achieved high levels of sophistication in specialized areas of 
the traditional professions. Just as physicians increasingly 
must rely upon the expertise of such healthcare professionals 
as pharmacists, respiratory therapists and dieticians, so too 
must healthcare administrators depend upon the expertise of 
their financial advisors, clinical directors and quality 
assurance personnel. 
Increasingly the general public is also recognized as 
being more educated and sophisticated and often able to 
~This point is adapted from Freidson, Professional 
Dominance, 151-160; Norman Daniels, "The Profit Motive and 
the Moral Assessment of Health Care Institutions," Business 
and Professional Ethics Journal 10, no. 2 {1991): 3-29. 
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perceive professional incompetence. Members of society may 
not always know how they were cured or received relief from 
their suffering, but they are often quick to lay blame on the 
physician or the healthcare institution when their healthcare 
needs are not satisfactorily addressed. A broader notion of 
professional intellectual superiority which includes the input 
and evaluation of those not directly considered to be members 
of a specific profession is needed to more accurately reflect 
the current state of affairs in professions and the evolving 
relationship between professionals and clients or patients. 30 
Third Criticism 
A third problem for the guild model of profession from 
the social contract perspective is the guild model's emphasis 
upon primary professional allegiance and accountability only 
to one's fellow professionals. There are two principle 
reasons why attempts at self-regulation and professional 
accountability fail. First, peer evaluation of professional 
practice tends to evaluate the process of that practice, e.g., 
what procedures or steps the physician took in surgery, or the 
healthcare administrator took in deciding to close an unprof-
itable service. Members of society, however, tend to evaluate 
not the process but the outcome of the professional practice, 
30This point is raised in Richard Feinstein, "The Ethics of 
Professional Regulation," New England Journal of Medicine 312, 
no. 12 (21 March 1985): 801-804; Paul Toro, "A Comparison of 
Natural and Professional Help," American Journal of Community 
Psychology 14, no. 2 (1986): 147-159. 
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e.g., if the patient benefitted from the surgery or if the 
healthcare administrator's decision improved or worsened the 
overall healthcare delivery for patients or the community. 
Professionals argue that focusing strictly on outcome perfor-
mance ignores the complexities and unique features of individ-
ual cases. But this means that a professional who is success-
ful in the evaluation of his or her peers relies solely on 
criteria established by the profession itself, regardless of 
the interests or values of society which is the beneficiary -
or the victim - of the professional services. 
Secondly, professional self-regulation under the guild 
model is hindered by a sense of in-group solidarity. Despite 
their competition with one another, healthcare administrators 
are like members of other professions in that they exchange 
some favors and information with one another and so develop 
collegial ties, making it difficult to objectively evaluate or 
to bring charges against one another. Negative public 
reaction to professional malpractice can be severe and can be 
generalized to the whole group, and so healthcare administra-
tors, like other professionals, tend to protect endangered 
colleagues unless doing so will bring harm to the whole group. 
Informal internal regulation does occur through subtle means, 
e.g., by raising general questions in professional meetings 
or, as physicians may not refer patients to colleagues with 
questionable practice, so too will healthcare administrators 
offer negative references or not hire fellow-professionals who 
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exercise questionable leadership or management behavior. In 
general, "professional etiquette" seems to discourage publicly 
criticizing one's peers. Furthermore, like other professional 
groups, healthcare administrators tend to have neither an 
effective regulatory body nor effective sanctions to correct 
professional malpractice. 31 
As a result of these two inherent problems with profes-
sional self-regulation, it is unrealistic to suppose that 
society would find it beneficial to itself to refrain from 
becoming involved in the evaluation of professional practice. 
The professional allegiance and accountability to peers as 
espoused in the guild model of the healthcare administration 
profession would not satisfy the terms of the social contract. 
Conclusion 
Because of these three major criticisms of the guild 
model of the healthcare administration profession, it is 
evident our understanding of professional obligation of 
healthcare administrators cannot be drawn from this model of 
profession. While there are some positive features in the 
guild model of profession that society would find beneficial 
to maintain and promote in the healthcare administration 
DThis point is explored regarding professions in general 
in William May, "Notes on the Ethics of Doctors and Lawyers," 
in Bernard Baumrin and Benjamin Freedman, ed., Moral Responsi-
bility and the Professions (New York: Haven Publications, 
1983), 93-125; Feinstein, "The Ethics of Professional Regula-
tion," 801-804. Haug, "The Sociological Approach to Self-
Regulation," 61-80. 
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profession, particularly the possession of exclusive expertise 
and the public commitment to address the social need for the 
deli very of high-quality healthcare, nonetheless another model 
of profession must be discovered or developed which can 
satisfy the reasonable terms of the social contract more 
completely. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ETHICS OF HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATORS 
IN THE AGENT MODEL OF PROFESSION 
In response to the criticisms of the guild model of 
profession explored in the last chapter, an increasing amount 
of literature on the professions and on professional ethics 
has argued for what will be called an agent model of prof es-
sion. This model is consistent with the Critical view of 
professions found in the sociological literature, and yet it 
allows for occupational groups to maintain their professional 
status. In this chapter the moral obligations and role-
specific duties of healthcare administrators will be examined 
from the context of this agent model. 
The first part of this chapter will briefly examine the 
principle presupposition of the agent model of profession. 
This model views the exercise of client or patient autonomy as 
the most fundamental value in our current social democracy. 
A pluralism of values in our society means that professions 
exist solely to restore or promote particular ends subjective-
ly valued by individual clients or patients. 
The second part of this chapter will examine the concept 
of profession as understood within the agent model. This 
model has grown in popularity in the past three decades as the 
guild model of profession increasingly has been criticized and 
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rejected, and as our developing cultural value of the near-
absolute individual right to self-determination has been 
transferred to clients and patients in their relationship with 
professionals. Professional practice is seen as justified in 
its existence and in its specific practice to the degree it 
promotes the autonomy of clients and patients. The agent 
model attempts to redefine the function and moral obligations 
of professions by reversing the authority in the roles of the 
professional and client or patient from what was described in 
the guild model. Healthcare administrators, like all other 
professionals, are only technical experts without important 
decision-making authority who contract for their services with 
members of society. The professional's role in this model is 
to place his or her expertise at the service of the client or 
patient to whom primary decision-making authority is now 
assigned. 
The third part of this chapter will explore the moral 
obligations and role-specific duties of healthcare administra-
tors as understood to exist within the agent model of profes-
sion. As in the previous chapter, the seven categories of 
professional obligation will serve as the format for this 
exercise. 
The fourth part of this chapter will argue that the 
concept of profession and of professional obligation in the 
agent model of profession fails to satisfy the terms of the 
social contract. This approach must therefore be rejected as 
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a means for determining the moral obligations of healthcare 
administrators. Two arguments are given for this. 
First, the agent model is structured on the liberal 
premiss of client or patient autonomy existing as the funda-
mental value. But this requires professionals to be no more 
than technicians protecting or honoring individuals' auto-
nomous choices while assisting them in pursuing their own 
subjective ends. Yet in reality the service provided by 
professionals is often desired by clients or patients to 
address some fundamental human need or social concern, and 
thus it is incorrect to claim that professional services are 
value-free. Furthermore, the provision of professional 
services is often desired by clients or patients to restore 
some of their lost or diminished autonomy, thus resulting a 
relationship that gives professionals a certain amount of 
authority over clients and patients; special obligations of 
the professional arise due to this position of relative 
authority. 
Secondly, the agent model of profession presupposes that 
professionals judge only the means and not the interests or 
ends of their clients or patients, and that they remain 
unbiased towards those interests or ends despite their own 
interests and values. Professionals, however, do in fact 
judge tend to judge the ends or interests of their clients or 
patients in light of societal and profession-specific values, 
and oftentimes will tend to promote the ends of their clients 
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or patients to a great extent through the perspective of those 
values. 
As a result, the agent model of profession inadequately 
describes the value of the professional services sought by 
clients or patients, and fails to accurately portray the 
professional-client/patient relationship as it actually 
exists. Subsequently, the agent model of profession cannot 
satisfy the reasonable terms of the social contract in 
determining the moral obligations of healthcare administra-
tors. 
Presupposition of the Agent Model of Profession 
The key presupposition underlying the agent model of 
profession is the near-uncompromisable value of client or 
patient autonomy or self-determination. This represents a 
rejection of paternalism as understood to exist in the guild 
model of profession. The value of autonomy is firmly grounded 
in the dignity of human persons and the claim that human 
beings have on each other to privacy, self-direction, the 
possession of their own values and goals in life, and the 
freedom to act in accordance with those values and goals. 
The historical origin of the current emphasis on autonomy 
traces largely back to the period of the French and English 
Enlightenment and the emergence of the doctrines of personal 
and political rights to freedom that undergird modern democra-
cy. Autonomy has been increasingly emphasized in our own 
society for three reasons. First, political democracy has 
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expanded to almost every sphere in civic life, leading to a 
common desire within our society for people to participate in 
decisions that affect their lives as individuals. This has 
also been accompanied, especially recently, by a general 
distrust of authority and expertise traditionally wielded by 
professionals in the guild model of profession that dominated 
professional practice for many decades into the second half of 
the 20th century. 
Second, there has been a general improvement in the 
education of the public and in the dissemination of informa-
tion by the media regarding areas of knowledge formerly 
belonging only to the exclusive realm of professionals. This 
lends credibility to input clients and patients desire to have 
in the professional decisions affecting their lives. 
Third, the increasing presence of moral pluralism in our 
society has resulted in a general recognition that personal 
values should be protected and important decisions not be 
usurped by others. Moral conflicts are generally viewed as 
irreconcilable since the only absolute value in our society is 
the freedom to choose according to one's own wishes and 
values, providing such choices do not seriously harm the 
freedom of others to choose according to their own wishes and 
values. 1 
1This key presupposition of the agent model of profession 
is explored in Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, For the 
Patient's Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 11-
22. 
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Autonomy or self-determination presupposes that indi vidu-
als possess the resources to act, i.e., freedom from physical 
and social restraints, bodily health and strength, etc., that 
they possess preferences or values, that they are able both to 
weigh those preferences or values and to act in such a way as 
to bring about particular states of affairs consistent with 
those preferences or values. Autonomy or self-determination 
for a client or patient, then, should be understood as the 
right to choose or refuse particular professional services or 
service options in accord with the client or patient's wishes 
and values. There has been a growing consensus in our society 
that autonomy or self-determination is something to be valued 
both in itself and as something that has great instrumental 
value in contributing to the individual's well-being. 2 Strong 
paternalism, on this view the deliberate overriding of a 
competent person's decision, wishes or values (for the sake of 
that person's well-being), is considered always to be morally 
culpable as a serious violation of patient or client autonomy 
or self-determination. 3 
2For a brief and accessible presentation of the main 
arguments in favor of autonomy or self-determination for 
competent patients, see "President's Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research," Making Health Care Decisions, vol. 1 (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 42-51. 
3Disagreement exists whether weak paternalism, i.e., 
acting in the presumed best interests of a patient or client 
who cannot give a fully informed consent for some reason, or 
who is not afforded the full possibility of full choice, also 
violates the patient or client's autonomy or self-determina-
tion, but this issue will not be of concern here. 
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Characteristics of the Agent Model of Profession 
The second part of this chapter will explore the concept 
of profession as understood within the agent model. This view 
of profession presupposes not only that clients or patients 
are competent individuals with both the ability and the right 
to exercise their autonomy or self-determination, but also 
that the services which can be provided by professionals 
represent only one good among many goods which the client or 
patient will choose from depending upon his wishes and values. 
A client or patient approaches a professional for 
assistance in addressing some fundamental human need or social 
concern which the client or patient is incapable of addressing 
unaided. The professional cannot presume, however, that she 
knows what is best for him. The client or patient may more 
highly value some other good more than the good which the 
professional can provide. Furthermore, professionals should 
be careful not even to assume that they can offer what is in 
the client or patient's best professional interests, i.e., 
their best medical, legal, or spiritual interests; there are 
many times when clients or patients value more highly some 
other interests or ends besides their medical, legal or 
spiritual interests or ends. Professionals should then 
acknowledge, when making treatment or service recommendations, 
that these will only address the patient's or client's need 
specific to the professional's realm of expertise. Prof es-
sionals cannot claim, or pretend to know, that their treatment 
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or service recommendation is in the overall best interests of 
the client or patient; only clients or patients can know that 
for themselves, and decide accordingly. 
Many of the current institutional structures providing 
professional services in health care, for example, both 
reflect and contribute to the need to promote client or 
patient autonomy. The emergence of tertiary care facilities 
and the proliferation of specialties and subspecialties have 
made it very difficult for physicians and caregivers to gain 
knowledge about the personal lives and values of their 
patients. This has helped contribute to a continually 
increasing emphasis upon the importance of patients autono-
mously directing their own treatments in light of their own 
personal values. The Joint Commission for the Accreditation 
of American Health Organizations understands ethical behavior 
in healthcare ins ti tut ions almost exclusively in terms of 
healthcare providers respecting patients' informed choices, as 
well as their confidentiality and privacy. 4 
The role of the professional in the agent model of 
profession is far different, then, from the role envisioned in 
the guild model of profession. In the agent model the client 
4For a broader discussion on the role of client or patient 
autonomy in the agent model of profession, see John Kultgen, 
Ethics and Professionalism (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1988) , 274-306; Allen Buchanan, "The 
Physician's Knowledge and the Patient's Best Interest," in 
Ethics, Trust and the Professions, ed., Edmund Pellegrino, 
Robert Veatch and John Langan (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1991), 93-107; Mark Osiel, "The Politics of 
Professional Ethics," Social Policy 15 (Sumer 1984): 43-48. 
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or patient is not a helpless and passive beneficiary of the 
professional's expertise who may paternalistically determine 
both the cause of the need and the best means to address that 
need. Instead, the client or patient is an autonomous 
individual who decides about the kind of service she wishes to 
receive from the professional. The role of the professional, 
therefore, is to apply his skills in such a way as to help the 
client or patient achieve her desired ends. 
In the relationship between the professional and the 
client or patient, the professional possesses expert knowledge 
and skills which can address some fundamental human need or 
social concern, and brings this expertise to the relationship; 
the client or patient possesses knowledge of her own needs and 
of her own particular values, and brings the ability to 
exercise self-determination to satisfy her own needs and to 
promote her own values to the relationship. The professional 
and the client or patient, then, enter into a type of contract 
which specifies the terms under which the professional will 
provide his expertise in technical matters in whatever way the 
client or patient judges those services to best meet her own 
needs and values. The professional offers options of techni-
cal services that are appropriate to the client or patient's 
need; the professional services that are administered, 
however, are chosen by the client or patient according to her 
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wishes and values. 5 
In the guild model of profession all authority resided 
with the professional. In the agent model of profession, the 
reverse is true; all authority resides with the client or 
patient. 6 
One popular variation of this relationship found in the 
literature on the professions, which seeks to incorporate the 
more personal aspect of the professional-client/patient 
relationship resulting from the greater vulnerability felt in 
self-disclosure to physicians, lawyers and priests, has been 
termed the "friendship model." In this slanted contractual 
view the professional acts in a type of one-way limited 
friendship to help the client or patient address some funda-
mental need. Like a friend, the professional takes her client 
or patient's interests and values seriously and gives them 
more weight than she does the interests and values of other 
persons. The professional continues to off er her services 
only in a manner which will respect and promote the client or 
patient's wishes and values, however, so as to respect his 
autonomy and self-determination within the bounds permitted by 
5The only exceptions to this occur if the client or 
patient requests the professional to act in a manner declared 
illegal by the state, or in a manner that the professional 
personally believes to be morally wrong. 
6See Robert Veatch, "Professional Medical Ethics: The 
Grounding of Its Principles," Journal of Medicine and Philoso-
l211Y 4, no. 1 (1979): 1-19. 
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society. 7 
In the agent model of profession the technical skills 
which the professional possesses are valued for the benefit 
they bring to their clients and patients, but those technical 
skills in and of themselves basically are considered to be 
amoral or value-free, i.e., neutral with respect to the ends 
they might be made to serve. Given a client or patient's 
specified end curing an illness, obtaining a divorce, 
seeking a baptism - the professional offers an effective means 
to that end. The professional contracts with the client or 
patient to provide the needed technical services so that the 
wishes and values of the client or patient may be realized. 
The professional, then, is a "hired gun" employed to do the 
client's or patient's bidding regardless of the moral worth or 
value of the client's or patient's desired ends. 
It would be an improper intrusion by the professional to 
7This analogy is most strongly argued for in Charles 
Freid, "The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the 
Lawyer-Client Relationship," in 1977 National Conference on 
Teaching Responsibility, Stuart Goldberg, ed. (Detroit: 
University of Detroit School Of Law, 1977), 129-158. 
There are problems with this analogy, however. Friendship 
implies a relationship of equals which is not the case in 
professional-client/patient relationships. Furthermore, a 
friendship is mutual but a professional has a concern for the 
client's or patient's interests which is not returned in kind 
to them, the affective commitment of friendship is usually 
lacking in the relationship with the professional, most 
encounters with professionals are with strangers rather than 
with friends, and the friendship model cannot be applied to 
professionals like healthcare administrators whose clients are 
groups and not individuals. For further discussion of 
problems with this analogy, see Bayles, Professional Ethics, 
2d ed., 73-74. 
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offer input or judgment concerning clients' or patients' 
motives or objectives. Professions have been established and 
granted relative autonomy in practice for the purpose of 
helping members of society meet specific fundamental needs; 
the value or moral status of those needs in our society 
cannot be determined by experts, but are set aside to the 
arena of the client or patient's personal freedom. Prof es-
sionals are limited to their value-free knowledge and skills 
and, in the agent model of profession, should not influence 
the autonomous choices of their clients or patients. 8 
The contract relationship between the professional and 
the client or patient as conceived within the agent model of 
profession has become popular image in recent times for many 
professionals as well as for many clients and patients. This 
has not come about from any newly discovered moral aversion on 
the part of professionals to the old attitude of paternalism 
so often associated in the past with the guild model of 
profession. Rather, many professionals now want to view their 
role more as technicians who offer their expertise in a value-
free manner to assist their clients or patients in meeting 
their own goals. These professionals do not want to decide 
8For further discussion, see Robert Veatch, "Medical 
Ethics: Professional or Universal?", Harvard Theological 
Review 65 ( 1972) : 531-559; Maynard Pirsig and Kenneth Kirwin, 
eds., Cases and Materials on Professional Responsibility {St. 
Paul: West Publishing Company, 1984), 12-20; Patricia 
Werhane, "Engineers and Management: The Challenge of the 
Challenger Incident," Journal of Business Ethics 10 ( 1991) 
605-616; Buchanan, "The Physician's Knowledge and the 
Patient's Best Interest," 93-100. 
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what is best for their clients or patients as in the guild 
model of profession, and in fact purposely render no judgment 
on the desired ends of their clients or patients but only on 
the best means to pursue those ends. This perspective allows 
professionals to distance themselves from what they view to be 
the inflated moral claims of their forerunners and from the 
unrealistic and undesirable moral expectations of society. 
For example, some physicians now offer treatment options 
with no recommendations and obligingly follow whatever 
directive they receive from the patient or family, or even 
from the third-party payer. They do not feel responsible to 
promote certain treatments, to encourage healthy behavior, or 
to lobby the third-party payer when particular treatments are 
financially denied. Many lawyers will offer their expertise 
both in understanding, interpreting, and applying the law and 
in manipulating trial court proceedings to advance the cause 
of their client regardless of whether or not this contributes 
to a just verdict. The moral responsibilities of professions 
in the agent model of profession would seem to be minimized by 
the constraints placed upon the professionals to promote only 
the valued ends desired by their clients or patients and not 
any values intrinsic to individual professions themselves. 
The origin and development of healthcare administration 
in our country would seem to be representative of the agent 
model of profession. As hospitals historically developed in 
the early part of this century, trustees assumed the role of 
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fundraising and all clinical matters were left to the domain 
of physicians. This left hospital administrators to organize 
and manage the non-medical workforce, coordinate the day-to-
day operation of the institution, and to oversee the "hotel 
management" of patients. If administrators then could even be 
called a profession, their role could be understood as 
promoting the health interests of the local community (embed-
ied by the trustees or by the hospital board) and the inter-
ests of the medical staff for the capable and efficient 
management of the hospital. Many physicians today, in fact, 
believe that healthcare administrators should return to this 
purely managerial role with few if any professional values, 
responsibilities or obligations. 9 
As levels of reimbursement for hospital services grew 
after World War II through the development of health insur-
ances such as Blue Cross and later through the federal 
programs of Medicare and Medicaid, and as the source of 
funding for building and development shifted from community 
contributions to federal allocations through the Hill-Burton 
Act, promoting merely the interests of the local community or 
board and the physicians has diminished. Instead, many 
healthcare administrators now view their professional 
9See, for example, Peter Morgan and Lynne Cohen, "Can 
Physicians Afford Not to Get Involved in Hospital Administra-
tion?", Canadian Medical Association Journal 146, no. 5 (1 
March 1992), 751-754; Gordon Ferguson, "Where's the Credibil-
ity in Hospital Administrators?", Canadian Medical Association 
Journal 132, no. 3 (1 February 1985): 286-287. 
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responsibility as effectively and capably directing their 
healthcare ins ti tut ions in such a way as to promote the 
interests and values of their healthcare institution's 
sponsor, community board, or owners or shareholders. As the 
role and responsibilities of the healthcare administrator 
expanded, the claim and image to professional status has more 
clearly emerged. Yet the understanding of the healthcare 
administrator's role as promoting others' interests and 
values, first with the community and later with the institu-
tion's sponsor, is perhaps best described through the agent 
model of profession. 10 
In the current climate of rapid change in the delivery of 
healthcare and with healthcare reform on the near horizon, a 
good deal of the literature on the professional ethics of 
healthcare administrators is calling for a return to or a 
revitalization of professional responsibilities as perhaps 
best understood within the agent model of profession, i.e., 
the obligation of healthcare administrators to promote the 
interests and values of the local community or of the insti-
tution's sponsor. In the third part of this chapter, then, 
the ethics of healthcare administrators will be explored from 
within the context of the agent model of profession, utilizing 
once again the seven categories of professional obligation. 
1
°What I have claimed to be a historical shift in the chief 
client of healthcare administrators is described in Rosemary 
Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth (New York: Basic Books, 
1989)' 72-79, 241-283. 
Professional Ethics of Healthcare Administrators 
in the Agent Model of Profession 
Identification of Chief Client 
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The chief client of a professional is understood to be 
the individual or group whose welfare the professional is most 
committed to promoting. In the agent model of profession, the 
professional is obligated to practice her exclusive expertise 
in the way most desired by the chief client. She possesses 
the technical skills while the chief client determines how 
those skills will be utilized to advance his own ends. In the 
agent model of profession the chief client of the healthcare 
administrator would be that group whose interests and values 
the healthcare administrator will utilize her skills to 
promote. It appears, therefore, that the chief client is not 
the individual patient, as stated in the Code of Ethics of the 
American College of Healthcare Executives, 11 but rather is the 
employer of the healthcare administrator, i.e,. the sponsor of 
the not-for-prof it healthcare institution, the board of the 
community hospital, or the owner or shareholders of the for-
profit healthcare institution. 12 The healthcare administra-
tor, then, applies her technical skills to promote the welfare 
of her institution's sponsor. 
11American College of Healthcare Executives, Code of 
Ethics, Expectation I. 
12The term "sponsor" will be used hereafter to refer to all 
three groups who employ healthcare administrators. 
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Ideal Relationship with Chief Client 
The ideal relationship between the healthcare administra-
tor and her chief client, her institution's sponsor, is 
readily found in the literature on the ethics of healthcare 
administration. Increasingly the professional role of the 
healthcare administrator is described in terms of "leadership" 
within the healthcare organization. Increasingly, the 
professional obligation of the healthcare administrator 
corresponding to this leadership role is described in terms of 
"management by values" or "management-based values." These 
values by which healthcare administrators are extolled to lead 
by are not uniquely correlated to the role of healthcare 
administration nor are they necessarily commonly associated 
with the provision of healthcare. Rather, "management by 
values" refers to leading or administrating according to the 
values of the institution as defined by the sponsor of that 
institution. 
Numerous resources under the title of "administrative 
ethics" are now available encouraging and instructing health-
care administrators to, "Put the values of your organization 
ahead of yourself and your own interests," to "Continually 
reinforce with your entire staff what your institution stands 
for," and to "Assure that all members of the organization 
know, understand, and accept these values of your institution 
as the ultimate criteria for judging decisions and individual 
behavior." Coupled with this emphasis upon managing according 
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to the values of the institution as defined by the sponsor of 
the institution are the reminders or admonitions that, "It 
should not be our goal to implant our values on the organiza-
tion," and "It is your role either to adopt the values of 
your institution or to make sure that those values are 
compatible with your own." In the agent model, there are no 
unique role-specific values to healthcare administration, but 
rather their exclusive expertise is assumed to be value-free 
and designed primarily to promote the values of the institu-
tion's sponsor. Values may be adopted or discarded depending 
upon the sponsor's preference and upon the effect those values 
have upon the successful administration of the healthcare institution. 13 
13See, for example, Gerald McManis, "Making Profits: Is It 
the Right Thing to Do?", Healthcare Executive 2, no. 5 (1987): 
58; Gerard Rossey, "The Executive's Role in Ethics: The View 
from Business and Industry," Healthcare Executive 2, no. 5 
(1987): 12-21; Fred Twinning, "Managing Values: Blueprint for 
strategic Direction," Healthcare Executive 2, no. 5 (1987): 
46-49; John Griffith, "The Mission of the Well-Managed 
Community Hospital," Michigan Hospitals 24, (July 1988): 43-
46; Lawrence Miller, "Corporate Success Includes Human 
Values," Hospitals 59 (1 September 1985): 47-48; Fernando 
Harrison, "Consider Values-Based Management," Health Manage-
ment Forum 6 (Autumn 1985): 4-17; Susan Tamborini-Martin and 
Kevin Hanley, "The Importance of Being Ethical," Heal th 
Progress 70 (June 1989): 24-27, 82; Raymond Rustige, Cynthia 
Carter Haddock and Sharon Homan, "Value-Based Leadership: Are 
Catholic Hospitals a step Ahead?", Health Progress 68 (June 
1987): 62-65; Robert Parsons, et al., "Motivating Middle 
Managers," Health Progress 70 (December 1989): 28-31; Annelle 
Fitzpatrick and Christine Gaylor, "In Pursuit of Commitment," 
Health Progress 70 (February 1989): 68-72; J. Daniel Beckham, 
"Everyday Values," Healthcare Forum Journal 34, no. 2 (1991): 
34-38; Sherwin Klein, "Platonic Virtue Theory and Business 
Ethics," Business & Professional Ethics Journal 8, no. 4 
(1989): 59-81; Charles Fahey, "Corporate Ethical Decision 
Making in Health Care Institutions," Hospital Administration 
Currents 31, no. 4 (1987): 19-26. 
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Commitment to the Good of the Chief Client 
As a professional, the healthcare administrator must be 
committed to the good of his institution's sponsor, however 
that good is conceived. 
professional promise to 
toward the desired end 
That commitment is based on the 
exercise one's exclusive expertise 
of the client with whom one has 
contracted without passing judgment or determining the moral 
value of that client's end. The exclusive expertise of the 
healthcare administrator is the effective and capable opera-
tion of that healthcare institution, but it is the institu-
tion's sponsor which determines the definition of "effective-
ness" and "capability" in the healthcare administrator's 
operation of that institution. These definitions in the agent 
model are not dependent upon some objective or universally 
accepted notions of effectiveness and capability, but rather 
they refer to matters of degree of effectiveness or capability 
in light of promoting the sponsor's own notion of the good. 
The nature of and specific duties established in the 
relationship between the institution's sponsor and the health-
care administrator should normally, then, be very clear and 
well-known to both parties. The healthcare administrator can 
be said to effectively and capably operate the healthcare 
institution if the practice of her exclusive expertise results 
in the sponsor's goal being achieved, e.g. , 
fulfilling the mission of the sponsor, or 
continuing or 
providing an 
acceptable quality, amount and type of healthcare to the local 
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community, or profit-maximization for the sponsor, or some 
combination of these or other goods. The skills of the 
healthcare administrator are value-neutral, but are utilized 
by the sponsor to promote the goals and values of the sponsor. 
The relationship of healthcare administrators to the 
good of individual patients is only indirect and instrumental 
in nature; the good of patients is generally met through the 
healthcare administrators' facilitating the work of other 
professionals and not through any direct contact with the 
healthcare administrator, and it is the collective good of 
patients as understood through the interests and values of the 
sponsor which the healthcare administrator structures the 
institution to address. Through the skills of good manage-
ment, business, and public relations, the healthcare adminis-
trator addresses the health needs of patients by attracting 
and keeping capable physicians and healthcare professionals as 
well as by providing high-technological equipment and a 
productive work environment to facilitate the provision of 
their healthcare. Through the skills of good management and 
communication, the healthcare administrator facilitates 
patients exercising their autonomy or self-determination 
through the development of institutional structures which 
respects their dignity and privacy and which promotes in-
creased dialogue between physicians and other healthcare 
professionals with patients, to better assure that patients 
are able to select treatments in accordance with their own 
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wishes and values. 
Central Values of the Profession 
The fourth category of professional obligation is the 
identification and prioritization of the central values of 
healthcare administrators. Central values are drawn upon or 
assumed when decisions must be made that are value-laden. 
In Chapter III it was proposed that there are five 
central values to the profession of healthcare administration: 
health of individual patients, health of the community, 
financial viability of the organization, effective and capable 
management of employees and good relations with the medical 
staff, and institutional integrity. In the agent model of 
profession, however, these cannot be considered values central 
to the profession of healthcare administration, but rather as 
values that most commonly are assigned to or expected of 
healthcare administrators by their institution's sponsor. 
That is, these are values generally held by the sponsors of 
healthcare ins ti tut ions and thus, in the agent model of 
profession, these are the values which healthcare administra-
tors are committed to upholding or promoting solely because 
(or if) they are the values of their institution's sponsor. 
But sponsors are not limited to these five values, and 
subsequently, in the agent model of profession, neither are 
healthcare administrators. Different sponsors will possess 
and promote different values. For example, one not-for-prof it 
institution may value a mission that is strongly oriented to 
200 
care for the poor, while another may be deeply competitive and 
highly financially motivated. One for-profit institution may 
have a sponsor which establishes strict criteria restricting 
the admission of unprofitable patients and limiting the kinds 
of treatments it will offer in order to yield the greatest 
return on investment, while another for-profit institution may 
include criteria for charity care and have a reputation for 
responding to the health needs of its community. 
Different sponsors will also prioritize their values in 
different ways, and subsequently, in the agent model of 
profession, so too will healthcare administrators. This is 
because, as stated before, in the agent model the healthcare 
administrator commits the use of her skills to advancing the 
interests and values of her institution's sponsor. Her skills 
are considered to be value-free, and thus there are no role-
specific values she brings to the exercise of her professional 
role. Furthermore, she herself cannot impose or implant her 
own personal values onto the organization without violating 
the autonomy or right to self-determination of that institu-
tion's sponsor to have that institution function according to 
the sponsor's own directives and values. 
The sponsors of institutions contract with (and substan-
tially pay14 ) healthcare administrators to promote their 
interests and values. Through specialized education and 
14See Judith Nemes, "Hospital Executives' Pay Beginning to 
Raise Eyebrows," Modern Healthcare 22 (8 June 1992): 41-52. 
201 
training, healthcare administrators maintain control over the 
content of their expertise, but sponsors determine the form in 
which that expertise will be exercised, i.e., the healthcare 
administrator knows best how to manage and make particular 
business decisions pertaining to her institution, but the 
sponsor provides the mission and the values the administra-
tor's expertise must promote as well as the criteria for 
determining the success or failure of the management and 
business skills of the healthcare administrator. 
In the guild model, the healthcare administrators prized 
effective and productive management of employees and good 
relations with the medical staff as the primary and most 
fundamental value in their hierarchic scheme of values. In 
the guild model, healthcare administrators believed that they 
owned and applied their exclusive expertise to the healthcare 
institution in whatever manner they judged to be best for the 
healthcare institution. In the agent model of profession, 
however, the skills of healthcare administrators are valued 
only because they can be applied in whatever manner the 
sponsor decides will best meet the interests and values of the 
sponsor. In the agent model of profession, the skills of 
healthcare administrators mean little to the sponsor if they 
are exercised for purposes other than promoting the mission 
and values of the sponsor. 
It is important that the healthcare administrator fully 
understand the mission and values of the institution whose 
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leadership has been entrusted to him, so that he does not 
experience serious conflict between this and his own personal 
value system, 15 and so that he may promote the mission and 
values of his institution's sponsor in the way he applies his 
special expertise of the practice of healthcare management and 
business skills. 
Promoting the mission and values of the institution's 
sponsor void of any central values of their own profession 
provides multiple opportunities for the professional careers 
of healthcare administrators. As it is quite feasible for 
healthcare administrators to contract for the utilization of 
their exclusive expertise with various institutions possessing 
different missions and values, a scenario is created that can 
be beneficial to both parties. In an era of tremendous change 
in healthcare deli very, institutions may benefit from an 
influx of different leadership ideas and management styles 
through contracting with different healthcare administrators 
at different times, who in turn can bring a wealth of experi-
ence to each new position that can directly advantage the 
sponsored institutions. This perhaps partially explains the 
25% turnover rate of hospital CEO's every year throughout the 
last decade. 
15The requirements here are minimal; the healthcare 
administrator need not be in agreement or fully support the 
mission and values of his sponsored institution, but rather 
that mission may simply be tolerated and the institution's 
values need only not be in serious conflict with his own 
personal value system. 
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Commitment to Competence 
The fifth category of professional obligation is the 
commitment to competence. Every professional is obligated 
both to acquire and to maintain the expertise needed to 
undertake his professional tasks. Every professional is also 
obligated to undertake only those tasks that are within his 
competence and to assist clients whose needs are beyond his 
expertise in locating a fellow-practitioner who can assist 
them. In the agent model of profession, these two obligations 
pose special problems for the healthcare administrator. 
Healthcare administrators gain their professional exper-
tise not just by acquiring a degree from a school certified in 
healthcare administration, but by also obtaining the needed 
experience by advancing through different levels and positions 
in administration in one or more institutions. Theoretically 
the best talent rises to the top, but it is well known in 
healthcare administration that job-placement is highly 
connected to personal contacts, i.e. , who you know is as 
important as what you know. It is therefore not necessarily 
the most competent of the candidates who may call themselves 
healthcare administrators, but rather those who are able to 
best adapt themselves to, and thereby promote, the interests 
and values of their ins ti tut ion's sponsor. Competency, 
therefore, is not determined by the profession itself, but by 
the differing measures of criteria established by the varying 
sponsors of healthcare institutions. 
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Secondly, many healthcare administrators find it person-
ally very threatening to acknowledge that some areas of needed 
competency desired by their institution's sponsor are beyond 
their own professional expertise. This most likely is due to 
the possibility that admitting professional incompetency may 
cost them their job. A physician is expected to refer a 
patient to another more qualified physician to address some 
specific problem beyond his realm of expertise without fear of 
losing patients of his own; for a healthcare administrator, 
however, to acknowledge an area of incompetency may result in 
him being viewed by the institutions' sponsor, i.e., his 
employer, as an indication that he is inadequate for the job. 
There is a natural tendency, therefore, for healthcare 
administrators to deny or coverup their own particular areas 
of professional incompetency or inadequacy rather than defer 
the tasks associated with those specific areas to a fellow 
professional or to a subordinate on her administrative team. 
A sense of loyalty or a greater assurance of job stability 
offered by the institution's sponsor may help alleviate this 
self-preserving tendency on the part of healthcare administra-
tors, but this attitude is not often found in today's highly 
competitive healthcare environment. 
Relationship with Fellow-Professionals 
The sixth category of professional obligation is the 
ideal relationship with fellow-professionals. The description 
of this relationship is in marked contrast with that in the 
guild model of profession. 
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Here the relationship is under-
stood in a much weaker form, since the common skills and 
central values of healthcare administrators are dependent upon 
the recognition of their institutions' sponsors and are not 
determined by the profession itself. 
First, since sponsors hire and terminate employment of 
healthcare administrators, the ultimate authority for deter-
mining professional expertise within healthcare administration 
rests more with the sponsors than with the profession. Unlike 
in the guild model, in which the professions themselves 
established their own standards for training and determining 
competency, in the agent mode of profession it is the sponsors 
who determine levels of competency and who dictate which 
skills healthcare administrators must possess. 
Secondly, in the agent model of profession, the skills of 
healthcare administrators are understood to be value-free and 
offered to promote the directives and values of their institu-
tion's sponsor. The values of their sponsor which they 
promote may be in marked contrast to the values promoted by 
other healthcare administrators exercising their professional 
role in the name of their sponsors. Again, the high turnover 
rate of hospital CEO's suggests that sponsor's values may be 
put on or taken off like a garment as many administrators 
embrace various sponsors' values throughout the course of 
their professional career. This lack of consensus and 
consistency regarding the values of sponsors has the effect of 
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weakening any relationship between healthcare administrators. 
Unlike the guild model where the profession determines the 
values by which its skills are practiced, in the agent model 
of profession it is the sponsors of healthcare institutions 
which dictate the professional values which guide the practice 
of healthcare administration skills. In the agent model of 
profession therefore, the ideal relationship between health-
care administrators is relatively weak due to lack of clear 
ownership in determining the standards of professional skills 
and to a lack of professional consensus over role-specific 
values. 
Relationship with Society 
The seventh category of professional obligation is the 
ideal relationship of healthcare administrators with society 
at large. In the agent model of profession, this relationship 
is determined and guided by the interests and values of the 
sponsor of the healthcare administrator's institution. 
A healthcare administrator is committed to the welfare of 
his client, namely, his institution's sponsor, rather than to 
the welfare of the community utilizing the services of his 
institution. The healthcare administrator's involvement with 
his community is primarily conducted through marketing and 
public relations so as to promote his institution. There are 
no role-specific duties or obligations for the healthcare 
administrator guiding his marketing or public relations except 
whatever will benefit the interests of the sponsor. The more 
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important issue to explore, in another context than this, is 
the ideal relationship of the sponsor to society for which the 
healthcare administrator serves only as the sponsor's repre-
sentative. But again, in the agent model of profession, the 
healthcare administrator would have no input into the nature 
or content of this relationship. 
A further point can also be made. Entering public 
discussion regarding societal issues such as healthcare reform 
or defining the elements of community health which should be 
addressed or advanced does not presuppose any special exper-
tise on the part of healthcare administrators; their exper-
tise is in the effective operation of a healthcare institution 
according to the criteria established by the sponsor and not 
in any public forum regarding the value of particular forms of 
healthcare provision. A leadership role in a healthcare 
institution does not imply for healthcare administrators any 
role-specific duties or obligations toward society in gener-
al .16 
Critique of the Agent Model of Profession 
for Healthcare Administrators 
1~his point is elaborated on in Gene Burton, "Health Care 
Advertising: Comparing the Attitudes of Hospital Administra-
tors and Consumers," Journal of Hospital Marketing 5, no. 2 
(1991): 83-94; Robert Goldman, "Wanted: A Practical Approach 
to Health Care Marketing Ethics," Health Marketing Quarterly 
3, no. 1 (1985): 7-10; Philip Cooper and Karen King, "Market-
ing Ethics, Functions, and Content: A Health Education/Market-
ing Survey," Health Values 9, no. 6 (1985) 29-36; Robert 
Veatch, "Allocating Health Resources Ethically: New Roles for 
Administrators and Clinicians," Frontiers of Health Services 
Management 8, no. 1 (1991): 3-29. 
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The ethics of healthcare administrators in the agent 
model of profession are determined according to the f ounda-
tional obligation of not exercising value judgments regarding 
the ends of their healthcare ins ti tut ion's sponsor. For 
professions in general, this foundational obligation of 
judging only the means and not the ends of their chief clients 
is in marked contrast to, and in some degree is in reaction 
against, what is often perceived to be the failure of profes-
sions in general to honor the moral obligations understood to 
exist in the guild model of profession. Determining the 
ethics of professionals according to this foundational 
obligation may well be considered beneficial since it serves 
to make professional ethics more easily identifiable, more 
capable of being lived up to for some professionals, and in 
general easier for society to hold members of professions 
accountable. Yet, as this fourth section of the chapter will 
present, there are two important reasons to argue that the 
obligations of professionals as understood to exist within the 
agent model of profession would not be acceptable within a 
social contract setting. 
First Criticism 
A first criticism of the agent model of profession is 
that this model presupposes patient or client autonomy as an 
absolute or fundamental value. This is in contrast to the 
guild model of profession, and emphasis upon this value has to 
a great extent successfully challenged professionals to avoid 
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paternalism and to utilize their knowledge, judgment and 
skills to expand and not replace the autonomy of clients or 
patients. This has been argued for on both deontological 
terms, i.e., professional respect for client or patient 
autonomy based upon their inherent dignity and inalienable 
right to self-determination, and on utilitarian terms, i.e., 
professionals best promote societal ends by helping clients or 
patients achieve benefits such as health, justice, or recon-
ciliation with God . 17 Yet focusing on autonomy as the most 
fundamental value fails to do justice to the human condition 
which gives rise to the unique relationship between the 
professional and the client or patient and which cannot 
adequately be described within the context of the agent model 
of profession. 
Professional practice, although empowered by exclusive 
expertise, is ultimately based on relationships with clients 
or patients that arise naturally as the result of the human 
condition. People become sick and need assistance in healing, 
or are victimized and seek redress in justice, or despair from 
tragedies in life and require counseling or spiritual support. 
It is natural to seek relief from physical suffering, to 
desire respect for one's rights or to be recompensed when one 
has been wronged, or to be relieved of emotional or spiritual 
distress. 
17These arguments can be found in Kul tgen, Ethics and 
Professionalism, 351-353. 
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Seeking professional help in these situations does not 
elicit a mere contractual relationship, as what occurs when a 
customer desires to purchase an automobile from a salesman; 
there the salesman "pitches his wares" but ultimately honors 
the will or desire of the customer and so respects her 
autonomy. But when one seeks professional help to address a 
fundamental human need, the professional is not merely helping 
the client or patient to satisfy her desires but he is helping 
her live more authentically according to what she truly is as 
a human being. It is the nature of the fundamental needs 
which professions address that makes the recipient a client or 
patient instead of a customer, and that contributes to making 
the helper a professional instead of a salesperson. To the 
client or patient, therefore, the exclusive expertise of the 
professional is not value-free but is intrinsically valuable 
in its ability to restore a lost or diminished fundamental 
human mode of functioning. 
Similarly, healthcare administrators are instrumentally 
involved in the provision of a needed service, i.e., health-
care, and not just another commodity, to a local community. 
There are times when members of society require healthcare 
that can be provided only through a healthcare institution. 
Because healthcare is commonly considered to be a fundamental 
good to society, the sponsors of healthcare institutions 
cannot arbitrarily pursue their own chosen ends regardless of 
the impact those ends have on the delivery of the fundamental 
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good of healthcare to that community. Expectations are placed 
upon healthcare institutions that they will, to some extent 
and to some acceptable fashion, deliver needed available 
healthcare to the community. These expectations are largely 
placed on healthcare administrators through community or local 
governing boards, but also by the community in general which 
perceives sponsors to be largely absent from the day-to-day 
operation of local healthcare institutions. Healthcare 
administrators are therefore held accountable to some degree 
by their local communities to assure that their healthcare 
institution delivers the available healthcare in an acceptably 
beneficial way to the community. This intrinsic value of 
professional services, however, cannot be accounted for in the 
agent model of profession. 
Furthermore, this gives healthcare administrators some 
limited type of authority in their relationship with their 
institution's sponsor. The delivery of healthcare is not 
value-free, but is intrinsically valuable in its ability to 
restore lost or diminished heal th function to members of 
society. Regardless of the particular interests or ends of 
sponsors of healthcare institutions, healthcare administrators 
exert a certain type of limited authority over their sponsors 
in the sense that they must administrate their healthcare 
institution in such a way that the heal th needs of the 
community are addressed in a manner generally acceptable to 
the community. If this does not occur, then eventually, in 
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some form or other, the community will call the sponsor to 
accountability or act in such a way that the sponsor will not 
be able to pursue its own interests or ends. Healthcare 
administrators, therefore, because of their formal knowledge 
and training which constitute their exclusive expertise and 
because they direct institutions which provide services that 
are considered essential or fundamental to human functioning, 
possess some authority in their relationship with their 
institution's sponsors which cannot be accounted for in the 
agent model of profession. 18 
Second Criticism 
A second criticism of the agent model of profession is 
that this model presupposes professionals to be psychological-
ly capable of judging only the means and not the interests or 
ends of their chief client, and that they remain unbiased 
towards those interests or ends despite their own interests 
and values. This presupposition, however, can be challenged 
in two different ways. 
First, respecting a client's or patient's pursuit or 
choice of their own interests or ends requires an absolute 
18This argument is also raised, though in somewhat differ-
ent fashion, by Robert Sokolowski, "The Fiduciary Relation-
ship and the Nature of Professions," in Ethics, Trust, and the 
Professions, 23-39; Richard Flathman, "Power, Authority, and 
Rights in the Practice of Medicine," in George Agich, ed., 
Responsibility in Health Care (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1982), 105-125; Richard Sherlock, "Reasonable Men 
and Sick Human Beings," American Journal of Medicine 80 
(January 1986): 2-4. 
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respect for their autonomy and a willingness (as well as an 
ability) to subjugate one's own autonomy, i.e., not to 
exercise one's own autonomous, value-laden choices, in that 
professional-client/patient relationship. It is not uncommon, 
however, to find among professionals, as members of society at 
large, a belief that possession of certain virtues or charac-
ter traits or particular ends is essential to "the good life." 
For example, even some who might claim to advocate the agent 
model of profession hold that one integral and necessary 
component of a good life consists in being a self-determined 
or autonomous person; this in turn would seem to require 
specific physical, mental and social functioning in order for 
this fundamental value to be exercised. To the degree, 
therefore, that clients or patients request specific treat-
ments or services that do not promote, and in fact, may lessen 
the ability to exercise their autonomy, then some profes-
sionals may in turn advocate different treatments or services 
in the belief that clients or patients are mistaken. In other 
words, they will exercise weak paternalism in order to benefit 
or restore client or patient autonomy. 
Other goods or values generally agreed upon in society as 
constituting fundamental elements of the good life may also be 
proposed or advocated over the client or patient's wishes. 
Healthcare administrators, while committed to promoting the 
interests of their ins ti tut ion's sponsor, may exercise a 
certain amount of discretion in interpreting what they may 
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believe are somewhat misguided or uninformed directives from 
their sponsor in order to promote their sponsor's interests in 
a way that they judge is best. Presuming that the client or 
patient should hold or pursue values or interests that are 
commonly held in society, or that the professional believes 
should be held or pursued, is not consistent with the agent 
model of profession, however, which insists that client or 
patient preferences or ends must be respected regardless of 
societal or personal conceptions of supposed "objective" ends 
or "universal" values. 
Furthermore, there is a natural tendency among profes-
sionals to promote the value of their exclusive expertise over 
other values which clients or patients may hold. Profession-
als provide a service addressing a fundamental human need or 
societal concern which they often tend to view, in light of 
their commitment to education and training in providing that 
service, as more important than most other values. Physicians 
will then often promote medical treatments to benefit physical 
health regardless how this is valued by the patient, and 
healthcare administrators will promote particular functions of 
the healthcare institution valued due to the perspective of 
their education, training and leadership style regardless of 
how this is valued by their ins ti tut ion's sponsors. As argued 
in Chapter III, possessing profession-specific values seems to 
be intrinsic to professionals in a way that the agent model of 
profession cannot address. 
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Secondly, it is too simple to state that the agent model 
of profession conceives the professional's role as using her 
training, knowledge and experience to provide the facts to the 
client or patient about her specific problem and the alterna-
tives available to address that problem, and the client or 
patient's role as providing the values and conception of the 
good with which to evaluate these alternatives and selecting 
the one that is best for himself. Underlying this view of 
division of labor are presuppositions about the nature and 
relation of facts and values that are the legacy of a logical 
positivism which has long since been rejected by most philoso-
phers. Positivism distinguished between descriptive state-
ments that were considered true or false according to whether 
they in fact correctly described and explained the world. By 
remaining properly descriptive or empirical, such factual 
statements theoretically were value-free. Expressions of 
value, on the other hand, were only expressions of emotions or 
attitudes and were neither true nor false, correct nor 
mistaken. 19 
It is generally agreed that such a distinction between 
fact and value is no longer meaningful, but that in many ways 
the identify and nature of so-called facts in intimately bound 
up in value judgments. For purposes here, then, it can be 
stated that clients or patients are never provided with 
19See Alfred Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1936); Charles Stevenson, Ethics and 
Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). 
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value-free facts from professionals.· There are a number of 
ways this can be illustrated. 
First, the language used by professionals to describe 
treatment or service alternatives is itself part evaluative, 
e.g., by telling a family that providing a particular treat-
ment will only prolong the patient's suffering, the suffering 
is presented as bad for the patient. Secondly, when often it 
is not possible to provide all possible relevant facts about 
the treatment or service options, a value judgment is always 
made about which facts are the most important. Thirdly, 
professionals often use body language, tone of voice, or 
emphasis in presenting information that reveals their own 
positive or negative evaluation of various alternatives. 
Fourthly, many professionals couple the process of informing 
the client or patient about treatment or service options with 
a recommendation that a particular alternative be pursued. 
Fifth, many professionals commonly see a part of their role as 
securing client or patient agreement with the service or 
treatment they have decided upon, and so they become strong 
advocates for that service or treatment. In sum, profession-
als are almost always naturally hindered in their attempt to 
promote only the interests and values of their healthcare 
institution's sponsor by their own natural biases and lack of 
obj ecti vi ty. 20 
21>This is explored in Dan Brock, "Facts and Values in the 
Physician-Patient Relationship," in Ethics, Trust, and the 
Professions, 113-132; Robert Veatch, "Is Trust of Profes-
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Conclusion 
The agent model of profession, therefore, inadequately 
describes the value of the professional services sought by 
clients or patients, and fails to adequately describe the type 
of relationship that actually exists between professionals and 
their clients or patients. Professionals, therefore, do in 
fact often judge the ends or interests of their clients or 
patients in light of societal and profession-specific values, 
and may well promote the ends of their clients or patients to 
a great extent through the perspective of those values. Yet 
this leaves the problem which the agent model of profession 
tried to correct, namely, the unwanted paternalism naturally 
built into the guild model of profession coupled with the 
unchecked dangers of professionals either abusing their 
relative autonomy in practice or exploiting clients or 
patients for selfish gain. 
Two possible solutions emerge. One reflects the desire 
found in our society to maintain client or patient self-
determination along with the desire found among many profes-
sionals to be freed from unwanted role-specific professional 
obligations. This solution proposes that a different view of 
professionalism is needed and is in fact evolving in our 
society today. This view sees professions as constituting no 
more than occupational groups with some specific expertise 
sionals a Coherent Concept?", Ethics, Trust, and the Profes-
sions, 159-175. 
218 
that they market for financial gain, and professionals as 
individuals who embark on careers in the professions for their 
own personal gain. The professions maintain re la ti ve autonomy 
in practice only in the content of their work, and allow their 
customers to decide which professional services they wish to 
purchase. No role-specific moral obligations should be 
expected of professionals except for those ordinary norms that 
generally apply to other business transactions in our society. 
The second possible solution is to preserve the 
expectation of role-specific moral obligations as both 
essential to our understanding of the meaning of profession 
and as a practice which society deems to be beneficial and 
worthy of keeping. The problems commonly associated with the 
guild model of professionalism may be addressed not by 
throwing out the expected atypical moral commitment and 
behavior of professionals, but by improving the institutional 
structures of professions and by widening their accountability 
to society. 
The first proposed solution will be examined in Chapter 
VII as the commercial model of profession. The latter 
solution will be discussed in Chapter VIII as the interactive 
model of profession. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE ETHICS OF HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATORS 
IN THE COMMERCIAL MODEL OF PROFESSION 
This chapter will explore the moral obligations of 
healthcare administrators as understood to exist within a 
commercial model of professions. The commercial model is a 
relatively recent and increasingly popular attempt to define 
the nature of profession and professional obligation in such 
a way that the problems arising from the traditional guild 
model of professions may be satisfactorily addressed. 
Presuppositions of the commercial model will be first 
identified. Defining professions and their moral obligations 
within the commercial model is dependent upon a Libertarian 
theory of economics and justice. The only moral obligations 
and role-specific duties within this model are the obligations 
and duties normally associated with everyday business transac-
tions. 
In the second part of this chapter the commercial aspects 
of professions in general and of healthcare administrators in 
particular will be explored. Drawing on the Critical view of 
professions found in the sociological literature, the commer-
cial model views professions simply as occupational groups 
which have successfully arisen to control the market by 
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gaining relative autonomy in practice in their area of 
expertise. It will be proposed that the commercial model of 
professions aptly describes many features of healthcare 
administrators' practice in the last three decades (1960's 
through 1980's). 
The third part of this chapter will then attempt to 
identify the moral obligations of healthcare administrators as 
understood to exist within the commercial model of profes-
sions. As in the previous two chapters, this will be done by 
examining the seven categories of professional obligation: 
identification of the chief client, ideal relationship with 
the client, commitment to the good of the chief client, 
central values of the profession, commitment to competence, 
ideal relationship with fellow professionals, and ideal 
relationship with society at large. 
The final section of this chapter will critique the 
concept of profession and professional obligation for health-
care administrators as understood within the commercial model. 
It will be argued that this understanding of professions and 
their obligations would not be acceptable in the social 
contract. It is not just that legitimate criticisms can be 
mounted against the minimal moral responsibilities argued for 
in the Libertarian model of economics and justice. More 
importantly, the fundamental human needs and societal concerns 
which give rise to the professions cannot be satisfactorily 
met in a commercial model of professions; the needy client or 
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patient is not on a "level playing field" with the profession-
al, the relationship between the professional and the client 
or patient is not a business transaction, and there are no 
grounds to trust the professional or to believe in his 
supposed commitment to service and to a fiduciary relationship 
when profit-maximization is the overriding moral norm. 
Presuppositions of the Commercial Model 
of Profession 
The commercial model of profession is based upon the 
presupposition of the possibility and integral value of a free 
enterprise economic system. Free enterprise systems allocate 
and distribute goods and services by means of market exchang-
es, market prices and consumer choices. This in turn requires 
institutions to protect private property and to enforce 
contracts, a recognized medium of exchange, and a competitive 
market structure. Competition in the free market is held to 
reward extraordinary skills and efforts, and also offers 
opportunities for enterprise, invention, and adaption so as to 
most efficiently maximize the production and exchange of goods 
in society. Consumer preferences, ordinarily without 
government interference (some free enterprise theorists permit 
government regulation in the specific case of unavoidable 
technical monopolies), are the sole determinant of price and 
profit incentives in this model. In this model goods and 
services are offered on the presupposition that consumers and 
producers are primarily motivated by the desire to maximize 
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their own self-interest, which in turn is held to yield 
(through what is often referred to as Adam Smith's "invisible 
hand" guiding the free market) the best possible social 
consequences in the distribution of goods and services. 1 
In the commercial model the free market system is also 
held to be the best means of assuring a just distribution of 
goods because, in this account, a distribution is just, no 
matter how unequal, if it has arisen from an originally just 
position of free transfers between individuals voluntarily 
buying or selling goods or services. Justice simply involves 
the preserving of what has been called each person's entitle-
ment - rights to property originally created or received in 
voluntary exchanges, regardless of the advantages or disadvan-
tages received by an individual in the "natural lottery," 
i.e., the genetic, social, economic and political endowments 
that are independent of people's voluntary exchanges. 2 This 
system is held to provide the maximum satisfaction of aggre-
gate demand or wants. Government should therefore avoid 
regulating business activities except insofar as intervention 
is necessary to prevent the use of force or fraud (or, as 
mentioned, in the face of technical monopolies according to 
'For a description and analysis of the free market system, 
see Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (New 
York: Simon & Schuster Publication, 1982); Richard DeGeorge, 
"Moral Issues in Business," in Richard DeGeorge, ed., Ethics, 
Free Enterprise, and Public Policy (New York: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 1980), 1-18. 
2See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia (New York: 
Basic Books, 1974). 
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some versions of the theory) . 3 
Immoral behavior is understood to occur in the commercial 
model only in situations when force or fraud prohibit volun-
tary market exchanges. There are no special moral obligations 
outside of the responsibility of persons in the marketplace to 
conduct transactions in a noncoercive manner. Coercion and 
acts of bribery, falsification of records, theft, corporate 
espionage, and so forth violate the very conditions necessary 
for making contracts and market exchanges voluntarily, and 
therefore are immoral and may, if law can effectively control 
them, be regulated by law. "In the end business has only two 
responsibilities - to obey the elementary canons of everyday 
face-to-face civility (honesty, good faith, and so on) and to 
seek material gain."4 Immoral behavior is understood to be 
only that which prohibits free and open competition, and this 
is normally understood to mean only the practice of coercion 
and deception. No other moral behaviors are prohibited. 5 
Claims of supposed existing obligations on the part of those 
3See Alan Goldman, "Business Ethics: Profits, Utilities, 
and Moral Rights," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 ( 1980) : 
260-286. 
4Theodore Levitt, "The Dangers of Social Responsibility," 
Harvard Business Review (September-October 1958), 49. 
5See Milton Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Increase Its Profits," in Joseph DesJardens and 
John McCall, eds., Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1.985), 21-25; 
Norman Bowie, "Changing the Rules," in Tom Beauchamp and 
Norman Bowie, eds., Ethical Theory and Business (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 147-150. 
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engaged in business transactions to promote the common welfare 
through specific practices of social responsibility are denied 
by arguing that businesses are not designed for nor capable of 
practicing social welfare, and that restrictions placed upon 
business negatively affect the benefits naturally provided to 
society by businesses since, in the long run, what is good for 
business is ultimately good for society. 6 
Characteristics of the Commercial Model 
of Profession 
In the second part of this chapter the commercial aspects 
of actual professions will briefly be explored. It is the 
claim of social theorists within the Critical perspective that 
professions in American society should be understood as 
business enterprises arising from and developing a uniquely 
advantageous position within the structures and values of the 
marketplace. 
Some of the Critical social theorists do not view this 
perspective on profession as something new. They hold that 
the earliest craft guilds in the Middle Ages, which are 
considered by many to be the forerunners of modern prof es-
sions, were constituted by artisans and tradesmen whose 
primary orientation was a commercial marketing of services. 
6See Charles Phillips, "What is Wrong with Profit Maximi-
zation?" in William Greenwood, ed., Issues in Business and 
Society, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), 77-
88; Joseph Pichler, "Capitalism in America," in Ethics, Free 
Enterprise, and Public Policy, 19-39; Richard McCarty, 
"Business and Benevolence," Business & Professional Ethics 
Journal 7, no. 2 (1988}: 63-83. 
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Modern professions, much like the earliest professions, they 
argue, are primarily a means for individuals who become 
professionals to earn an income on the basis of transacted 
services. The occupational groups which constitute the modern 
professions simply emerged preeminent over competing groups 
offering similar services solely through the organizational 
efforts of their leaders and their own voluntary associations. 
These organized occupational groups first created a distinc-
tive commodity, then created and controlled the market for 
their services, induced new recruits to accept their standards 
and programs for training and licensure, sought to convince 
their potential clientele of their goodwill and trustworthi-
ness to be granted relative monopoly and autonomy in practice, 
and finally solidified their professional status through legal 
and other institutional structures and societal recognition of 
their exclusive expertise. 7 
Regardless how the origin and rise of professions in 
America actually occurred, all Critical social theorists 
reflect the perspective and sentiment (which is also found 
both outside and sometimes within the professions) that 
professions should be viewed as commercial entities with no 
distinctive role-specific moral obligations that would set 
7This position is argued for in Magali Sarfatti Larson, 
The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1977), 3-18, 40-53; Marie Haug, "The Sociological 
Approach to Self-Regulation," in Roger Blair and Stephen 
Rubin, eds., Regulating the Professions (Lexington, MA: D.C. 
Health and Company Lexington Books, 1980), 61-80. 
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them aside from other players in the market. Their only 
obligations are those normally associated with everyday 
business transactions. This perspective on professions is 
maintained for three reasons. 
First, this commercial view of professions views profes-
sional claims to a disinterested, self-sacrificing fiduciary 
relationship with clients or patients with skepticism because 
it considers human motivation to be primarily self-interested. 
Individuals may join a profession for a variety of reasons, 
but ultimately their motivation is to advance their own self-
interests, whether this be through financial gain, social 
prestige, or the emotional rewards of a public life of 
service. If these interests or benefits were taken away, 
proponents of the commercial model would argue, few if any 
members would remain with their profession. 8 
Secondly, since individuals utilize their professions to 
make a living, they cannot but help being influenced by the 
commercial or free enterprise system in our American society. 
Professionals generally are rewarded for their marketable 
skills with high prestige and income. One of the most 
attractive features of becoming a professional is the antici-
pated higher level of income commonly perceived to be associ-
ated with professional status. Thus, even if the previous 
8This point is argued in Tibor Machan, "Ethics and the 
Regulation of Professional Ethics," Philosophia (Israel) 13 
(1983): 337-348; James Gaa, "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of 
Professional Rights and Responsibilities," Journal of Business 
Ethics 9 (1990): 159-169. 
227 
point about motivation was not true, these theorists argue, 
the system within which professionals practice requires them 
to act according to the commercial model anyway. 
Thirdly, the vast majority of professionals are now 
employed by corporations or are part of group-practices whose 
primary purpose is profit-maximization. The presence and 
purpose of these organizations tends to diminish or remove the 
traditional one-on-one relationship with the client or patient 
and fosters in professionals a greater loyalty to the institu-
tion and to its prof it-maximization than to the client or 
patient. Even professionals working in so-called not-for-
profit institutions must practice in such a way that the 
institution's survival is secure. In every respect, then, 
professional practice is constrained to follow the pattern of 
the marketplace. 9 
Within the commercial view, professions maintain a 
monopoly in the market to the degree that their services are 
not offered or emulated by other occupational groups that 
might take away the buyers of their services. Normal societal 
problems with market monopoly such as price controls and 
regulation of quality of the product or service are addressed 
by professional attempts at self-regulation (which is not a 
response to any generally agreed upon terms of a social 
contract, nor is there any moral obligation to self-regulate 
9This last point is suggested in L. Shannon Jung, "Commer-
cialization and the Professions," Business & Professional 
Ethics Journal 2, no. 2 (1983): 57-82. 
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in this model; instead, this is simply a strategy to keep 
monopoly-busters at bay) and by proclaiming (as part of their 
advertising) an atypical moral commitment to the client or 
patient and by claiming extraordinarily high standards for 
entry into and life-long accountability within the profession, 
so the higher-priced professionals are - or are perceived to 
be - more capable in rendering the higher-quality service to 
more people than under any proposed competitive alternative. 
Any qualified person attracted by the anticipated rewards is 
free to incur the training sacrifice and debt assumption to 
enter any profession. Should the anticipated rewards fail to 
materialize, exit from a profession is virtually costless save 
for the possibility of a few psychological scars. 10 
In the commercial model the service provided by the 
professional is viewed as a commodity transaction. This 
transaction occurs between two equal partners who freely 
contract for the desired service. Healthcare or its delivery, 
legal advice or representation, religious counseling or 
preaching, are all ultimately commodities to be bought and 
sold in the marketplace. The professional "owns" the exper-
tise which can be offered in practice to the client or patient 
who is the purchaser of the services; together they bargain 
over the price of the commodity. The client or patient 
exchanges funds for the services, prior to that agreement 
1°This point is argued in Ira Horowitz, 11 The Economic 
Foundations of Self-Regulation in the Professions," in 
Regulating the Professions, 3-28. 
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possessing only the rights usually accorded a consumer in a 
free-market economy, i.e., the right not to be deceived or 
coerced. 11 
The role of healthcare administrators in the past three 
decades increasingly has been understood in terms of the 
commercial model of profession. This is largely due to the 
fact that their role has become more and more like that of the 
administrators of other large non-healthcare institutions 
competing in the marketplace. Hospital expansion in size and 
technological services began after World War II, continued in 
earnest through the 1950's with the predominant emergence of 
third party payers, and exploded with the introduction of 
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements in the 1960 's. Until the 
1980's, the more expenditures healthcare institutions in-
curred, the more income they received. Providing more 
healthcare to more people was handsomely reimbursed. The 
profitability of healthcare institutions led to a number of 
consequences; competition increased, for-profit institutions 
developed, healthcare systems emerged with multiple institu-
tions, and not-for-profit institutions and systems began to 
emulate the services, product-lines, and business practices of 
11This view of professional service as a commodity transac-
tion is also examined (and criticized) in Edmund Pellegrino 
and David Thomasma, For the Patient's Good (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 101-102; Michael Bayles, Profession-
al Ethics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1980) , 72; George Agich, "Professionalism and Ethics in 
Health Care," The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 5, no. 3 
{1980): 186-199. 
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the for-profit chains. The introduction of DRGs (Diagnostic 
Regulated Groupings which pay a set fee per case) in 1983 to 
cut healthcare costs was also intended to foster competition 
between institutions to treat patients faster, more intensive-
ly, and with greater success than their less efficient 
competitors. 
Much of the literature on the ethics of healthcare 
administrators has reflected this increasing emphasis upon a 
market mentality. There is recognition that healthcare 
administrators formerly viewed themselves as directors of 
charitable institutions established for patient care, communi-
ty service, scientific research, and training and education 
programs. Now, however, healthcare administrators tend to 
view themselves as presidents of large businesses competing 
with numerous other healthcare facilities for customers and 
market share in an increasingly crowded and varied healthcare 
field. 12 
The reasons proposed for this change towards a market 
perspective on their professional practice include increased 
competition with other healthcare providers, reaction to 
government and third-party payer pressures on cost-contain-
12This change in role-perception is acknowledged in Tasker 
Robinette, "Adapting to the Age of Competition: A Paradigm 
Shift for Voluntary Hospitals," Hospital and Health Services 
Administration (May-June 1985), 8-19; Charles Fahey, "Corpo-
rate Ethical Decision Making in Health Care Institutions," 
Hospital Administration Currents 31, no. 4 (1987}: 19-26; 
Warren J. Salmon, "The Medical Profession and the Corporati-
zation of the Health Sector," Theoretical Medicine 8 (Fall 
1987): 19-29. 
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ment, introduction and emulation of big for-profit chains, 
emphasis on business skills in healthcare administration 
education, and a shifting emphasis toward the value of 
personal self-advancement among those now entering the 
profession. 13 The result of this change in perspective is 
that the professional skills necessary for successful health-
care administration are now commonly identified in the 
literature to be marketing, finance, strategic planning and 
management,w the primary professional qualities desired in 
healthcare administrators are proposed to be ambitiousness and 
13See, for example, Samuel Levey and James Hill, "Between 
Survival and Social Responsibility: In Search of an Ethical 
Balance," The Journal of Health Administration Education 4, 
no. 2 (1986), 225-231; David Kinzer, "Commentary," The 
Journal of Health Administration Education 4, no. 2 (1986): 
225-248; Stephen Shortell, "The Medical Staff of the Future: 
Replanting the Garden," Frontiers of Health Services Manage-
ment 1, no. 3 (1985): 3-48; Peter Weil, "Health Care Execu-
tives Look at Rationing," Discharge Planning Update 10 
(September-October 1990): 3-7; J. Timothy Phillips, Don 
Wineberg and Adam Elfenbein, "Meeting the Goals of Medicare 
Prospective Payments," West Virginia Law Review 88 (Fall 
1988): 225-262. 
14See, for example, Stuart Wesbury and Joyce Florey. 
"Wanted: CEO' s and Trustees With a Business Perspective," 
Trustee 37 (December 1984): 32-33; Kenneth Kaufman, "Hospi-
tals Unique in Mission, Not Operation," Hospitals 61, no. 22 
(20 November 1987): 100; Evelyn Cunico, "Health Care Values 
Redefined," The Hospital Manager 15, no. 1 (1985): 3; Judith 
Nemes, "More Chief Financial Officers are Setting Their Sights 
on the Executive's Suite," Modern Healthcare 20 ( 11 June 
1990): 43-56; Richard Clarke, "Role of Chief Financial 
Officer Changes; Today's 'Take Charge' CFO Aspires to be CEO, 11 
Federation of American Hospitals 20. no. 1 (1987): 49-51. 
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competitiveness, 15 and the primary moral obligation of health-
care administrators is described as personal self-interest ex-
pressed through activities seeking to assure institutional 
survivability and profit-maximization. The Code of Ethics for 
the American College of Healthcare Executives obligates 
healthcare administrators, except for its focus on patients' 
health, only to a series of general moral norms that are 
consistent with the minimal ethics guiding business transac-
tions in the free enterprise system, i.e., to refrain from 
coercion and fraud and to fulfill their contractual commit-
ments. 16 
Professional Ethics of Healthcare Administrators 
in the Commercial Model of Profession 
To more carefully delineate the moral obligations of 
healthcare administrators as understood within the commercial 
model of professions, this third section of the chapter will 
15See, for example, Linda Levey et al., "Health Leaders of 
Tomorrow: A Descriptive Analysis," The Journal of Health 
Administration Education 7, no. 2 (1989): 244-273; Edward 
Kazemek and Daniel Grauman, "Successful Healthcare Executives 
are Entrepreneurs," Healthcare Financial Management 43, no. 2 
(1989): 82; Julie Johnsson, "Is Competition Driving CEO's out 
of Health Care?" Hospitals 64, no. 6 (20 March 1990): 77 
16This point is recognized in James Summers, "Closing 
Unprofitable Services: Ethical Issues and Management Respons-
es," Hospital and Heal th Services Administration 3 O, no. 5 
(1985): 8-28; Jan Clement, "Corporate Diversification, 
Expectations and Outcomes," Health Care Management Review 13 
(1988): 17-23; Richard Perry, "Survival is Not Enough - The 
Case for Profit," Journal of Mental Health Administration 14 
(1987): 37-39; Julie Johnsson, "Preventing Board Conflict 
over Mission, Margin," Hospitals 65, no. 17 (5 September 
1991) : 48. 
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now address each of the seven categories of professional 
obligation from within the context of the commercial model of 
profession. 
Identification of Chief Client 
Despite claims to the contrary in the Code of Ethics of 
the American College of Health Executives, in the commercial 
model of profession individual patients do not constitute the 
chief client of healthcare administrators. The professional 
relationship of healthcare administrators with individual 
patients is shaped by the fact that the healthcare administra-
tor is directing and managing the production of healthcare 
that is sold like any other commodity in the marketplace to 
patients who are consumers desiring or needing the services 
which only a healthcare institution can provide. The health-
care institution, directed by the healthcare administrator, 
contracts with the patient17 for particular services at 
specific prices as occurs in any other marketplace transac-
tion. The patient is not resigned to being a passive recipi-
ent of whatever kind of care and treatment the healthcare 
administrator18 has elected to offer. The patient first 
17The patient's insurance company, HMO, or Medicare 
supplemental coverage is normally the party which contracts 
for the services with the healthcare institution in place of 
the patient, but this should be understood to constitute part 
of the meaning whenever only "the patient" is referred to here 
as doing the contracting. 
18The type and quality of care and treatment offered is 
integrally related to the corresponding physician practice; 
this should be understood to constitute part of the meaning 
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judges the value of the service offered in terms of benefits 
and costs and then chooses whether or not to purchase those 
services. 
The relationship between the healthcare administrator and 
the individual patient is thus an impersonal one, and is 
marked exclusively by the communications about the offered 
commodity and its price, and then the actual exchange of that 
commodity for the price that is agreed upon. In this model 
the healthcare administrator and patient are primarily 
competitors. Each is trying to obtain from the other the 
greatest amount of what he or she wants (money, restoration to 
health or well-being, etc.) while giving up in the exchange as 
little as possible. Thus the criterion by which the health-
care administrator determines the kind of care and treatments 
to offer the patient is determined by what the patient is 
willing to pay for and by what will yield the greatest return 
to the healthcare institution in terms of least cost in time, 
effort, and materials . 19 
As a result, the patient should not believe that he is 
receiving the best possible quality care and treatment from 
whenever only "the healthcare administrator" is referred to 
here. 
19This is discussed further in David Ozar and David Sokol, 
Dental Ethics at Chairside (St. Louis: Mosby, 1994): 41-44. 
David Ozar, "Patients' Autonomy: Three Models of the Profes-
sional-Lay Relationship in Medicine," Theoretical Medicine 5 
(1984): 61-68; "Three Models of Professionalism and Profes-
sional Obligation in Dentistry," Journal of the American 
Dental Association 110, no. 2 (1985): 173-177. 
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the healthcare institution. The patient also should not be 
surprised if she becomes the beneficiary of unnecessary tests 
or treatments. The primary goal of the healthcare administra-
tor is maximization of profit; as a purchaser of healthcare, 
the patient is but a consumer well advised to be self-protect-
ing, i.e. , "Caveat emptor;" and the patient is free to 
purchase whatever kind and amount of healthcare she really 
needs, wants or can afford. The patient should expect no more 
of the healthcare administrator and the healthcare institution 
than she would expect from any other seller in the market-
place. 20 
It should be apparent, therefore, that in the commercial 
model individual patients are not the chief client of the 
healthcare administrator. The patient ranks far down the list 
of clients whose well-being the healthcare administrator is 
committed to addressing. 
In the commercial model of profession, the chief client 
whose well-being the healthcare administrator seeks to 
2lltJ'his point is also discussed in Ozar and Sokol, Dental 
Ethics, 41-42; Ozar, "Three Models of Professionalism and 
Professional Obligation in Dentistry," 174; Ozar, "Patient's 
Autonomy: Three Models of the Professional-Lay Relationship in 
Medicine," 64. Marc Hiller, "Ethics and Health Care Adminis-
tration: Issues in Education and Practice," The Journal of 
Health Administration Education 2, no. 2 (1984): 182; Banks 
McDowell, Ethical Conduct and the Professional's Dilemma (New 
York: Quorum Books, 1991), 23-26; Peter Marsh, "Ethics and 
Success - The Relationship," Healthcare Computing & Communica-
tions 1, no. 11 (1984): 39, 46; Alan Miller, "Ethics and 
Administration," Journal of Mental Health Administration 11, 
no. 2 (1984): 28-30; Daniel Wikler, "Forming an Ethical 
Response to For-Profit Health Care," Business and Health 2 
( 1985) : 25-29. 
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promote, would seem to be the physicians. Healthcare institu-
tions cannot earn a profit without patients. For a patient to 
be admitted into a healthcare institution or to utilize their 
outpatient services, however, a physician's medical order 
normally is required. Patients don't "use" the services of 
a healthcare institution, rather they are sent there by their 
physicians. Physicians are the ones who use most of the 
services a healthcare institution provides. Healthcare 
institutions, therefore, are dependent upon physicians for 
their patients and for the utilization of their services. 
Physicians thus constitute the chief client of healthcare 
administrators in the commercial model of profession. 
Ideal Relationship with Chief Client 
In our society hospitals and physicians have long existed 
in varying degrees of tension with one another. Hospitals 
need physicians but (until recently) did not employ them; 
physicians need hospitals as an extension of their own private 
practice but can exert only limited influence and control over 
the internal power structure of hospitals. 21 Some physicians 
ally themselves closely with a particular hospital, but many 
physicians prefer to have privileges at more than one hospital 
and either utilize the services at different hospitals that 
best meet their particular specialty or tastes, or "play" one 
21With a tradition of acting as solo-practitioners, 
physicians historically have not often exercised their 
potential to work in unison to exert control over hospital 
administration. 
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hospital off against the other to exert control over decision-
making and capital expenditures. 
Healthcare administrators in return seek ways either to 
placate their medical staffs through decisions which entice 
physicians to utilize their hospital, or to control physicians 
through contracts, employment, or financing physician offices 
in proximity to their hospital. As physicians build their own 
labs, radiology centers, etc., in response to the increasing 
healthcare reimbursement for outpatient treatments and 
services, however, hospital administrators now find themselves 
competing against physicians for the same business as well as 
trying to appease and control them. New models of hospital-
physician relationships are continually being proposed in the 
literature, and the final direction of health-care reform will 
undoubtedly dictate which model is chosen. In the meantime, 
healthcare administrators maintain a difficult and delicate 
relationship with physicians as their chief clients whose 
well-being they seek to promote in order to gain financial 
reimbursement. 22 
Another client group which is rising in importance almost 
to the level of physicians are the third-party payers. 
Patients are not only not the ones who "use" the services at 
healthcare institutions, and they are also predominantly not 
nsome of the new models of hospital-physician relation-
ships are explored in Stephen Hage, "Physicians, Not Patients, 
are Hospital's True Customers," Modern Healthcare 21 ( 5 August 
1991): 22; Shortell, "The Medical Staff of the Future: 
Replanting the Garden," 3-48. 
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the ones who pay for those services. Almost all healthcare is 
now funded by Medicare, Medicaid, HMO's or PPO's, and private 
insurance. Patients may be billed for deductibles or for co-
payments, but their portion of their bill is significantly 
less than that assigned to third party payers. While Medicare 
DRGs increase the institutions's reliance upon physicians as 
their chief clients to successfully treat patients in a timely 
manner, other third-party payers who have already contracted 
with specific physicians now negotiate and contract for 
services from healthcare institutions at prices significantly 
lower than charges. These third-party payers are already 
contracted with particular physicians and the payers authorize 
hospital admissions payment for particular services. Increas-
ingly healthcare administrators must rely on contracts with 
these third-party payers rather than simply on physicians for 
their business. It is incumbent upon administrators, there-
fore, to "sell" these third-party payers the product that 
their institution can provide the highest quality care for the 
lowest price. 23 
Commitment to the Good of the Chief Client 
The "good" of physicians should be understood to mean, in 
this context, as their ability and willingness to practice 
their skills at the healthcare administrator's institution. 
23This trend is explored in Robinette, "Adapting to the Age 
of Competition: A Paradigm Shift for Voluntary Hospitals," 8-
19. 
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A healthcare administrator seeks to promote this understanding 
of the good or well-being of physicians by providing them with 
the best affordable technology and by designing the operation 
of the healthcare institution to best facilitate the practice 
of their medical skills. 
The commitment of the healthcare administrator to the 
good of physicians, however, is dependent upon the benefit 
that type of commitment yields to the healthcare administra-
tor. The healthcare administrator is concerned about the 
physician's well-being only as a means of improving the 
financial well-being of his own institution, and, in turn, 
securing his own position and financial well-being. 
The physician's need for particular services and technol-
ogy in a healthcare institution in order to provide medical 
tests and treatments for individual patients imposes no 
special ethical obligation upon the healthcare administrator. 
The physician's need may function as a motivator for them to 
seek and contract for medical staff privileges from a particu-
lar institution, but this need can be used effectively by the 
healthcare administrator to market the services and technology 
of his healthcare institution to entice physicians to join the 
medical staff and thereby, through the utilization of the 
institution's services and technology, financially benefit the 
institution and, in turn, the healthcare administrator. 
The only moral obligations that exist for the healthcare 
administrator are those that exist for all other bargainers in 
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the market place as well, namely, not to coerce, cheat or 
defraud, and to keep the contractual commitments one makes 
with others. If the practice patterns of individual physi-
cians results in a healthcare institution losing rather than 
making money with negative repercussions for the healthcare 
administrator, then the healthcare administrator may choose 
not to renew the medical staff privileges of those physicians 
and thus terminate their contract, regardless of the benefit 
those practice patterns provided to individual patients. 
Central Values of the Profession 
The fourth category of moral obligation is the central 
values of healthcare administrators. These values were first 
identified in Chapter IV. In the commercial model of profes-
sion the central values are, in prioritized order: 
1. Financial viability of the organization 
2. Effective and capable management of employees and 
good relations with medical staff 
3. Health of individual patients 
4. Institutional integrity 
5. Health of community 
The growth in professional status of the healthcare 
administrator in the last three decades has been integrally 
tied to the financial success of healthcare institutions. A 
consistent positive bottom line and growth in the physical 
plant and technological services offered by the healthcare 
institution have been the key criteria by which administrators 
have been judged by their sponsoring organizations, boards, 
and peers. CEO salaries and turnovers have been directly 
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associated with the success or failure to achieve this primary 
central value. Because of the emphasis upon profit-maximiza-
tion in the commercial model of profession, the value of 
maintaining the financial viability of the organization 
normally supersedes all other values for the healthcare 
administrator. 
The second central value in the hierarchic scheme is 
effective and capable management of employees and maintaining 
good relations with the medical staff. The high ranking of 
this value reflects the dramatic impact physician practice has 
on the financial viability of the healthcare institution which 
results in physicians becoming the chief client of healthcare 
administrators. Effective and capable management of employees 
is highly valued by the healthcare administrator since it 
assists her exclusive expertise and promotes the financial 
viability of the institution. 
In the commercial model these two central values are more 
important to the healthcare administrator than the health of 
individual patients. This ranks as only the third central 
value in the hierarchy of values. While delivering a good 
product to individual patients is important in order to 
maintain credibility in the healthcare business, patients are 
viewed as only the beneficiaries of healthcare services; to 
maximize profit, it is far more important to address the 
concerns of those who use and pay for the services, namely, 
the physicians and third-party payers. By promoting the 
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interests of those clients, it is generally assumed that the 
value of addressing the health needs of individual patients 
will also be realized. 
Occasionally in isolated incidents, when the potential 
harm to a patient may be so great, the value of the health of 
the individual patient may rise in priority to take precedent 
over the value of good relations with the medical staff and 
maintaining effective and productive management of employees. 
In those cases the healthcare administrator may intervene, 
even if this causes problems with physicians or staff, to 
avoid potential liability and negative public relations over 
the revealed harm to the individual patient, which could cause 
significant harm to the healthcare institution and potentially 
to the healthcare administrator. Such cases normally should 
be rare, however, according to the belief that promoting good 
relations with the medical staff and maintaining effective and 
capable management and employees serve as the best means to 
prevent harm occurring to individual patients. 
The fourth central value is maintaining institutional 
integrity by promoting the mission and values of the health-
care institution. This value has recently been given greater 
attention in business management books, but only for the 
purpose of helping to achieve the more important values ranked 
above it in the commercial model of profession. Institutional 
mission and values are important only if promoting them in 
turn promotes the bottom line, facilitates relations with the 
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medical staff and with third-party payers, is popularly viewed 
as mechanisms of good management, and help employees deliver 
a better product to patients at a lower cost. It is highly 
unlikely in the commercial model that an institution's sponsor 
will prize the promotion of institutional integrity if the 
healthcare administrator financially mismanages the organiza-
tion, lacks good management and business skill, antagonizes 
the medical staff, or allows the health of individual patients 
to suffer in any public way under his administration. 
The least important of the central values for healthcare 
administrators is the health of the community. Since individ-
ual patients, who pay for the services provided by healthcare 
institutions, return to their community, healthcare institu-
tions do take interest in - and thus value - the health status 
of the general community. In the commercial model, however, 
valuing the heal th of the community is to a great extent 
exercised as a marketing tool for advertising or to provide 
good public relations. A general improvement in the overall 
health of the community would actually negatively affect the 
financial return to healthcare institutions, which prosper 
only when there are health problems in a community resulting 
in the admission of patients. Healthcare institutions 
benefit, therefore, from health problems in the community. 
Unless managed care with capitation reimbursement develops to 
provide different financial incentives, then, it is hard to 
comprehend how the health of the community could rise any 
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higher in the hierarchic scheme of central values for the 
healthcare administrator in the commercial model of profes-
sion. 
Furthermore, no professional obligations exist in the 
commercial model unless an explicit contract has been estab-
lished defining those obligations. Healthcare institutions 
exist, like any other business, ultimately for the purpose of 
profit-maximization; charges of supposed social responsibili-
ty to society at large, as in providing healthcare for the 
poor and uninsured, unfairly ask healthcare institutions to 
take on others' responsibilities and unjustly detract from 
their ability to pursue means of profit-maximization.M 
Commitment to Professional Competence 
Moving beyond the central values of healthcare adminis-
tration in the commercial model of profession, the fifth 
category of professional obligation is the obligation to 
possess and maintain competence. Education and training of 
healthcare administrators now focuses on management, strategic 
24This position is argued for in Hiller, "Ethics and Heal th 
Care Administration: Issues in Education and Practice," 159-
169; Richard Gifford and Nancy Davidson, "Gone Tomorrow? 
CEO's Speak Out on Institutional Survival," Trustee 38 (May 
1985): 33-37; James Summers, "Clinicians and Managers: 
Different Ethical Approaches to Honoring Commitments," Journal 
of Healthcare Material Management 7, no. 4 (1989): 62-63; 
"Duty and Moral Obligations," Journal of Healthcare Material 
Management 7, no. 2 ( 1989) : 80-83; "Loyalty and Ethical 
Obligation: A Report from the Field," Journal of Healthcare 
Material Management 6, no. 6 (1988): 82-84; "Closing Unprof-
itable Services: Ethical Issues and Management Responses," 8-
28. 
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planning, finance and marketing.~ Since in today's highly 
competitive healthcare market the survivability of the 
healthcare institution and the preservation of the healthcare 
administrator's job are dependent upon his or her remaining 
competent in these areas, the motivation for healthcare 
administrators to remain competent in their field of exclusive 
expertise is "built in" for individuals wishing to remain in 
this profession. Competency in the commercial model is 
directly correlated with the ability to compete in the 
marketplace. 
Relationship with Fellow-Professionals 
The sixth category of professional obligation is the 
relationship with fellow healthcare administrators. This 
relationship has rarely been analyzed in the literature on 
healthcare ethics. 26 The highly competitive healthcare market 
in the past three decades has led to two dichotomous yet 
coexisting behavioral patterns in the relations between 
healthcare administrators. Internally their relations are 
often marked by ruthless competition as they seek institution-
al advantage over one another in the marketplace; yet 
publicly they often maintain cordial and even friendly 
~see, for example, the textbook: Lawrence Wolper and Jesus 
Pena, eds., Health Care Administration: Principles and 
Practices (Rockville, MA: Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1987). 
261J'his has begun to change in the last few years as market 
conditions have begun forcing healthcare administrators to 
consider collaboration with other institutions in order to 
insure their own institutional survivability. 
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relations as if out of respect for the dated guild or gentry 
mentality of profession.n Professional incompetence is 
rarely publicly criticized and the offender is almost never 
held accountable by the profession; it is understood that 
both incompetence in skill and moral incompetence within the 
commercial perspective, i.e. , coercing or failing to keep 
contracts, will punish itself in the marketplace. 28 
Relationship with Society 
The seventh category of professional obligation is the 
relationship of healthcare administrators with the wider 
community. In actuality this category does not exist in the 
commercial model of profession. 
In the commercial model, obligations occur only when 
services are contracted for; the provision of healthcare is 
contracted with individual patients and not with the community 
at large, and therefore healthcare administrators do not 
believe that they or their institutions are obligated to the 
larger community, either to provide healthcare to the poor and 
indigent or in any other way. Charity care traditionally has 
nperhaps, too, with the high turnover rate in healthcare 
administration positions in the past decade, i.e, the average 
length of hospital CEO tenure is only four years (see Brian 
McCormick and Linda Brooks, "Shared MD/Hospital Values," 
Trustee 43, no. 6 (1990): 17. These publicly harmonious 
relations are maintained out of necessity to maintain possi-
bilities for potential future job placements. 
~This point is suggested in Hiller, "Ethics and Health 
Care Administration: Issues in Education and Practice," 178-
181; Haug, "The Sociological Approach to Self-Regulation," 
64-68. 
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been offered to those without the means to pay, but only on a 
limited basis and in exchange for institutional tax-exempt 
status, philanthropic gifts, and the right to shift those 
costs to paying customers. 
Many healthcare administrators, however, find it benefi-
cial to business to be perceived as providing some sort of 
community service or to promoting the general health of the 
community at large. Most healthcare administrators do not 
have strong ties to the local community primarily because they 
transferred into their job from another geographical location 
and because, as has been mentioned, in today's highly volatile 
market the length of CEO tenure is short and the rate of 
turnover is high. In the commercial model, however, health-
care administrators are encouraged to become involved in their 
community so as to advance their career or to promote good 
public relations for their institution. 29 
Critique of the Commercial Model of Profession 
for Healthcare Administrators 
29This reasoning can be found in Julie Johnsson, "Who's 
Responsible for Care in Underserved Areas?" Hospitals 64, no. 
13 (5 July 1990): 66; Jim Summers, "Providing Indigent Care: 
Strategic Issues in Management, Marketing and Ethics," Health 
Care Strategic Management 4, no. 8 (1986): 4-13; Claus 
Schwing, "Hospitals Marketing," Heal th Estate Journal 45 (June 
1991): 22-24; Linnes Sodergren, "Health Care Marketing 
Minicase," Journal of Health Care Marketing 10 (March 1990): 
56-61; Ronald Hill, "A Broadened View of Ethics and Health 
Care Marketing," Journal of Health Care Marketing 11 (March 
1991): 2-4; Brian McCormick and Linda Brooks, "Shared 
MD/Hospital Values," Trustee 43, no. 6 (1990): 17; Paula 
Eubanks, "Community Service Benefits Careers, Hospitals," 
Hospitals 65, no. 7 (5 April 1991): 66. 
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In the final part of this chapter, three sets of criti-
cisms will be raised arguing that the professional obligations 
of healthcare administrators as defined within the commercial 
model of profession fail to satisfy the requirements of any 
reasonable social contract regarding the healthcare adminis-
tration profession. Because of this, the account of profes-
sional obligations as outlined above must be rejected in favor 
of a model of profession that would satisfy the terms of the 
social contract. 
First Criticism 
The first criticism is that the free market in and of 
itself is suspect and possesses two inherent problems. First, 
a general assumption is made in the free enterprise system 
that business, left to itself without outside interference, is 
the means best suited to serve the needs of society. It is 
not true, however, that behaviors promoting profit-maximiza-
tion will guarantee maximal aggregate utility to society. 
Profits can be secured by supplying people with what they 
want, but this does not necessarily involve helping them or 
providing them with what they need. In addition, social costs 
or harm to the public does not always figure into producers' 
costs. The free market's demand for freedom from interference 
or regulation should not be acceptable to society without 
qualification, if at all, therefore, and thus the commercial 
model of profession cannot satisfy the requirements of the 
social contract. As society questions itself about the kinds 
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of institutions it wishes to have, it may need to require that 
elements of social responsibility, i.e., particular social 
structures or behaviors that promote the welfare of the 
members of society in place of, or along with, the welfare of 
the institutions, be considered normal obligations for at 
least some forms of business, e.g., those dealing in meeting 
peoples' basic human needs. 30 
A second problem with the free market is that it seems to 
presuppose that people involved in business act without any 
personal set of values, and that institutions involved in 
business transactions are void of values except for the sole 
purpose of profit-maximization. Yet it is not true that 
business people as a rule act without personal values or that 
institutions are created and operated in a value-free manner. 
Successful business practice, i.e., the maintenance of long-
term survivability and profitability, requires of business 
people the personal values of integrity, honesty, and loyalty 
to the client and to the institution, and it requires that 
institutions possess or be perceived as possessing the social 
values of consistency, reliability, and good stewardship. 
Profit-maximization cannot be pursued value-free without 
undermining the very moral foundation necessary for 
30This point is suggested in Goldman, "Business Ethics: 
Profits, Utilities and Moral Rights," 268-277; Joseph 
DesJardens and John McCall, eds. , Contemporary Issues in 
Business Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1985), 25-32; Richard Mccarty, "Business and Benevolence," 
Business and Professional Ethics Journal 7, no. 2 (1988): 63-
83. 
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continuance of successful practice of business. 31 
Second Criticism 
It is quite possible, however, to successfully argue that 
these two general criticisms of the free market can be 
satisfactorily addressed while still keeping many of the same 
components and values of the commercial model; these two 
criticisms above, after all, serve as part of the foundation 
for teaching ethics to those involved in business. It will 
not do to merely describe a commercial model in its worst 
possible light and then "knock down the straw man." Further 
criticism of the commercial model of professions in general 
and of its application to healthcare administration in 
particular is needed. 
A second set of criticisms, therefore, needs to be raised 
arguing that the producer-consumer transaction as described in 
the commercial model is not what should take place in the 
professional-client/patient relationship, particularly in 
regards to healthcare administrators. Healthcare administra-
tors facilitate the provision of healthcare by their institu-
tions to individuals and to the community at large. Yet the 
nature of healthcare and the nature of its provision have 
become so complex that individuals and the community at large 
31This point is argued in Goldman, "Business Ethics: 
Profits, Utilities, and Moral Rights," 277-286; Thomas 
Schindler, "Business Ethics: A Waste of Time? A Fig Leaf? An 
Essential Component?" Michigan Hospitals 24, no. 12 (1988): 
23-27. 
251 
cannot fully play the rational consumer's role in selecting 
and choosing among options in healthcare or between healthcare 
institutions themselves. Laypeople are at a marked disadvan-
tage due to their lack of knowledge regarding the kinds of 
medical treatments and the means of providing healthcare, 
which makes them easy prey for overtreatment or for expensive 
treatments since they generally lack the capability of seeking 
out and weighing all possible options. No reasonable society 
would establish institutions that presume that ordinary 
patients could overcome this problem on their own. 
Second, people seek out healthcare only when they are 
sick. Illness often is experienced as a threat to or as a 
lessening of an individual's autonomy. This is not just 
because illness involves symptomatic deficits of function, but 
also because the experience of being sick is an experience of 
no longer being in control of one's body - which includes a 
sense of no longer being fully in control of one's life or 
one's goals. People seek out healthcare in part to recover 
their autonomy, to have their control over their own bodies 
and lives restored. This means, however, that many times they 
may lack the full capacity to be co-equal bargainers with 
physicians and healthcare institutions in the marketplace. 
The commercial model, therefore, misrepresents the position of 
people seeking healthcare by failing to recognize the poten-
tial limitations in their autonomy, and is not a model that a 
reasonable society would choose for administrating healthcare. 
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Third, many people do not seek out healthcare, especially 
its provision through the facilities of healthcare institu-
tions, unless it is an emergency or until they believe they no 
longer adequately function without the provision of health-
care. Again, it seems clear that a patient cannot function as 
a rational consumer, comparing all alternatives in terms of 
cost and benefit, if he no longer has the option not to buy at 
all. 
Fourth, with the reimbursement for the provision of 
healthcare coming primarily from third-party payers, many 
people now find their options for selecting physicians and 
healthcare institutions to be extremely limited. Short-term 
contracts in managed care result in financial pressure being 
applied to patients to change physicians and to receive the 
provision of their healthcare from one select institution. 
Once again, this means that patients cannot play the part of 
the rational consumer able to refuse offered products if none 
are judged satisfactory on a cost-benefit analysis. 32 
A number of reasons exist, therefore, to argue that the 
nature of the professional-patient relationship in the 
provision of healthcare is much different from the 
32These points are also discussed in Ozar, "Patients' 
Autonomy: Three Models of the Professional-Lay Relationship in 
Medicine," 64-65; Ozar and Sokol, Dental Ethics at Chairside, 
42-44; Edmund Pellegrino, "Heal th Care: A Vocation to Justice 
and Love," in Francis Eigo, ed., The Professions in Ethical 
Context: Vocations to Justice and Love (Villanova: Villanova 
University Press, 1986), 97-126; Eliot Freidson, "The 
Centrality of Professionalism to Health Care, 11 Jurimetrics 
Journal 30 (1990): 431-445. 
253 
producer-consumer relationship assumed in the commercial 
model. Because of this, no reasonable society would establish 
the institution of profession according to the commercial 
model if the members of society are unable to exercise the 
role expected of them in the commercial model. 
Third Criticism 
A third set of criticisms can also be raised arguing that 
since the provision of healthcare addresses a fundamental 
human need and societal concern, specific obligations are 
expected by society on the providers of healthcare that are 
not expected on the providers of other goods and services 
within the free market system. The literature on the ethics 
of healthcare administrators seems to frequently emphasize 
this point. 
It is often claimed that medicine and healthcare 
because they address basic human needs - ought to be, and are 
commonly understood in our society to be public goods, and not 
a private commodity to be bought and sold in an ordinary 
market arrangement. The purpose of healthcare is to cure 
illness, improve function, and to provide comfort for the 
suffering; healthcare is also essential to preserving and 
sometimes restoring the autonomy of patients, and is thus a 
prerequisite for individuals to be able to participate in 
market transactions in order to enjoy the goods and services 
offered in a free market economy. Therefore, because medicine 
and healthcare constitute a more basic kind of human and 
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societal good, different expectations, i.e., different 
professional obligations, are expected of those entrusted with 
the provision of those goods. Some type of fiduciary rela-
tionship or atypical moral commitment to the good of patients 
seems to be commonly expected of both physicians and health-
care institutions and those who administrate them. This seems 
to represent a general understanding by patients and by 
society at large, that healthcare institutions exist to 
promote the welfare of the sick and those whom they serve and 
not merely to "sell" healthcare as a product in pursuit of 
their own financial gain. A pure commercial model of health-
care provision is incapable of describing or justifying the 
kinds of relationships reasonably to be expected of healthcare 
providers, including healthcare administrators. 33 
Even if a broader sense of moral values and a sense of 
nThis point is raised and argued for in Hiller, "Ethics 
and Health Care Administration: Issues in Education and 
Practice," 165-173; Barry Greene, "Alexander's Dilemma: 
Conflict Between Professionalism and Entrepreneurialism in 
Health Services Administration," The Journal of Health 
Administration Education 4 (1986): 581-589; Gary Anderson and 
Valerie Glesnes-Anderson, "Ethical Thinking and Decision 
Making for Health Care Supervisors," The Health Care Supervi-
~ 5, no. 4 (1987): 1-12; Lawrence McCullough, "Moral 
Dilemmas and Economic Realities," Hospital and Health Services 
Administration 30, no. 5 (1985): 63-75; Mark Yarborough, 
"Patients and Profits," Theoretical Medicine 7 ( 1986) : 93-102; 
Frank Marsh and Mark Yarborough, Medicine and Money (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990), 33-41; Dan Brock and Allen Buchanan, 
"The Profit Motive in Medicine," The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 12 (1987): 1-35; Annelle Fitzpatrick and Christine 
Gaylor, "Mission Versus Margin: A Question of Values," Health 
Progress 69, no. 8 (1988): 82-84; Emily Friedman, "Marginal 
Missions & Missionary Margins," Healthcare Forum 33, no. 1 
(1990): 8-12; Robert Cunningham, "More Than a Business?" 
Hospitals 57, no. 2 (16 January 1983): 88-90. 
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social responsibility are allowed to operate along with the 
commercial model, its emphasis upon profit-maximization is 
generally viewed as not compatible with the intrinsic value 
individuals and society place upon healthcare. This is not to 
imply that profit-making cannot be part of the picture of 
providing healthcare in our country. It is to say, however, 
that prof it-making cannot be the primary motivation or the 
driving force in the institutional structures a society 
establishes for its healthcare providers. In addition, this 
means that great caution, societal input, and careful regula-
tion must all be involved in the provision of healthcare in 
order to avoid or correct the natural tendency in commercial 
dealings involving healthcare delivery to limit access to 
care, to limit the provision of care, to provide only care 
which can be reimbursed, and to defend cost containment at the 
expense of the health needs of the poor and those unable to 
pay. 34 Because of the great value placed upon healthcare by 
34The tension between profit-making and a sense of social 
responsibility among healthcare administrators is identified 
in Hiller, "Ethics in Health Administration: Issues in 
Education and Practice," 165-169; Norman Daniels, "The Profit 
Motive and the Moral Assessment of Health Care Institutions," 
Business & Professional Ethics Journal 10, no. 2 (1991): 3-30; 
Terese Hudson, "Administrative Ethics in the 19 9 O's: CEO' s 
Confront Payment, Access Dilemmas," Hospitals 66, no. 1 ( 5 
January 1992}: 20-28; Samuel Levey and James Hill, "In Search 
of Basic Values," Health Progress 67, no. 5 (1986): 51-53; 
"Between Survival and Social Responsibility: In Search of an 
Ethical Balance," 225-248; Eli Ginzberg, "Can Inner-City 
Hospitals Survive?" Healthcare Executive 6, no. 3 (1991): 24-
26; Charles Dougherty, "Ethical Perspectives on Prospective 
Payment," Hastings Center Report 19, no. 1 (1989): 5-11; 
Renae Justin, "Cost Containment Forces Physicians into Ethical 
and Quality of Care Compromises," Theoretical Medicine 10 
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individuals and by society at large, the commercial model of 
profession must be set aside and another model sought instead. 
(1989): 231-238; Kevin O'Rourke, "An Ethical Perspective on 
Investor-Owned Medical Care Corporations," Frontiers of Heal th 
Services Management 1, no. 1 (1984): 10-26; Bethany Spielman, 
"Financially Motivated Transfers and Discharges: Administrato-
rs' Ethics and Public Expectations," The Journal of Medical 
Humanities and Bioethics 9, no. 1 (1988): 32-43. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE ETHICS OF HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATORS 
IN THE INTERACTIVE MODEL OF PROFESSION 
This chapter will attempt to identify the moral obliga-
tions of healthcare administrators as conceived through the 
interactive model of profession. It will be argued that this 
is the only model of profession and professional obligations 
which is acceptable according to the terms of the social 
contract that a reasonable society would accept for the 
profession of healthcare administration. 
Two key presuppositions of the interactive model first 
will be defined. One is that social discourse has an integral 
value in society for the determination of the structures 
desired to best facilitate the meeting of fundamental human 
needs and societal concerns. Professions can then be under-
stood to be occupational groups who, through social discourse, 
are structured to address those vital needs and concerns. In 
the interactive model, dialogue occurs within society, between 
professions and society on a general level, and between 
professionals and clients or patients on an individual level 
regarding how best not only to attain those needs and goals, 
but also what is the appropriate understanding of those needs 
and goals in light of other needs and goals possessed by 
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members of society. 
A second key presupposition in the interactive model of 
profession is the integral association of the principle of 
beneficence with the expected atypical moral commitment on the 
part of professionals. Re la ti ve autonomy in practice is 
granted to the professions and their members to a great degree 
in exchange for practicing their profession in two beneficial 
ways. First, it is understood that professional practice 
normally should respect client or patient self-determination, 
it should enable clients and patients to reacquire to the 
degree possible the fullness of their autonomy, and it should 
seek the good as perceived by clients or patients while at the 
same time remaining faithful to the primary purpose and 
central values of the profession. Secondly, professions are 
obligated to contribute to the common good by engaging in 
public dialogue and by becoming involved in the development of 
public policy in order to best promote the primary purpose or 
function of their profession as understood to exist through 
continual dialogue with society in general and with clients or 
patients in particular. 
The second section of this chapter will develop the 
concept of profession within the interactive model. It will 
be proposed that the interactive model blends together what 
has been argued normatively to be the best characteristics of 
the guild and agent models. Important characteristics of 
profession gleaned from the guild model include the possession 
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of exclusive expertise and the public commitment to address 
fundamental human needs and societal concerns. The important 
characteristic taken from the agent model is the element of 
dialogue. Though in that model the dialogue was restricted to 
the professions and their members offering input only on the 
most effective means to reach clients' or patients' ends, in 
the interactive model of profession the role of professions 
and their members in the dialogue is expanded. 
In the interactive model an ongoing dialogue occurs 
between society and the professions in order to determine the 
nature of professional services, the proper mode for their 
delivery, and the norms for the professional groups. It will 
be proposed that the relationship between professionals and 
clients or patients is best described as covenantal rather 
than paternal as in the guild model or contractual as in the 
agent model or potentially exploitive as in the commercial 
model. 
The major part of this chapter will then attempt to 
identify the moral obligations of healthcare administrators as 
understood to exist within the interactive model of profes-
sions. This will be done by examining the seven categories of 
professional obligation as in the previous chapters. 
The final section of this chapter will address two 
principle challenges to the interactive model of profession. 
While it may be charged that beneficence may not necessarily 
be considered as important as social discourse in the 
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interactive model, it will be argued that it is difficult to 
conceive of the relationship between the professional and the 
client or patient which arises out of a significant need in 
the human condition without the expectation of accompanying 
beneficence on the part of the professional. Secondly, 
legitimate concerns may be raised to challenge the very notion 
of social discourse which is essential to the interactive 
model of profession. An attempt will be made to address these 
concerns by clarifying the notion of social discourse to 
illuminate more carefully its role in the determination of 
professional ethics in general and the ethics of healthcare 
administrators in particular. 
Presuppositions of the Interactive Model 
of Profession 
The first key presupposition of the interactive model 
concerns the nature and value of discourse in society for the 
determination of professional ethics. Professional ethics are 
best identified descriptively and normatively in public social 
discourse; that is, matters of genuine societal concern which 
involve professions are best addressed within society at large 
and not merely in an internal fashion between colleagues 
within a given profession. 
The nature of discourse and its involvement in and impact 
on ethics has been thoughtfully developed by Habermas. 1 
1See Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communica-
tive Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990); The Theory of 
Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of 
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Admittedly, his philosophical presuppositions are not above 
challenge. For example, a purely rational discourse about 
interests or needs seems impossible without at least some 
"thin" presupposition about the good. In addition, consensus 
alone is not an absolute grounds for establishing truth; nor 
can moral norms be justified apart from the rational tradi-
tions from which they emerged. 2 Nevertheless, Habermas' 
discourse ethics remains a strong influence in moral psycholo-
gy, sociology and political science today. His communicative 
ethic calls for a "genuine communication," which is understood 
as recognition of the autonomy and responsibility of the 
participants, their cooperation in pursuing shared goals of 
understanding, and their search for distorted communication 
and varying social realities. 
For purposes here, social discourse will be presumed to 
be the means by which the ethics of professions in general and 
of healthcare administrators in particular may be evaluated 
Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); Communication and the 
Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979); Knowledge 
and Human Interest (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). 
2Brian O'Toole, "A Critical Look at Discourse Ethics" 
(Term paper for Loyola University Chicago, Philosophy 490: 
Issues in Moral Philosophy and Psychology, 1992). Despite 
these criticisms, I argue that a "watered-down" version of 
Habermas• model may be implemented if the participants in the 
dialogue possess a preliminary acceptance of a common or 
generalized notion of the good, e.g., health, justice, 
religious salvation, and so forth, and if there are "experts" 
present whose very self-identity is bound up in their commit-
ment to this particular notion of the good to lead and guide 
the discussion; in other words, if the participants in the 
discussion are representative members of professions and 
society. 
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according to the image of the social contract developed 
earlier. Such discourse can occur between a profession and 
society, and between individual professionals and individual 
clients or patients. Discourse presumes that each participant 
takes a role as full and equal partner in the dialogue, and 
that the dialogue seeks common grounds in understanding the 
wishes and values of the participants and in identifying 
attitudinal biases or personal agendas. 
Such social discourse about a profession and its ethics 
has multiple purposes; one function is to search for the 
values, interests, and assumptions among the participants, 
particularly those views submerged or lost in conventional 
thinking, political expediency and distorted communicative 
process. Another function is to look for varying meanings or 
perspectives in regard to the fundamental human values or 
societal goals that have elicited the professional practice in 
the first place. A third function is to try to achieve common 
ground in the determination of the nature of specific profes-
sional practices and specific professional norms. 3 
The determination of professional ethics, therefore, can 
be said to be a kind of ongoing conversation and renegotiation 
of the social contract between the professions and society. 
If the moral obligations of professionals are determined 
3These three functions are adapted from Stephen Payne, "A 
Proposal for Corporate Ethical Reform: The Ethical Dialogue 
Group," Business & Professional Ethics Journal 10, no. 1 
( 1991) : 67-106. 
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solely by the professions themselves, as the guild model 
holds, then members of society - who have been left out of the 
discourse establishing professional ethics experience 
themselves as disenfranchised in the resulting social rela-
tionship. Similarly, if lay persons are given complete 
authority for specifying the framework of their relationship 
with the professions, as the agent model holds, then profes-
sionals are omitted from the discourse and lose all sense of 
being autonomous agents able to make moral and other value 
choices. The determination of professional ethics, then, 
should be seen as the product resulting from social discourse 
yielding a continually developing social contract through 
ongoing negotiation between the parties. This process 
identifies the relevant belief system, the moral values, and 
the way those values are to be applied to specific problems in 
the professions' practice. 4 
The social discourse concerning professional ethics which 
ideally takes place between the professions and society and, 
against the background of that larger conversation, also 
between individual professionals and clients or patients, 
4This is also proposed, although in different forms, in 
Bruce Jennings, "The Regulation of Virtue: Cross-Currents in 
Professional Ethics," Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1991): 
561-568; Robert Veatch, "The Triple Contract: A New Founda-
tion for Medical Ethics," in Peter Wind, et al., Ethical 
Issues in the Professions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1989), 72-74; Richard Flathman, "Power, Authority, and 
Rights in the Practice of Medicine," in George Agich, ed., 
Responsibility in Health Care (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1982), 108-110. 
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would seem to be ever ongoing because new technical and social 
situations arise involving professional services, and because 
different values become more or less important over time in a 
given society. Such changes are most satisfactorily addressed 
for all involved parties through social discourse between the 
professions and society, which sets the parameters for the 
more personal discourse between individual professionals and 
clients or patients. 
Social discourse concerning professional ethics would 
also seem to be ever ongoing due to divergent views of 
morality in our society today. For example, social discourse 
between proponents of the agent model of profession and the 
guild model of profession would seem unable to easily reach 
agreement due to their contrasting values. On one hand, as so 
powerfully exhibited in the agent model of profession, the 
value of autonomy or self-determination is held in such esteem 
as to be considered (almost) nonviolable; this results in the 
foregoing (or loss, depending upon one's normative perspec-
tive) of any commonly accepted notion of the good, which means 
that professionals are viewed as serving individuals' notions 
of the good but possessing no essential or fundamental good 
intrinsic to their service. This agent model of profession 
determines professional ethics according to the standard of 
respecting client or patient autonomy, or, to express this in 
other words, according to the standard of what best promotes 
a society with the values of freedom, equality, prevention of 
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harm, welfare, and privacy. 5 On the other hand, as suggested 
by the guild model of profession, it is possible to argue that 
there are fundamental human values that are specific to the 
professions, e.g., physical and emotional wholeness in human 
beings for physicians, justice in human relations for lawyers, 
and the service of God or the facilitation of religious 
salvation for clergy. This position holds that these values 
are universal human values which normally should guide 
professional behavior in their relationship with clients or 
patients. 6 
Now these two contrasting positions should not necessari-
ly imply that one or both are incorrect, or that agreement 
between the participants representing these two divergent 
positions, when they appear in the discourse, is impossible. 
Neither the agent model nor the guild model of profession was 
found capable of offering a satisfactory foundation for 
grounding professional ethics. Yet professions remain with us 
today as societal institutions designed to serve fundamental 
human needs and societal goals, and each model can offer 
useful elements of a reasonable and adequate social contract. 
5This view of professional ethics is argued for in Michael 
Bayles, "Professionals, Clients, and Others," in Wade Robison, 
Michael Pritchard and Joseph Ellin, eds., Profits and Profes-
sions: Essays in Business and Professional Ethics (Clifton, 
NJ: Humana Press, 1983}, 65-73. 
6This point is strongly developed in Gilbert Meilanender, 
"Are There Virtues Inherent in a Profession?" in Edmund 
Pellegrino, Robert Veatch and John Langan, Ethics, Trust, and 
the Professions (Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 
1991), 139-155. 
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Yet, to the degree that there is disagreement expressed with 
the role and ethics of the professions, there is the ongoing 
need to continue and even broaden the dialogue between society 
and the professions in an ongoing search for increased 
consensus on the nature of professional ethics. 7 This chapter 
of the dissertation is an effort to contribute to that ongoing 
dialogue. 
The second presupposition of the interactive model of 
profession is that the principle of beneficence is integrally 
associated with professional practice. This is in marked 
contrast to the view of the agent model of profession which 
considered the principle of client or patient autonomy to be 
the preeminent moral value professionals were obligated to 
respect. As previously argued, however, absolutizing the 
value of client or patient self-determination neglects the 
fact that their decision-making regarding professional 
services is often an interpersonal transaction with profes-
sionals; the client or patient faces a threat to or an 
inadequacy regarding his human condition while the profession-
al possesses expertise to address that need; this binds the 
two parties to each other in a way that makes absolute 
decisional autonomy on the part of the client or patient 
unrealistic and undesirable goals for both parties. 
7This point is also expressed in Lisa Newton, "Profession-
alization: The Intractable Plurality of Values," in Profits 
and Professions: Essays in Business and Professional Ethics, 
23-36. 
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Furthermore, absolutizing the value of client or patient 
autonomy does not give sufficient attention to the impact of 
disease, injustice, or religious despair on the client's or 
patient's capacities to exercise his autonomy. Lastly, the 
fundamental values of the professional services, i.e., 
healing, justice, or restoring a relationship with God, in the 
central instances of profession, constitute essential goods in 
normal circumstances to clients or patients8 , and this is not 
given sufficient weight in the agent model of profession (The 
central values of the healthcare administration profession 
according to the interactive model will be examined in the 
third section) . 
But the principle of beneficence involved in the interac-
tive model is also in marked contrast to the view of the guild 
model of profession which justifies a paternalistic relation-
ship with clients or patients. Beneficence, as the term will 
be used here, is not to be confused with (strong) paternalism 
which assumes not only that professionals know what is best 
for all clients or patients, but also that professionals may 
therefore override the client's or patient's own directives 
8The development of this position, which space constraints 
prohibit here, is to argue that since these are fundamental 
goods to human existence, in normal circumstances human beings 
are morally obligated to pursue these goods for their own 
fundamental well-being. This strikingly illustrates a 
significant difference between the principles of beneficence 
and autonomy, for the latter does not recognize any moral 
obligation to pursue supposed fundamental goods but rather 
presupposes the absolute value of value-free choosing, or the 
selection of goods based entirely upon a subjective interpre-
tation of those goods. 
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and values in pursuit of the profession's central values 
(e.g., healing, justice, or religious salvation). Such 
(strong) paternalism is objectionable because it violates the 
respect for the autonomy of the client or patient. It is 
generally agreed in our society that it is essential to the 
nature of human beings that they be respected in their freedom 
to decide about the conduct of their own lives. The profes-
sion's central values, the fundamental goods that professional 
services can provide, are not in all cases the highest or most 
important goods to the client's or patient's way of thinking. 
Circumstances may well present themselves when the value of 
the professional services is outweighed by other more impor-
tant values to the client or patient. It is a tenant of 
contemporary understandings of professionals' roles that it is 
ordinarily wrong for a professional to paternalistically 
override this. 
Beneficence, then, can be understood as a commitment to 
the best interests of the client or patient. This includes a 
deep respect for autonomy, i.e., the client or patient may 
choose among personally valued goods, while acknowledging that 
some goods are normally considered in our society to be more 
fundamental and therefore normally are expected to be weighed 
more heavily in the benefits-to-burdens calculus by the client 
or patient. 
In the interactive model of profession, beneficence in 
this sense is expected to be an important component of 
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professional ethics in the professional's relationship with 
individual clients or patients and in the professions' 
involvement in society at large. The role of beneficence in 
professional ethics is exhibited in a number of ways in the 
relationship of professionals with individual clients or 
patients; by the presence of the atypical moral commitment on 
the part of professionals to the problems and needs of the 
clients or patients, by the promise to do no harm, by the 
presumption in favor of both the professional good and the 
autonomy of the client or patient so that no decisions are 
made without first seeking to achieve consensus between the 
professional and the client or patient, and by the resolution 
of conflicts or of difficult moral quandaries by means which 
preserve as many values of both the client or patient and 
professional as possible. 
The autonomy and the welfare of clients or patients may 
at times conflict. The role of beneficence in the profession-
al ethics guiding the relationship of individual professionals 
with clients or patients attempts to bridge that conflict, 
even though it is not able to magically resolve it in every 
case. Beneficence obligates the professional to respect the 
self-determination of clients or patients, and yet it also 
obligates the professional to bring about the central values 
of the profession if the client or patient so chooses, and it 
also obligates the professional to restore that autonomy to 
the client or patient when it is diminished or questionably 
aoseni:. -
The principle of beneficence is also integral in deter-
mining the moral obligations of professions toward society at 
large. In Chapter III it was argued that professions are 
obligated to contribute to the common good by engaging in 
public dialogue and in public policy formation to promote the 
central purpose or function of their profession as understood 
and valued by society at large. Professions are powerful 
shaping forces in our society's culture. Professions affect 
not only how individuals live and how institutions work, but 
also the way we think about how we should live and about the 
ends our social ins ti tut ions should serve. They nurture 
particular values that are integral to our cultural heritage 
and our way of life. It is essential, then, that professions 
actively contribute to the discourse within society about how 
we want to understand the nature of our fundamental human 
needs and how we want to design the institutions that provide 
professional services to meet those needs. 
The social discourse about professions is intended also 
to allow society to influence the professions' view of their 
own services. The nature of the value of the professional 
services, i.e., the general understanding of what is meant by 
9This above discussion of beneficence has been adapted 
from Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, For the Patient's 
Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 11-36; Frank 
Marsh and Mark Yarborough, Medicine and Mone_y (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990), 65-95. 
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health, justice, religious salvation, etc., must be determined 
by compromise and consensus between all the participants in 
the discourse, i.e., professions and society together. 
There is always a concern, of course, that professions 
may be tempted to present themselves in the discourse as no 
more than special interest groups promoting their own view of 
their professional value for the benefit of the members of 
their group. Should this occur, or should this be perceived 
as occurring, then society may view professions as evolving 
into an undesired guild or commercial model of profession and 
subsequently exercise its prerogative within the terms of the 
social contract to restrict the professions' relative autonomy 
in practice. Discourse within the social contract allows for 
a "check and balance" system which helps encourage or "prod" 
the professions into fulfilling their obligation to promote 
the fundamental value of their professional services in a 
manner that is acceptable and beneficial to society. 10 
Characteristics of the Interactive Model 
of Profession 
In the second section of this chapter, the concept of 
profession within the interactive model will now be more fully 
developed with the above presuppositions about social dis-
course and beneficence incorporated as important features of 
'°These points are 
Callahan and Susan Wolf, 
Common Good, " Hastings 
1987) : 3-11. 
drawn from Bruce Jennings, Daniel 
"The Professions: Public Interest and 
Center Report 1 7, no. 3 (February 
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professions in general and of healthcare administration in 
particular. The interactive model, like the agent model of 
profession, deeply values the client's or patient's autonomy 
or self-determination. Like the guild model, the interactive 
model views the professional as possessing an exclusive exper-
tise and an atypical moral commitment to the good of the 
client or patient. 
In the interactive model the value of autonomy or self-
determination is applied to both parties in the professional-
client/patient relationship. This autonomy must be mutually 
respected since each cannot presume to know or be able to 
fully learn the other party's values. Furthermore, each 
enters the relationship viewing the professional services 
through the perspective of values which can only be mutually 
understood through communication and cooperation. In short, 
the professional possesses the expertise to address the 
client's or patient's need and a commitment to certain 
(central) professional values, but the client or patient has 
the understanding of her own values, goals and priorities, 
without which the decision to accept the professional's 
interventions cannot be made. 11 
Professionals and clients or patients are then morally 
obligated to dialogue with one another to mutually arrive at 
11This point is drawn from David Ozar and David Sokol, 
Dental Ethics at Chairside (St. Louis: Mosby, 1994), 44; 
Ozar, "Three Models of Professionalism and Professional 
Obligation in Dentistry," Journal of the American Dental 
Association 110, no. 2 (1985): 176. 
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a good decision about professional intervention. A good 
decision is not just one that provides the most proper 
technical service in terms of professional expertise, but also 
one that best fits this particular client or patient given her 
aspirations, expectations, values, and situation in life. The 
interactive model of profession, then, necessarily obligates 
the professional to the practice of discourse. 12 
As has often been stated, however, frequently the client 
or patient experiences a diminishment or loss of autonomy due 
to his need that requires the services of a professional. The 
client or patient, therefore, is often unable to be a coequal 
bargainer with the professional as required in the commercial 
model of profession, and lacks the requisite ability to 
autonomously choose personal ends as assumed in the agent 
model of profession. Yet a major reason why clients or 
patients sometimes seek out professionals is to have their 
diminished or lost autonomy restored to the greatest extent 
possible through the provision of needed professional servic-
es. Thus the paternalistic spirit of the guild model must 
also be set aside. 
The interactive model, like the guild model, also 
proposes that a critical aspect of the nature of profession is 
the atypical moral commitment of professionals to the good of 
their clients or patients. Now this commitment does not 
1~his point is explored in Edmund Pellegrino, "Toward a 
Reconstruction of Medical Morality," Journal of Medical 
Humanities and Bioethics 8, no. 1 (1987): 7-18. 
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derive only from the professional's membership in the profes-
sion, as was held in the guild model. Rather, the source of 
this commitment is found in the value given to the profession-
al service by society at large, and the individual practition-
er's participation in the profession's commitment to the 
larger society to provide that service for the benefit of the 
members of society. The paternalistic spirit of the guild 
model is thus replaced in the interactive model by the 
principle of beneficence, i.e, acting to benefit society by 
promoting the good of the client or patient as understood to 
mean a restoration from lost or diminished autonomy normally 
through the provision of professional services. 
Society places great value on the services provided by 
professionals. The client or patient seeks the services of a 
professional because she is incapable of satisfactorily 
addressing some fundamental human need such as health, 
justice, or a relationship with the divine, and in many cases 
because this threat to her fundamental human condition has 
threatened or diminished her autonomy. Individual patients 
and local communities appeal to healthcare institutions, with 
healthcare administrators at their head, to facilitate the 
provision and delivery of needed healthcare. 
Since the client or patient is disadvantaged in the 
relationship with the professional for reasons frequently 
cited, it is essential that the needed professional services 
be offered with the understanding that the client or patient 
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will not be exploited and that the professional's authority 
will not be abused. Clients or patients open the most private 
domains of their bodies, minds, social and family relation-
ships to professionals, and to be able to do this they must be 
able to trust that their vulnerability will not be exploited 
for power, profit, prestige or pleasure. Our society current-
ly conducts social programs to financially reimburse health-
care institutions for providing healthcare to the elderly and 
poor, grants tax-exempt status in exchange for healthcare 
institutions providing charity care, and heavily subsidizes 
medical research to aid the development of technology in 
healthcare institutions. This can only be done or maintained 
if society believes healthcare institutions are functioning 
for the greater benefit of society's members, and not primari-
ly for their own financial benefit. 
Because the services which the professional provides may 
be so vital to human functioning and to the good order of 
society, it is essential to our understanding of the nature of 
profession that these services are recognized as offered for 
the good of the client or patient, and thus for society at 
large. A reasonable society therefore creates professional 
roles which includes in its understanding the principle of 
beneficence as articulated above, shaping the expression of 
the societal-expected atypical moral commitment of the 
professional to the good of the client or patient. According 
to the principle of beneficence, the professional is obligated 
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to seek to bring about the client or patient's understanding 
of the good relative to his professional expertise for three 
reasons13 ; first, because respect for her autonomy calls 
forth respect for that which she values, namely, the address-
ing of her fundamental need, secondly because she has 
approached a member of a profession who, by the very meaning 
of the nature of his being a professional, possesses the 
exclusive expertise to address the fundamental human need of 
the client or patient, and lastly because the application of 
professional services may be the exclusive means by which to 
facilitate the restoration of her autonomy. 14 The principle 
of beneficence, therefore, means that the professional is 
obligated to draw upon her expertise to address the health, 
justice or religious needs of her clients or patients or the 
healthcare delivery needs of her institution's local communi-
ty, in such a way that their interpretation of the good life 
will be protected or promoted, and not so that the profes-
sion's understanding of the nature and value of its services 
13Another possible reason obligating the professional to 
respond to the good of the client or patient is that her 
plight or suffering resulting from her fundamental human need 
calls forth, in an ideal communicative setting, a natural 
sentiment of sympathy on the part of the professional who 
possesses the exclusive expertise to address that need. This 
reason breaks rank with Habermas' concept of communicative 
ethics, however, though it does represent my own view as 
indicated in footnote number 2, and which at a future time I 
hope to develop further. 
14This is drawn from ozar and Sokol, Dental Ethics at 
Chairside, 44-45; Michael Davis, "The Special Role of 
Professionals," Business and Professional Ethics Journal 7 
(1988): 51-62. 
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can be maintained or promoted. 
In Chapter VI it was argued that the professional possess 
a certain type of limited authority over the client or patient 
in the area of exclusive expertise. In the interactive model, 
society will accept this limited amount of professional 
authority only if it is managed in a manner that is responsi-
ble to the needs and interests of the society whose values the 
professional services. This has been described in terms of a 
fiduciary relationship. In this relationship both parties are 
considered to be autonomous and responsible agents and their 
own particular judgments are given consideration. Because the 
professional has a greater opportunity for effective autonomy 
since he is not in a needy position and is expertly informed, 
he has special obligations to protect the interests and values 
of his client or patient who must trust the professional. The 
patient or client consents to particular professional servic-
es, but cannot determine their nature without assistance from 
the professional. It is the professional's role to propose 
certain appropriate courses of action, and the patient or 
client consents to a particular recommendation or decides 
against all proposed causes of action based on her own wishes 
and values. 
The nature and value of the professional services thus 
requires that the client or patient extend some limited part 
of herself, i.e., some aspect of her prudence or judgment, to 
the professional. The client or patient trusts in the 
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existence and utility of the professional expertise, and in 
its possession by the one who is being consulted. This trust 
is inspired less by the actual person than by the common 
recognition of the defined social role that the person holds. 
The professional, by nature of a societal-recognition of his 
role, is deemed to be - and because of his acceptance of and 
representation of that societal-recognized role, is obligated 
to be - worthy of that trust, or trustworthy. 
The professional promises to be the finest he is capable 
of being in the sense of knowledge and technical competence. 
He further promises to be responsive to each client or patient 
within their unique circumstances and condition, and to be 
responsible for all that is said and done on behalf of that 
client or patient. The professional promises to accurately 
analyze the client or patient's problem, canvass the feasible 
alternatives, know as well as one can their likely conse-
quences, fully convey this information, oftentimes make a 
recommendation, and work honestly and loyally for the client 
or patient to effectuate the chosen alternative. This is 
expected not only of the physician with his patient, but also 
of the healthcare administrator, who oversees the function of 
the healthcare institution, with the local community which 
depends upon that institution for its healthcare delivery. In 
short, the trust placed in the professional is dependent upon 
the belief that the professional will use his knowledge and 
ability in the interests of the client or patient, or, in the 
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example of the healthcare administrator, for the benefit of 
the local community. In doing this, the professional is 
fulfilling his moral obligation and his responsibility to both 
his profession and to society which has established his 
profession. 15 
While this professional commitment to promote the good of 
the client or patient by virtue of being a member of a 
profession may be reminiscent of the guild model of profes-
sion, two features of this commitment distinguish it within 
the interactive model of profession. First, in the guild 
model, the inequality of the relationship results in profes-
sionals exercising paternalism in determining the appropriate 
mode of intervention for the re la ti vely passive client or 
patient. In the interactive model, however, professionals 
participate in social discourse and are held to the principle 
of beneficence, which require them to actively engage with the 
client or patient so as to offer not only professionally 
appropriate services but also treatment or help that will be 
most consistent with or best promote the client or patient's 
wishes and values. 
Secondly, in the guild model, it was the responsibility 
15This point is argued for in Pellegrino, "Toward a 
Reconstruction of Medical Morality," 11-17; Stanley Hauerwas, 
"Authority and the Profession of Medicine," in Responsibility 
in Health Care, 83-103; Michael Bayles, Professional Ethics, 
2d ed., (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989), 77-
79; Richard Zaner, "Trust and the Patient-Physician Relation-
ship," in Ethics, Trust and the Professions, 45-63; Edmund 
Pellegrino, "Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics," in 
Ethics, Trust and the Professions, 69-85. 
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of the profession itself to determine its own moral standards, 
to decide on the nature and degree of its moral obligation to 
clients or patients, and to regulate or discipline its own 
members to uphold its established moral standards. In the 
interactive model, however, since it is society which confers 
professional status upon particular occupational groups, 
society thereby is authorized to offer a substantial voice in 
the establishment of professional moral standards, in the 
understanding of the nature and degree of the professional 
obligation to clients or patients, and in the manner of 
regulation and disciplining of professionals in their prof es-
sional practice and behavior. 
This societal involvement is required because of the very 
nature of professional work. On the one hand, a profession is 
a calling realized in a community and centered around the 
intrinsic goods of certain practices such as healing or the 
deli very of healthcare, restoring justice, counseling or 
preaching, and so forth. On the other hand, a profession is 
also a career in which individuals earn their livelihood, and 
in which professional practice occurs in social institutions 
which may sometimes function with aims quite different from 
the aims of the professional practice itself. 
The intrinsic goods of professional practices, i.e., 
healing or the delivery of healthcare, justice, assisting in 
religious salvation, and so forth, may be sharply distin-
guished from another class of goods, external to the practice 
281 
itself, that engaging in the practice may also bring about, 
i.e. , financial reimbursement and social rewards. Professions 
are continually reminding their members of the priority of the 
goods internal to professional practice over the external 
goods of weal th and prestige. Yet, as the sociological 
literature in the Critical view of professions demonstrates, 
relying on the professions alone to maintain their atypical 
moral commitment to clients or patients is open to abuse and 
fraught with examples of failure. What is required is that 
the institutional conditions of professional education and of 
professional practice itself must be reformed in the direction 
of promoting and emphasizing a public service orientation. 
This will and can not occur, however, without societal input 
and involvement in the determination of professional standards 
of practice and of the nature of professional norms and oblig-
ations . 16 
The relationship between the professional and the client 
or patient in the interactive model of profession may be 
called a covenant here rather than a contract. The biblical 
roots of covenant originally speak of a relationship between / 
unequal partners in which the more powerful party promises to 
16This point is developed, with specific recommendations on 
how to practically involve societal input, in William Sulli-
van, "Calling or Career? The Tensions of Modern Professional 
Life," in Albert Flores, ed., Professional Ideals (Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988), 40-46; John Kultgen, 
Ethics and Professionalism (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 181-208; Alan Goldman, "Profes-
sional Values and the Problem of Regulation," Business and 
Professional Ethics Journal 5, no. 2 (1986): 27-39. 
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take care of or look after the needs of the less powerful 
party. In applying the covenant relationship to the profes-
sional-client/patient relationship, three important character-
istics of the covenant relationship may be emphasized, namely, 
openness, flexibility, and growth. 
Unlike contracts which establish clearly defined and 
usually quite restrictive obligations or rights and duties 
between the parties, in a covenant the professional and the 
client or patient enter into a relationship without clear 
foreknowledge or strong restrictions on what might be required 
of them in the future. This involves trust that each will be 
able and willing to meet the expectations of the other and 
that the demands on the other will not be inappropriate. 
Secondly, a covenant also establishes a distinctive sort of 
relationship for the professional which becomes a part of her 
very moral identity. Lastly, a covenant relationship chal-
lenges both the professional and the client or patient to 
growth and flexibility in their ways of relating to one 
another, and allows for the possibility of enlargement of 
their relation and of themselves through the relation. 
Covenant language has been invoked in the professional-
client/patient relationship to describe the flexibility, 
indeterminacy, and trusting nature of the relationship that 
naturally evolves in light of the complexity of the goals 
pursued, the unpredictability of what might be required in 
order to attain those goals, and what steps might be required 
if those goals are unattainable.n 
Professional Ethics of Healthcare Administrators 
in the Interactive Model of Profession 
283 
There are strains within the literature of healthcare 
administration which are beginning to call attention to the 
role of society in determining the professional role and norms 
of healthcare administrators as understood and as embodied in 
the decisions and directives undertaken by their healthcare 
institutions. It is generally acknowledged that currently the 
commercial model of profession seems to be the predominant 
view among most healthcare administrators. The literature on 
healthcare administration, which is largely geared towards 
"gaining the competitive edge," is then occasionally inter-
rupted by prophetic calls or conscientious reminders that the 
goal of health services is to improve the health of individu-
als and communities, and not just to gain additional revenues, 
institutional or community pride, or market domination. 18 The 
17Covenant language to describe the professional-cli-
ent/patient relationship is explored in Paul Camenisch, 
Grounding Professional Ethics in a Pluralistic Society (New 
York: Haven Publications, 1983), 127-129; William Maestri, 
Basic Ethics for the Health Care Professional (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1982), 51-54. 
18See, for example, c. Thomas Smith, "Hospitals Must Regain 
the Public's Trust," Hospitals 65, no. 17 (5 September 1991): 
60; Stanley Hupfield, "The Governing Board: A Moral Force," 
Trustee 45, no. 5 (May 1992) : 14; David Kinzer, "Where is 
Hospital Leadership Coming From?" Frontiers of Hea 1th Services 
Management 3 (November 1986): 3-26; Stuart Wesbury, "Ethics 
and Hospital Decision-Making," Michigan Hospitals 19, no. 3 
(April 1983): 7-9; Albert Gilbert, "Hospital Leaders as 
Community Leaders," Private Sector Coalitions: A Fourth Party 
in Health Care 1 (1983): 86-89. 
284 
healthcare administration literature is also beginning to 
include suggestions on how healthcare institutions may 
collaborate with one another and with physician groups rather 
than compete so as to better benefit the community served by 
those institutions and groups. 19 Yet it seems to be largely 
the changing market for healthcare services which is forcing 
healthcare administrators to look more closely at community 
and patient needs and to seriously consider various methods of 
collaboration with former competitors, for there is a growing 
sense that this will serve as the future foundation and means 
for their own institutional survivability. 20 
The third section of this chapter, then, will attempt to 
'
9See, for example, Julie Johnsson, "Hospital Collabora-
tion: Tough but Rewarding for the 1990's," Trustee 45, no. 1 
(January 1992} : 16-17; John Stoeckle and Stanley Reiser, "The 
Corporate Organization of Hospital Work: Balancing Profession-
al and Administrative Responsibilities," American College of 
Physicians 116, no. 5 (1 March 1992}: 407-413; Thomas Cloher 
and Duncan Boldy, "Public Health and Health Administration: 
Collaboration or Competition? An Australian Perspective," The 
Journal of Health Administration Education 8, no. 3 (1990}: 
417-423; Dennis Robbins, "Toward Integrated Clinical/Admini-
strative Ethics Policies in Health Care," Michigan Hospitals 
24, no. 12 (December 1988} : 19-22; Stephen Shortell, "The 
Medical Staff of the Future: Replanting the Garden," Frontiers 
of Health Services Management 1, no. 3 (1985): 3-48; W. 
Richard Scott, "Managing Professional Work: Three Models of 
Control for Health Organizations," Health Services Research 17 
(1982}: 213-240; Ken McGeorge, "A Call for Moral Leadership 
in Health Service Administration," Health Management Forum 1, 
no. 1 (1980}: 27-30. 
~This view is given serious attention in Rosemary Stevens, 
"The Hospital as a Social Institution, New-Fashioned for the 
1990's," Hospital and Health Services Administration 36, no. 
2 (Summer 1991}: 163-173; Jeff Goldsmith, "A Radical Pre-
scription for Hospitals," Harvard Business Review (May-June 
1989}: 104-111. 
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further this discussion by explicating the professional ethics 
of healthcare administrators from the perspective of the 
interactive model of profession. 
Identification of Chief Client 
Identification of the chief client of a profession is the 
first category of moral obligation of profession. Many 
healthcare administrators would argue that the collective 
group of individual patients constitute their chief client. 
Indeed, the Code of Ethics for the American College of Health 
Care Executives states in its first standard, "Individuals 
shall hold paramount the welfare of persons for whom care is 
provided. 1121 It may well be true that healthcare administra-
tors are first and foremost obligated to promote the welfare 
of their institution's individual clients. It is proposed 
here, however, that the chief client of healthcare administra-
tors, principally those members belonging to the American 
College of Healthcare Executives, 22 is the actual community 
served by the healthcare ins ti tut ion which the healthcare 
administrator directs and represents. The welfare of the 
community, however, to which the healthcare administrator is 
expected to possess an atypical moral commitment, is limited 
21The American College of Heal th Care Administrators, Code 
of Ethics, Expectation I. 
22This restriction is meant to distinguish only those who 
serve in top administrative roles of healthcare institutions 
and who subsequently have a great deal of involvement with the 
community, its leaders and with the community's governmental 
representatives. 
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to - or, to phrase it better, is focused on - the health of 
the community at large. 23 
Proposing that the community of the healthcare institu-
tion is the chief client of the healthcare administrator is 
based on the view that the changing face of healthcare 
currently occurring in our society is producing a changing 
purpose and function for healthcare administrators. This 
evolving role brings with it a new chief client, a new 
prioritization of the central values of the profession, and 
correspondingly new moral obligations.u 
Ideal Relationship with Chief Client 
The ideal relationship of healthcare administrators with 
the community as its chief client takes three forms. First, 
there must be continual dialogue between them so that the 
healthcare administrator can be aware of the health needs of 
the community and develop or adapt her institution's services 
accordingly. The community must also be made aware of the 
type and cost of particular services so that technology is 
nThis discussion will also incorporate the seventh 
category of professional obligation, i.e., ideal relationship 
with the larger community. 
~The changing face of healthcare is occurring principally 
for market reasons, i.e., government and third-party payers 
are increasingly placing restrictions on payments for high 
technological treatments for which hospitals have heavily 
invested, and instead are compensating programs that provide 
preventive, rehabilitative, or non-curative care, and they are 
moving towards managed care and capitation reimbursement. 
These changes in healthcare delivery will continue to occur 
regardless of the success or failure of the passage of any 
type of national healthcare reform plan. 
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chosen and utilized in a manner that is both most effective 
and most consistent with the community's wishes and values. 25 
Secondly, institutional structures which enable the 
community to have a voice in the healthcare institution must 
be developed or strengthened. Typically the trustees, 
governing board or citizens board is intended to fulfill this 
function. It is not unusual, however to find that their 
loyalty is to the institution more than to the community, and 
that they are utilized more in an advisory capacity or as a 
lobbying group for the healthcare institution than in terms of 
practical feedback on how to allocate funds, judge the 
acceptability of services, plan for future services to address 
community needs, or provide accountability for the overall 
practice of the ins ti tut ion. Their role must be better 
developed and other structures formed to facilitate the two-
way communication between the healthcare administrator and the 
community and to increase the sense of institutional account-
ability to the community. 26 
Thirdly, healthcare administrators increasingly should 
~see D. Kirk Oglesby, Jr., "Health Care Leaders - It is 
Time to Step Forward," Frontiers of Health Services Management 
8, no. 3 (1992}: 34-36. 
211This point is raised in J. David Seay and Robert Sigmond, 
"Community Benefit Standards for Hospitals: Perceptions and 
Performance," Frontiers of Health Services Management 5, no. 
3 (1989}: 3-39; Laurelyn Veatch, "Community Participation in 
Health Care Decisions," in Robert Veatch and Roy Branson, 
eds., Ethics and Health Policy (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger 
Publishing Company, 1976}, 289-305; Alan Goldman, "Profes-
sional Values and the Problem of Regulation," Business and 
Professional Ethics Journal 5, no. 2 (1986): 27-39. 
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utilize their exclusive expertise in the institutional 
response to healthcare needs by adopting key advocacy roles in 
health policy issues on the federal and state levels. While 
there is a natural tendency and danger to lobby chiefly, even 
exclusively for the needs of the healthcare institution, 
healthcare administrators are obligated by their professional 
status to publicly speak out on the health needs of their 
legislators' constituents. Furthermore, in the absence of a 
national consensus, healthcare administrators increasingly are 
presented with the opportunity to take a leadership role, 
based upon their understanding of the needs and values of 
their community, in helping our society define what the 
appropriate goals of medicine and healthcare should be, and 
what portion of our social assets should go toward those 
trying to achieve those goals.n 
Commitment to the Good of the Chief Client 
In the interactive model of profession the commitment to 
the health good of the community seems to arise, as it did in 
the guild model of profession, from the healthcare admini-
strators' role as leaders of the institutions developed by 
society to address the healthcare needs of patients. In the 
27This point is raised in Julie Johnsson, "CEO' s Play Key 
Advocacy Role in Health Policy Issues," Hospitals 64, no. 12 
(20 June 1990): 26-32; Daniel Callahan, "Setting Policy: The 
Need for Full Participation," Frontiers of Health Services 
Management 8, no. 1 (1991): 34-36; Ronald Carson, "Ethical 
Aspirations and the Regulation of Professions," in Roger Blair 
and Stephen Rubin, eds., Regulating the Professions (Lexing-
ton, MA: D.C. Heath & Company, Lexington Books, 1980), 97-101. 
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interactive model the source of the moral obligation is 
different, however. In the guild model of profession the 
healthcare administrator's obligation to serve the health good 
of patients utilizing her healthcare institution arises from 
her membership in the profession which pledges this commitment 
to patients. In the interactive model of profession the 
obligation arises from the relationship between the individual 
healthcare administrator and the community at large; it is 
the community, rather than the profession, which confers upon 
the healthcare administrator the status of a professional with 
the corresponding moral obligations to serve the health good 
of the community. 
The current view which society has of healthcare ins ti tu-
t ions, especially of hospitals, is hampered by assumptions and 
expectations of their institutional function that are now 
becoming out of date. Hospitals may be said to be stuck in a 
conceptual groove, still focusing on inpatient care, acute 
care, and high technological care, concentrating on getting 
patients in and out of the hospital rather than on the 
patient's total period of illness, and rarely using the social 
authority vested in the healthcare institutions as a force for 
health in the community as a whole. Communities today, either 
reflecting or following the lead of those entities which 
finance healthcare, are looking to hospitals and to other 
healthcare institutions to include all medical technology that 
can usefully be applied to both health and illness. The newly 
290 
evolving conception of the purpose of healthcare is therefore 
conceptualizing a good healthcare institution as one that 
maintains the health of the community through education and 
preventive care, through the provision of high-quality but 
low-cost acute care for times of accidents and temporary 
illnesses, and through technologies which address disabilities 
and chronic illnesses. Hospitals, then, might eventually 
become places where people go at the beginning rather than at 
the end of their sickness. 28 
Healthcare institutions increasingly are being called 
upon to address the healthcare needs of their community in new 
ways. The leadership role then naturally falls to the 
healthcare administrator to respond to this call from the 
community. If hospitals are understood to be social institu-
tions developed for the sake of, and supported by, local 
communities, then within the social contract the professional 
status of healthcare administrators is to a certain extent 
dependent upon the realization of their atypical moral 
commitment to the welfare, i.e., health needs, of the local 
communities. 
Central Values of the Profession 
The identification of the community as the chief client 
28This perspective is best articulated in Rosemary Stevens, 
In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 351-365; "The Hospital 
as a Social Institution, New Fashioned for the 1990 1 s 1 11 163-
173. 
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of healthcare administrators is reflected in the prioritiza-
tion of central values of healthcare administrators as 
understood to exist within the interactive model of profes-
sion. This constitutes the fourth category of professional 
obligation. 
It is proposed that the central values of healthcare 
administrators in the interactive model of profession are 
prioritized as follows: 
1. Health of the community 
2. Health of individual patients 
3. Institutional integrity 
4. Financial viability of the organization 
5. Effective and capable management of employees and 
good relations with medical staff 
The health of the community ranks as the premier value 
for healthcare administrators by virtue of the community 
establishing or supporting healthcare institutions to protect 
and promote the community's health, and by virtue of the 
community recognizing the professional status of healthcare 
administrators with the accompanying expectation that their 
exclusive expertise as the leaders and representatives of 
those healthcare institutions will be exercised for the 
benefit of the community's health. This value ranking is 
reflected in the "Guidelines on Ethical Conduct and Relation-
ships for Health Care Institutions," adopted in 1981 by the 
American Hospital Association and the American College of 
Hospital Administrators. 29 This statement defines hospitals 
NThis group is now know as the American College of Health 
Care Executives. 
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as service organizations that should provide not only patient 
care but also a wide range of health-related services for 
their communities. Hospitals are understood to carry public 
responsibilities for the health of their communities. 
Guideline number 1 prescribes that hospitals are to be 
interested in the overall health status of people and not 
simply in providing direct patient care services. While it 
may be apparent that this moral stance has not been universal-
ly observed, community health interests and the concerns of 
government and third-party payers appear to be serving as a 
motivating force for healthcare administrators to rediscover 
the value of - and their obligation to - the health of the 
community served by their institution. 30 
The second central value in the hierarchic scheme is the 
health of individual patients. This takes high priority in 
the interactive model since society, which bestows profession-
al status on healthcare administrators, traditionally has 
helped create and support healthcare institutions for the 
purpose of benefitting their members who, as individual 
patients, require medical tests and treatments. In the 
interactive model of profession however, that benefit is 
30This perspective is raised in Robert Sigmond, "A Communi-
ty Perspective on Hospital Ownership," Frontiers of Health 
Services Management 1, no. 1 (1984): 33-40; Stuart Wesbury, 
Jr. "Ethics and the Health Care Executive: Current Perspec-
tives," Michigan Hospitals 22, no. 12 (1986): 17-20; Ruth 
Rostein, "The Marketplace Should Not Decide Who Survives," 
Hospitals 63, no. 21 (5 November 1989): 60-61; Judith Shaw, 
"How the Public Eyes Hospitals," Kentucky Hospitals 7, no. 4 
{1990): 16. 
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understood both in terms of the treatments and modes of care 
which will best promote the health of the patients as well as 
in terms of the expected openness in communication to best 
assure that patients are capable of giving informed consent to 
treatment modalities which are most in keeping with their 
personal wishes and values. 
In the guild model, the healthcare institution pledges 
to make resources available to patients who are sick or 
hurting with the promise to help them regain their lost or 
diminished heal th to the greatest extent possible. The nature 
and type of care, however, is largely decided by the physi-
cians within the healthcare institution managed almost 
exclusively under the expertise of the healthcare administra-
tor. In the interactive model, however 1 the healthcare 
institution serves the health needs of patients in a manner 
that patients deem most consistent with their own wishes and 
values. Patient autonomy must be respected and promoted by 
both physicians and healthcare administrators through the 
structures of their institutions. 
The commitment to the good of individual patients, then, 
on the part of healthcare administrators is not just a 
commitment to address their health needs, but it is a commit-
ment as well to respect and promote the restoration of 
patients' autonomy or self-direction. Essential to the nature 
of the healthcare administrator's commitment to the good of 
the patient, then, is the principle of beneficence, i.e., a 
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commitment both to his welfare and to his person which 
involves a collaborative enterprise between individual 
patients and the healthcare institution which the administra-
tor directs and represents. 
This means that healthcare administrators, as leaders of 
their healthcare institutions, must assure that individual 
patients are adequately informed of their diagnosis, treatment 
options, consequences and potential side effects of those 
various options, the goal and the chance of reaching that goal 
for each of the options, and their overall prognosis in light 
of each option. Structures must be in place and personnel 
fully trained to openly and honestly communicate with patients 
in order to remove or reduce any misunderstandings or dis-
agreements about treatments or procedures. Furthermore, any 
elements of self-interest which may cloud or influence the 
judgments of physicians or other caregivers must be disclosed, 
and structures must be provided to facilitate the seeking of 
second opinions, other physicians or caregivers, or another 
healthcare institution. Procedures must be in place to allow 
for feedback from individual patients on the quality of their 
treatment and care so that continual efforts are made to 
improve the services of the healthcare institution for the 
benefit of the patients. Fulfillment of this moral obligation 
on the part of healthcare administrators to promote the good 
of their patients undoubtedly is costly in terms of time spent 
for unreimbursed services, but all of this is mandated by the 
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professional role of the healthcare administrator as estab-
lished through the social discourse between the profession and 
society. 31 
Though healthcare administrators have little contact or 
involvement in the actual day-to-day care of patients, they 
are ultimately responsible in the eyes of the community for 
the fiduciary relationship expected from the healthcare 
institution as a whole toward the patients it serves. Unlike 
the guild model, in which the healthcare administrator had a 
moral obligation to his profession to serve the health needs 
of patients, in the interactive model the coID111unity, which 
bestows professional status on the administrator, conceives of 
the administrator as professionally obligated not to the 
profession but to the community to promote the welfare of 
individual patients. Though the personal relationship of 
healthcare administrators with individual patients is exer-
cised primarily through physicians and through layers of 
management and employees, the professional role of healthcare 
31 For further discussion, see William May, "Notes on the 
Ethics of Doctors and Lawyers," in Bernard Baumrin and 
Benjamin Freedman, eds., Moral Responsibility and the Profes-
sions (New York: Haven Publications, 1983), 103-107; Banks 
McDowell, Ethical Conduct and the Professional's Dilemma (New 
York: Quorum Books, 1991), 109-115; Karen Lebacqz, Profes-
sional Ethics: Power and Paradox (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1985), 113-144; Mary Mahowald, "Power and Professional Life, 11 
in Yaeger Hudson and Creighton Peden, eds. , Philosophical 
Essays on the Ideas of a Good Society (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1988), 257-269; David Thomasma, "Ethical Duties to 
Employees," Healthcare Executive 7, no. 3 (1992]: 26; Lisa 
Newton, "Moral Leadership in Business: The Role of Structure, 11 
Business & Professional Ethics Journal 5, no. 3-4 (1986): 74-
90; Wesbury, "Ethics and Hospital Decision Making," 7-9. 
296 
administrators obligates them to the community to capably and 
effectively administrate and manage their complex healthcare 
organization for the benefit of their patients. 
The value of the health of individual patients cannot 
supersede the value of the health of the community, however. 
While healthcare institutions are established to treat the 
healthcare needs of individual patients, this is only because 
such a function is considered to be of vital importance to the 
overall health of the community. Healthcare institutions do 
not exist for individuals first of all, but for communities. 
While normally the healthcare needs of individual 
patients should not negatively impact the overall health of 
the community or the healthcare institution's ability to 
address the healthcare needs of the community at large, with 
today's expensive high-technological treatments it is concei v-
able that individual patients may require or demand an 
inordinate amount of healthcare resources to the detriment of 
the available healthcare to the community at large. Should 
this occur, local communities or society in general may elect 
to allocate limited healthcare resources in such a way that 
would deprive some individual patients of particular treat-
ments in order not to deprive greater numbers of patients less 
costly yet also needed treatments. While the criteria for 
determining which treatments will or will not be funded has 
been and will continue to be debated, individual patients do 
not have an absolute claim on an inexhaustible amount of 
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healthcare to the grave detriment of society from the point of 
view of the obligations of healthcare administrators. Since 
individual healthcare institutions possess an obligation to 
provide healthcare to their communities, then this obligation 
/ 
cannot be allowed to be significantly negatively impacted by 
the inordinate use of healthcare resources by a few individual 
patients. 
The third value of healthcare administrators in the 
interactive model of profession is institutional integrity, or 
administrating according to the mission and values of the 
institution. The mission or purpose of healthcare institu-
tions cannot take priority over the two previous values. If 
healthcare institutions are viewed by their communities as 
acting unfavorably towards vulnerable or dependent patients, 
e.g., overpricing, overtreating, or discharging too early, or 
as acting unfavorably towards the community which utilizes and 
depends upon its services, e.g., closing unprofitable though 
needed services or failing to provide what the community 
judges to be adequate amounts of charity care, then healthcare 
institutions would be perceived as no different than other 
businesses in society. This might well result in a loss in 
the charitable and service-orientation image of healthcare 
institutions, for if they exist for their own sake and not for 
the benefit of society, then, according to the reasonable 
terms of the social contract, they must be societally-regulat-
ed like any other business. This would in turn, then, also 
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diminish the professional role and responsibility of health-
care administrators. 
Healthcare institutions exist to promote the health of 
the community and of individual patients, and society would 
expect that the mission and values of these institutions 
promote, and are thus subservient to, this primary function of 
healthcare institutions. The particular charism or character-
istic values of individual healthcare institutions would not 
be valued as highly as the institution's purpose of providing 
healthcare, especially since most people cannot pick or choose 
from between different healthcare institutions due to the 
proximity of institutions or the restrictions imposed by their 
third-party payers. Furthermore, it would seem that society 
would cherish the mission and values of particular institu-
tions only if that mission and those values safeguarded or 
promoted the self-determination of patients as well as other 
particular values deemed important by society at large. 32 
The fourth value in the interactive model of profession 
is maintaining the financial viability of the organization. 
For a healthcare administrator of a for-prof it healthcare 
institution, this value would rise to number three in the 
hierarchic scheme providing that it is understood that the 
for-profit institutions' basic mission or purpose is to make 
money. Although appearances may be deceiving, this is not the 
32This point is raised in Michael Czerny, "Health Care in 
Search of Ethics An Age-Old Dilemma," Catholic Health 
Association of Canada Review 13, no. 2 (1985): 5-11. 
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same for a not-for-profit healthcare institution; most 
sponsoring organizations would (or should) find it objection-
able to seriously compromise on their particular mission and 
values, i.e., the provision of healthcare for a community and 
individual patients within their own traditional charism and 
values, at the cost of losing their identity or "selling out" 
on their values for the sake of institutional survival or 
simply to turn a profit. For example, Catholic healthcare 
institutions were to a great extent developed to address the 
healthcare needs of those who exist on the margins of society: 
the elderly, the dying, the disabled, and the most neglected. 
To neglect those values for the sake of market success would 
result in a loss of their mission and their Catholic identi-
ty. 33 
For both for-profit and not-for-profit institutions, 
society normally would not value the profitability of health-
care institutions over the provision of needed healthcare for 
the community and for individual patientsj if healthcare 
institutions survive or prosper to the detriment or neglect of 
the community's heal th, then their purpose for existence 
nThis point is argued in Richard Devine, "Catholic 
Healthcare' s New Crisis: Values Versus the Bottom Line," 
Health Proqress 69, no. 4 (April 1988): 71-73; John E. 
Curley, "Foreword," in No Room in the Marketplace: The Health 
Care of the Poor (St. Louis: Catholic Health Association, 
1986); James Hug, "Capitalism and Christian Values: Dilemma 
for Catholic Heal th Care," Heal th Progress 6 6 (January-
February 1985): 42-44c; Edmund Pellegrino, "Catholic Hospi-
tals: Survival Without Moral Compromise," Health Progress 66 
(May 1985): 42-49. 
beg ins to wane. 
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Similarly, borrowing from the critic isms 
raised against the commercial model of profession, it does not 
appear likely that society would look favorably upon institu-
tional survivability or profitability if this is done at a 
cost to individual self-determination or the health of 
individuals in the community, or to other values which society 
may cherish. 
Placing the financial viability of the healthcare 
organization below the value of institutional integrity in the 
hierarchic scheme of values assumes that the community will 
have access to health care from other local healthcare 
institutions should a particular institution reduce or elimi-
nate the provision of its services rather than compromise on 
its mission and values. If the health of a community would 
seriously suffer because of the closure of a healthcare 
institution, however, it is not inconceivable that maintaining 
the financial viability of the healthcare institution would be 
given greater importance. In the interactive model a communi-
ty may be willing to accept a compromise in the institution's 
willingness or ability to carry out its mission and values in 
exchange for the institution still serving the healthcare 
needs of the community. 
The fifth central value in the hierarchic scheme is 
effective and capable management of employees and good 
relations with the medical staff. This is valued to some 
extent by healthcare administrators since it is commonly 
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associated with the exclusive expertise which has lead to the 
societal recognition of professional status for healthcare 
administrators. Communities highly value the services of 
healthcare institutions and subsequently highly value their 
capable and effective operation. While there are many books 
and workshops today promoting a variety of theories of manage-
ment and business, management styles or business practices 
which are consistent with the interactive model of profession 
are those which address the need of healthcare administrators 
to dialogue with physicians, management and employees to 
create a sense of shared purpose to integrate individual 
efforts toward this common purpose, i.e., to beneficently 
treat and care for the healthcare needs of the community and 
of individual patients.~ 
Effective and capable management and employees of good 
relations with physicians ranked first in the hierarchic 
scheme for healthcare administrators in the guild model of 
profession, because it was possession of that expertise that 
allowed the profession to acknowledge its members as profes-
sionals. In the interactive model, however, since it is the 
34See, for example, R. Scott Macstravic, "Warfare or 
Partnership: Which Way for Health Care?" Health Care Manage-
ment Review 15, no. 1 (1990): 37-45; Terence Moore, "The 
Ethics of Power," Michigan Hospitals 24, no. 12 (1988): 7-11; 
John Aram, "The Manager," in Robert Clarke and Robert Lawry, 
eds., The Power of the Professional Person (New York: Univer-
sity Press of America, 1988): 93-108; Bruce Buchanan, 
"Building Organizational Commitment: The Socialization of 
Managers in Work Organizations," Administrative Science 
Quarterly 19, no. 4 (1974): 533-546. 
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community which bestows professional status for the benefit 
returned to the community, this exclusive expertise of 
healthcare professionals is not viewed as intrinsically 
valuable but only as instrumentally valuable for the sake of 
safeguarding or promoting the greater value of the general 
health of the community and the health of the individual 
patients directly utilizing the services of the healthcare 
institution. The possession of good management and business 
skills by healthcare professionals would not be valued by the 
community or by patients if they themselves did not benefit 
from this exclusive expertise; subsequently, unlike in the 
guild model, this value cannot rank any higher in the hierar-
chic scheme. 
The somewhat low ranking of this value in the hierarchy 
is perhaps reflective of the diminished influence and authori-
ty of physicians over healthcare institutions. With mandated 
utilization review services and clinical pathways coupled with 
the introduction of economic criteria for credentialing in 
hospitals, and with the development of third-party payer 
authorization over patient tests and treatments, physicians no 
longer have as much control over hospital operations as in the 
past. 
It is important to note, however, that the importance of 
the value of good relations with physicians may change with 
the possible evolution of partnerships between healthcare 
institutions and physicians. The old model of the hospital 
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being the doctor's workshop is obsolete, and it is becoming 
increasingly harder for physicians to play one hospital off 
against another for their own benefit or to obtain desired 
expensive technology. With the development of managed care, 
increasingly the fortunes of healthcare institutions and 
physicians are integrally linked together as third-party 
payers contract for the services of specific physicians and 
particular healthcare institutions. Achieving greater 
efficiency of care, i.e., quality, low-cost care1 will work to 
the betterment of both parties. Should this partnership 
become the normal model in the provision of healthcare within 
the next few years, then even more importance will be given to 
the value of healthcare administrators maintaining good 
relations with the medical staff. 
Commitment to Professional Competence 
The fifth category of professional obligation is the 
commitment to competence. In the interactive model, the 
competence required of healthcare administrators is three-
fold. First, much like the skills and values emphasized in 
the guild model of profession, healthcare administrators are 
expected in the interactive model to be highly trained in 
their management and business skills. 35 Given the evolution 
of management theory and the changing face of healthcare, 
35For a summation of these skills, see L. F. Wolper and 
Jesus Pena, Health Care Administration: Principles and 
Practices (Rockville, MA: Aspen Publishers, Inc., 1987). 
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continual updating in these management and business skills is 
presumably also required. 
Secondly, much like the skills and values emphasized in 
the agent model of profession, healthcare administrators in 
the interactive model are expected to be competent in develop-
ing and coordinating institutional structures which not only 
respect but also promote the autonomy or self-determination of 
the individual patients as well as the ability of other 
healthcare professionals to work to the fullest extent of 
their capability. 
Third, the interactive model also requires that health-
care administrators be highly trained in communication skills 
with their communities as well as with the various client-
groups whose welfare they seek to address, so that their 
exclusive expertise is exercised in a way that promotes the 
wishes and values of their community and client-groups. This 
communication does not consist simply of listening to the 
wishes or discerning the values of the community as understood 
within the agent model, but is rather a give-and-take dialogue 
in which healthcare administrators also advocates for particu-
lar heal th needs and particular modes of healthcare provisions 
based upon their own exclusive expertise. Maintaining this 
dialogue with openness and integrity is the best assurance, 
i.e., is the best means of maintaining accountability, that 
healthcare administrators reflect a beneficent rather than a 
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self- or institutional-serving position.M 
Relationship with Fellow-Professionals 
The sixth category of professional obligation is the 
relationship with one's peers. This relationship is stronger 
in the interactive model than as described in the agent model 
of profession. This relationship in the interactive model is 
also protected here from the shortcomings of its description 
in the guild model of profession due to the continual interac-
tion of healthcare administrators with the community and due 
to the fact that it is the community (and not the institu-
tion's sponsor or the profession itself) which bestows 
professional status upon healthcare administrators. 
The relationship between peers in the agent model is very 
weak. Healthcare administrators in that model are dependent 
upon the wishes and values of their institution's sponsor for 
the recognition and direction of their professional skills. 
This results in a lack of cohesion, harmony, and common 
identity within the occupational group. In contrast, in the 
interactive model healthcare administrators are working 
towards the common purpose of benefiting the health needs of 
the community at large and of individual patients within that 
community. This lends itself to greater group-identity and 
support. Discourse with the community over how the health 
36This point is indirectly addressed in Edmund Pellegrino, 
"Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality: The Primacy of 
the Act of Profession and the Fact of Illness," in Moral 
Responsibility and the Professions, 179-202. 
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needs of the community might best be addressed also serves, 
then, to direct when the institutions of healthcare adminis-
trators should collaborate with one another and when they 
should compete with each other. The interactive model 
provides a forum for a greater sense of peer accountability 
since the discourse with society is public and the criteria 
for accountability is the beneficial or detrimental effect the 
actions and decisions of healthcare administrators have upon 
the healthcare needs of the community. 
The relationship between peers within the guild model was 
much stronger. While there professional groups profess to 
regulate themselves due to their atypical moral commitment and 
expertise which excludes nonprofessionals from being able to 
judge their behavior, the result often tends to be mutual 
self-protection and lack of adequate accountability. The 
relationship between peers within the interactive model, 
however, is not as strong or as self-protective. The bonding 
is weaker since it is society rather than the profession which 
bestows professional status upon healthcare administrators. 
The self-protection is exposed through the open discourse with 
the community. This public accountability is therefore 
conducive to greater internal accountability within the 
profession as part of the overall discourse.TI 
37This is addressed indirectly in Marsha 11 Gregory, 
"Plato's Protagoras: Professional Models, Ethical Concerns," 
Change 15, no. 3 (1983): 42-45; David Nash, "Ethics .... And 
the Quest for Excellence in the Profession," Journal of Dental 
Education 49, no. 4 (1985), 198-201. 
Critique of the Interactive Model of Profession 
for Healthcare Administrators 
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In the final part of this chapter, criticisms of the 
interactive model of profession will be raised and responses 
offered. There are two principle criticisms which must be 
addressed if the interactive model of profession is to be 
defended as the only model which satisfies the social contract 
that a reasonable society would contract for regulating the 
profession of healthcare administration. 
First Criticism and Response 
The first criticism is less of a threat to the interac-
tive model itself and thus can be more readily addressed. 
This criticism questions the obligation of beneficence 
expected of professionals in the interactive model, both by 
clients or patients and, in fact, by society at large. This 
criticism stresses the natural inequality of the professional-
client/patient relationship, and raises two concerns. First, 
it is not clear that reliance upon beneficence will allow for 
the full respect entitled to the autonomous choices or right 
to self-determination by clients or patients. Second, it is 
not self-evident that the principle of beneficence moves 
beyond the individual professional-client/patient relationship 
and fully captures what are perceived by many to be the social 
duties of professionals (and of all members of society) to 
address the social issues surrounding the provision of 
professionals services, e.g., issues of medical cost-contain-
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ment or the identification of a healthcare package entitled to 
all members of society. 
In response, it must be acknowledged that, given the 
social discourse within society and between the professions 
and society, it is theoretically possible that agreements may 
be reached in which beneficence is not given the priority as 
a role-specific norm of professionals that has been described 
here. Given the threats to, or the needs inherent in, the 
human condition which have given rise to the very need for and 
subsequent existence of professions, however, it is hard to 
conceive how beneficence would not be required of profession-
als at all. But the possibility must be acknowledged that a 
given society would accord it less importance than is present-
ly the case, as in fact it once did in American society in 
relation to physicians only a few decades ago. In this 
respect, social discourse is more essential to the interactive 
model of profession than beneficence. 
It is true that there will always be a risk in emphasiz-
ing the principle of beneficence in professional practice that 
client or patient autonomy may not be fully respected. 
Presumptions by the professional about the inordinate value of 
her professional services and about what she perceives to be 
objective goods to the human condition may threaten the 
autonomous choices of clients or patients. In reply, this 
threat must simply be acknowledged as ever-present in our 
American culture which continually struggles over the 
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balancing of autonomy vs. other values and needs. The 
interactive model of profession would attempt to address this 
potential threat to client or patient autonomy by proposing 
that ongoing social discourse within society acts as a 
"watchdog" to such threats, thereby allowing the continual 
evolvement of norms or role-specific behaviors for profession-
als by which such threats to the autonomy of clients or 
patients may be continually monitored and checked as society 
deems necessary. 
The same response may be made to the second question 
raised about the practice of beneficence. Only through social 
discourse may a clear understanding and separation of the 
individual moral obligations of the professional to the client 
or patient and the social duties of the professional to 
society as a whole be established. It was proposed earlier 
that the principle of beneficence obligates professionals to 
utilize the exclusive expertise of the limited realm of their 
professional services to take a leadership role in the social 
discourse and public policy debate over the social provision 
of their professional services. Providing that public 
accountability successfully checks the potential for profes-
sions to inordinately promote the value or a specific means of 
provision of their professionals services, it is hard to 
conceive how social discourse over the provision of vital 
professional services may take place without the leadership 
involvement of the professions themselves. Nonetheless, it is 
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theoretically conceivable that society would decide not to 
allow for professions to undertake this role within the social 
discourse over the proper nature and method of the provision 
of professional services. Again, the principle of beneficence 
is not as central as social discourse to the core idea of the 
interactive model of profession. 
Second Criticism and Response 
A second and more threatening criticism against the 
interactive model of profession challenges the very notion of 
social discourse itself, which is a fundamental component of 
the interactive model of profession, and, in some respects, of 
the very notion of social contract itself. Social discourse 
has been criticized as presenting an inadequate view of human 
rationality and as being a concept that is for all practical 
purposes unrealizable in actual human practice. 
To begin with, rational discourse as understood to 
theoretically exist in its purest form in the social contract 
presupposes that universal moral norms may be intersubjective-
ly recognized through ideal speech communications between 
participants. In other words, in formulating the contents of 
a society's social contract and in particular its standards of 
professional conduct for healthcare administrators, it is 
presupposed that sufficient unity of values, interests and 
needs exists among the participants in the social discourse 
that they can come to consensual agreement about the matter. 
Only those moral norms are part of the social contract that 
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could be agreed to after a sufficiently open and informed 
debate and could be chosen as representing a generalized 
interest or meeting a generalized need, and not simply 
particular interests or needs. This is a reformulation of the 
Kantian approach to morality, substituting Kant's rnonological 
model of decision-making by reformulating the universaliza-
bility principle along lines compatible with the procedural 
rules of argument geared to attain communicative agreement. 
Two critical problems have been raised about this under-
standing of the nature of social discourse. First, it has 
been argued that rational discourse alone cannot yield 
universalizable moral norms because reason does not exist in 
a pure form but is conceptually dependent upon cultural-
historical traditions. 38 Consensus, therefore, can function 
only as a self-contained criterion of validity, based upon 
agreement itself rather than expressing universal moral norms. 
Second, it has been argued that discourse within the 
social contract requires an ideal speech situation, namely, 
the opportunity to discourse without limitation as to dura-
tion, number of participants or variation of perspectives or 
views. It requires participants who are equal in communica-
tion skills, who are fully and identically informed about the 
real world, who are set free from their own particular 
interests and values in such a way that they can fully 
38This is argued in Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988). 
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understand the particular interests and values of all other 
participants, and who all desire to achieve consensual 
agreement. 
In actual practice, it has been argued, it is difficult 
to conceive how discourse may be practiced employing the use 
of reason alone, for argumentative strategies are necessarily 
affective and even manipulative in their attempts to convince 
because arguments in search of consensus or of some objective 
understanding of truth do not employ merely reason but 
invariably engage passions and prejudices at many levels. It 
is also conceivable that what might be called "special 
interest groups" may morally justify their particular inter-
ests and be resolute and uncompromising in the discourse 
situation because they truly believe those interests should be 
accepted by all of the society. 
Furthermore, as often experienced in the encounter 
between the professional and the client or patient, rational 
discourse can never entirely remove itself from a recognition 
of expertise. Individuals who have a command of language and 
know how to use it well, or who have a strong educational 
background or a rich portfolio of experience as many profes-
sionals do, can also be accorded a kind of authority that 
somewhat undoes the "balance of reason" among the participants 
of the discussion. It would seem that discourse would often 
involve such disparities in actual communicative power. 
An illustration of the difficulty of achieving an ideal 
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situation for social discourse may be seen in dialogue between 
philosophers, who consider themselves to be roughly equals and 
to share a common body of knowledge, and who pride themselves 
on their ability to engage in rational discourse. Neverthe-
less, they are frequently unable to replicate among themselves 
the ideal of the discourse model.~ 
It seems highly unlikely that such an ideal speech 
situation would be ever possible, and in any case that none 
has been actually achieved in any real life situation in which 
professional standards of healthcare administration have been 
determined. 
These are significant criticisms. But for purposes here 
all that is required to meet them is an adaption of the 
discourse model and of our understanding of the social 
contract. 
First, it is not necessary to depend upon truly universal 
rational discourse to establish the moral norms of healthcare 
administrators. It can be presumed instead that the health of 
the community and the healthcare needs of individual patients 
are ideas whose content is commonly agreed to and whose role 
as fundamental human needs and societal concerns are commonly 
39See, for example, Michael Walzer, "The Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism," Political Theory 18 (1990): 6-23; 
and "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation," The Philosoph-
ical Forum 21 (1990): 192-196; Adi Ophir, "Beyond Good-Evil: 
A Plea for a Hermeneutic Ethics," The Philosophical Forum 21 
(1990): 98-117; David Ingram, "The Possibility of a Communi-
cation Ethic Reconsidered: Habermas, Gadamer, and Gourdiew on 
Discourse," Man and World 15 (1982): 149-161. 
accepted in our society. 
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They thus constitute commonly 
agreed-upon notions of the good for our social discourse about 
the healthcare administration profession. The specific 
understanding of "good health" or "the proper addressing of 
healthcare needs" will vary between different societies and 
within the same society at various historical times; there-
fore, the professional obligations of healthcare adminis-
trators cannot be discerned by reason alone independent of 
people's experience in particular times and places nor can 
they be considered necessarily universalizable. In addition, 
the product of discourse may at times require compromise to 
achieve consensual agreement between a profession and society 
regarding the moral norms of that profession, as well as an 
ongoing dialogue in a continuing and never-ending effort to 
identify the unfolding and potentially changing moral obliga-
tions of professions and their members. 
Second, even if an ideal speech situation as envisioned 
in social discourse is most likely impossible to actually 
achieve, this does not mean that the process of social 
discourse or the ever-developing results emerging from the 
ongoing process of social discourse in establishing the moral 
obligations of healthcare administrators is without signifi-
cant value. Natural limitations to an ideal speech situation 
can be acknowledged without significantly diminishing the 
value of social discourse. 
The social discourse model may serve as an ideal norm to 
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which the members of society may continually seek to actualize 
or to emulate through actual efforts of ongoing dialogue over 
the determination of professional ethics. One important value 
in discourse may be the moral conversation itself and the 
development of the human capacity for learning how to listen, 
for reversing moral perspectives and for broadening moral 
point of view of the participants. The process of the 
discourse rather than any premature claims to some absolute 
end may be the best assurance that a professional ethic 
acceptable within our society may ever come closer to being 
actualized. 
In an important sense, one of the goals of social 
discourse should be not only the end of dialogue with certain 
results of the dialogue now established as guides for profes-
sional conduct, but also the actual dialogue itself; that is, 
not only current consensus but also the ongoing conversation 
and mutual understanding. Or rather, consensus should be 
understood as a continual generation of reasonable agreement 
about the moral norms of professions via an open-ended moral 
conversation, with a continual emphasis upon the human 
. 
relationships fostered in discourse rather than with the pure 
rational component of dialogue. 
Therefore, despite natural limitations to an ideal situa-
tion, an ongoing understanding of the professional obligations 
of healthcare administrators may yet be an actual product of 
an actual, if defective according to Habermas' view, dialogue. 
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The social discourse is surely imperfect, but in social 
contract thinking it still remains the source of the estab-
lishment of professional norms. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, strong reasons have been put forth to 
argue that the ethics of professions and their members in 
general and of healthcare administrators in particular cannot 
be developed in a manner acceptable to many if not most 
members of society by appealing to the other models of 
profession. Paternalistic self-regulation within the guild 
model is too open to misuse or abuse of professional autonomy. 
The value-free approach required in the agent model fails to 
do justice to the unique expectations placed upon the profes-
sional due to the significant need of the client or patient 
for assistance in achieving well-being, which has given rise 
to the expected relationship with the professional. A commer-
cial view of profession unacceptably fails to protect society 
from potential exploitation of clients or patients. 
The interactive model of profession, therefore, proposes 
that professional ethics can be satisfactorily defined only 
through on ongoing discourse within society and between 
society and the professions. This discourse is always 
analyzing and critiquing currently espoused or exercised 
professional norms according to the criteria of the values of 
society and in light of what is generally understood to be the 
needs of the society and its members. As these societal 
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values may evolve and the needs of society change, however, 
the role-specific moral norms and obligations of the profes-
sions will likewise evolve and change. This dissertation, 
then, should be viewed not only as an attempt to philosophi-
cally justify the interactive model of profession, but also as 
a contribution to the ongoing process of defining the profes-
sional ethics of healthcare administrators. 
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation has been an attempt to contribute to 
the discussion concerning the moral obligations of healthcare 
administrators in our American society. This is an important 
contribution since the current literature addressing ethics in 
healthcare administration is limited in quantity, incompletely 
developed, and either focusing on personal values and institu-
tional standards or on loose applications of ethical theories. 
Nowhere is there a serious attempt to identify the central 
values or the role-specific moral obligations of healthcare 
administrators. 
Healthcare administrators in American society commonly 
consider themselves to be members of a profession and, because 
of their responsibility in facilitating the institutional 
delivery of highly valued healthcare in our society, are 
subsequently treated in our society as professionals. 
Therefore it has been assumed in this dissertation that the 
question, "What are the role-specific obligations of the 
profession of healthcare administrators?" is an important one 
deserving of careful examination. 
Defining the professional obligations of healthcare 
administrators first requires an understanding of the nature 
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of profession so as to make sense of the unique character of 
professional obligations. This task was undertaken in Part 
One. A great deal of sociological literature exists regarding 
the professions in our society. However, a careful examina-
tion of this literature reveals four different understandings 
or conceptual models of profession. 
What has been called the Functionalist model views a 
profession as an occupational group characterized by its 
special expertise and monopoly in competence which, combined 
with the commitment of its members to altruism in unselfishly 
addressing particular fundamental human needs or social 
concerns, results in relative autonomy in practice and freedom 
from control by society. The other three understandings of 
profession found in the sociological literature, however, 
criticize this Functionalist model as idealistic and as a 
normative rather than a descriptive portrayal of professions. 
What has been called the Dominance model views a profes-
sion as an occupational group which has successfully organized 
itself to gain a monopoly over a service and control of the 
market so as to develop a demand for the service in the form 
it alone provides. What have been termed the Deprofessionali-
zation and Proletarianization models agree with this critical 
view of profession, but the former also claims that profes-
sional autonomy in practice has eroded due to formalized and 
hierarchical controls imposed by society, while the latter 
argues that professional autonomy has diminished due to the 
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general practice now of employing professionals in most 
fields. 
It is apparent, therefore, that sociology is unable to 
construct one paradigm model of profession. Three reasons 
were given for this. First, social theorists presuppose the 
"traditional" professions of medicine, law, and clergy without 
explaining what structures or features of those occupational 
groups make them prime examples of a profession, thus leading 
to disagreement both between and within the different models 
over the essential features of a profession. Second, the 
different models make different normative assumptions about 
the institutional function or purpose of profession. Third, 
social theorists evaluate the claims of other occupational 
groups to professional status in light of their limited 
historical-cultural perspective of American professions in 
this century. As a result of these three problems, we cannot 
turn to sociology for an adequate understanding of profession 
in order to determine the professional obligations of health-
care administrators. 
Instead, a philosophical approach to describing a 
profession was undertaken in this dissertation. It was 
proposed that occupational groups commonly considered in our 
society today to be professions be identified, and that the 
popular image or common conception of profession which those 
groups embody in ordinary language usage be developed from 
these "central instances" of profession. In other words, it 
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was argued that a popular image of profession as conceptually 
understood in common language usage exists and is dependent 
upon medicine, law and clergy as the central instances of 
profession - even if these particular occupational groups have 
never perfectly embodied the contents of our image of profes-
sion in any particular historical time. 
Utilizing this approach, it was proposed that there exist 
four essential features of profession in our popular image of 
profession as found in common language usage. If any occupa-
tional group lacks one or more of these essential features, it 
can be called a profession only by analogy to the central 
instances. The four essential features are: 1) Exclusive 
expertise 
practical 
the possession of both theoretical knowledge and 
application of a skill, learned only through 
membership in the profession, which provides a service highly 
valued by members of society since it addresses some fundamen-
tal human need or societal concern like health, justice, or 
religious salvation; 2) Relative autonomy in practice - the 
relative control over the determination and evaluation of the 
technical knowledge and skills used in their work, as well as 
relative control over the social and economic terms of their 
work; 3) Societal or institutional recognition - the acknowl-
edgement by society of an occupational group's professional 
status either through the visible formal structure of a social 
institution or through the granting of relative autonomy in 
practice; 4) Professional obligations. 
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This last feature is of most interest in this disserta-
tion. David Ozar has proposed that there are seven different 
categories of moral obligation that, taken together as a 
group, are unique to professional groups and their members. 
They are 1) identification of the chief client, 2) ideal 
relationship with the chief client, 3) commitment to the good 
of the chief client, 4) central values of the profession, 5) 
commitment to professional competence, 6) ideal relationship 
with fellow-professionals, and 7) ideal relationship with 
society at large. 
Before examining the professional obligations of health-
care administrators, however, a justification for the exis-
tence of professional obligations and a conceptual clarifica-
tion of the nature of professional obligations was offered 
using the conceptual structure that has come to be known as 
the "social contract." Historically social contract language 
has been used by many political theorists to describe the 
relationship between the members of society and their govern-
ment, but increasingly it has been applied to business and 
organizational theory. For purposes here, it is used to 
understand professions as social constructs arising from 
agreement both within society, and between society and the 
occupational groups accorded professional status by the 
society, for the purpose of directing specialized expertise to 
meeting specific fundamental human needs or social concerns 
such as health, justice, and religious salvation. 
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In utilizing social contract thinking in this study, it 
was first proposed that the term, "society," can be understood 
to mean an aggregate of individuals who possess the capability 
of reason and discourse to deliberate and potentially to agree 
on particular services and the means of delivering those 
services which will best meet their individual and collective 
needs. Second, despite the presence of moral pluralism and 
the lack of value-consensus in our society, a good deal of 
unanimity does exist on a number of values which allows for 
potential agreement on the provision of such goods as health 
and justice. Third, though a social contract may not exist in 
visible reality, e.g., a written contract, this idea is a 
means of conceptualizing an existing state of affairs and a 
heuristic device for explaining how any existing social 
arrangement may be evaluated morally according to the criteria 
of whether all involved participants would grant approval to 
such an arrangement. Fourth, the unwritten details of a 
social contract can be known through "social rules, " an 
expression borrowed from H.L.A. Hart to refer to patterns or 
standards of behavior for which there is a perceived obliga-
tion to conduct behavior according to that expected pattern or 
standard simply because that is what is expected in society. 
In light of such a social contract, each profession 
exists and are granted relative autonomy in practice and 
dominance in the market by a society because that society 
views this structure as the best available means to benefit 
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its members through addressing fundamental human needs and 
social concerns, and because that society wants mechanisms in 
place to assure that its members will not be harmed by 
professionals abusing their autonomy or market dominance. 
Every occupational group's claim to professional status must 
therefore always be evaluated by a very straightforward 
question: Is this a good bargain for society? Does this 
particular institution, this profession as presently consti-
tuted, achieve an appropriate level of benefit to society at 
acceptable cost? 
In light of such social contracts, professional obliga-
tions exist because there is a common expectation in our 
society that professionals, in exchange for relative autonomy 
in practice, must exhibit an atypical moral commitment to the 
good of the client or patient and must also provide their 
professional service in ways that will serve the interests of 
society. Furthermore, the norms of professional behavior are 
to a great extent limited and determined by the common moral 
norms of the society. 
The professional obligations of healthcare administrators 
are therefore articulated and measured by the reasonable terms 
of such a social contract. In Part Two of this dissertation, 
the professional obligations of healthcare administrators were 
described according to four different theoretical constructs 
or interpretations of historically developed characteristics 
of profession. These were called the Guild, Agent, 
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Commercial, and Interactive models of profession. These four 
accounts of professional obligations of healthcare administra-
tors were then evaluated in light of the terms of a reasonable 
social contract for this society. 
The guild model of profession identifies characteristics 
of the medieval guilds and of later professional associations 
which left a historical imprint on the development of profes-
sions in our own country. These characteristics include a 
professional education in theoretical knowledge coupled with 
hands-on practical application of that knowledge, ownership of 
exclusive expertise and a life-long commitment to excellence 
in one's professional field, atypical moral commitment 
paternalistically expressed towards clients or patients, 
primary allegiance and accountability to one's fellow-profes-
sionals, and an aristocratic or "gentlemanly" behavior in 
professional life. 
In the guild model, the chief client of the healthcare 
administrator is the healthcare institution. This is because 
the healthcare administrator possesses the exclusive expertise 
to manage the healthcare institution, whose welfare the 
healthcare administrator is thus committed to serving. The 
healthcare administrator's relationship with the institution 
is characterized by skillfully managing the work of other 
healthcare professionals while maintaining final authority on 
all matters of management and business. Healthcare adminis-
trators promote the good of the healthcare institution in four 
326 
ways; by helping the institution achieve its purpose of 
providing high quality care for patients utilizing its 
services, by capably managing the work of employees and 
physicians, by fulfilling its institutional mission and 
values, and by maintaining the organization's financial 
viability through sound business decisions. 
The premier central value of healthcare administrators in 
the guild model is effective and productive management of 
employees and good relations with the medical staff, for this 
constitutes the nature of the exclusive expertise which 
society expects of healthcare administrators for the success-
ful operation of healthcare institutions. The second value in 
the hierarchic scheme is institutional integrity. The 
healthcare administrator represents and promotes the interests 
of the institution, but sometimes can redirect its mission or 
values since the administrator knows what is best for the 
institution. The third value is financial viability of the 
organization. This is important for the welfare of the 
ins ti tut ion, but it cannot supersede its mission or the 
healthcare administrator's professional role without diminish-
ing the healthcare administrator into a mere businessperson. 
The health of individual patients comes next. It is presumed 
that they will benefit from the healthcare administrator's 
capable and effective operation of the healthcare institution, 
but they are not his primary concern. The health of the 
community is valued in light of its impact upon individual 
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patients. 
The guild model of profession, however, would not be 
acceptable to the members of our society in a social contract. 
Three reasons can be given for this. First, this model 
presupposes that professionals know what is best for their 
clients or patients. This paternalistic relationship is 
largely unacceptable in a society which today values client or 
patient autonomy or self-determination. Second, societally-
unregulated professional practice has often been shown to not 
benefit society, because professionals often either inade-
quately regulate themselves or naturally tend to promote the 
value of their professional service over all other values in 
society. Third, professions and society measure the success 
and benefit of the professional services according to differ-
ent criteria, but the guild model removes societal input from 
this matter. Because of these problems, the professional 
obligations of healthcare administrators cannot be drawn from 
the guild model of profession. 
In contrast to the guild model, the agent model of 
profession is anchored on the premiss that client or patient 
autonomy or self-determination is uncompromisable. This means 
that the professional offers only technical services to help 
a client or patient achieve a desired end. The professional' s 
services are considered to be value-free, and are given value 
only in light their ability to assist clients or patients 
achieve their desired ends. In the guild model of profession 
all authority resided with the professional; 
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in the agent 
model, all authority resides with the client or patient. 
In the agent model the chief client of the healthcare 
administrator is his employer, which will be called the 
healthcare institution's sponsor. The sponsor owns the 
healthcare ins ti tut ion, and contracts with the healthcare 
administrator to manage the institution to enable the sponsor 
realize desired ends. Regardless if these ends are medical 
education, care for the poor, or profit-maximization, the 
healthcare administrator applies his exclusive expertise 
seeking to achieve those ends. The healthcare administrator 
manages according to the mission and ethics of the sponsor, 
and is totally committed to the welfare of the sponsor in the 
sense of seeking to bring about the sponsor's desired ends. 
There are no values central to the profession of health-
care administration in the agent model, but only those values 
held by the sponsor and therefore adopted by the healthcare 
administrator. The healthcare administrator is committed to 
the health of individual patients and to the health of the 
community only to the degree and manner of the sponsor. 
Two problems can be raised with the agent model of 
profession, however. First, focusing on client or patient 
autonomy as the most fundamental value fails to do justice to 
the human condition which gives rise to the unique relation-
ship between the professional and the client or patient. Many 
people seek professional help to restore lost or diminished 
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autonomy. Further, the service provided by many profession-
als, including healthcare administrators, address a fundamen-
tal need or social concern like healthcare delivery. Subse-
quently that service is generally not viewed as value-free in 
our society but as intrinsically valuable in its ability to 
restore a lost or diminished human mode of functioning. 
Second, it seems inadequate to presuppose that professionals 
do not relate to clients or patients in light of societal or 
professional conceptions of good ends. In sum, therefore, the 
agent model of profession fails to adequately describe the 
type of relationship that actually exists between profession-
als and clients or patients, and thus is unable to help 
clarify the professional obligations of healthcare administra-
tors according to the terms of the social contract. 
Another popular model of profession is the commercial 
model. Here professionals are viewed as commercial players 
whose service is a commodity transaction with a consumer; the 
professional owns the expertise and the consumer bargains over 
the price in order to purchase the commodity. In this model 
there are no distinctive role-specific moral obligations for 
professionals other than those normally associated with 
everyday business transactions, i.e., avoiding coercion and 
deception which violate the very conditions necessary for 
making contracts and market exchanges voluntary. 
Applying this model to the ethics of healthcare adminis-
tration, the chief client of healthcare administrators here 
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would seem to be the physicians. It is physicians who use the 
services of a healthcare institution and on whom the financial 
welfare of the institution is dependent. While healthcare 
administrators may "sell" their expertise to the sponsors of 
healthcare institutions, it is the physicians whose welfare 
they must seek to promote for the institution (and the health-
care administrator) to financially benefit. Healthcare 
administrators therefore seek ways either to placate their 
medical staffs through providing particular services and 
technology which entice physicians to utilize their institu-
tion, or to control physicians through contracts, employment, 
or networking arrangements. 
The primary central value of healthcare administrators in 
the commercial model of profession is the financial viability 
of the organization. This is premised on the belief that the 
healthcare administrator prospers in direct relation to the 
healthcare institution. The second most important value is 
effective and productive management of employees and good 
relations with the medical staff, for this has direct impact 
on the financial status of the institution. The health of 
individual patients ranks next, and presumably they benefit by 
promoting the two higher values. Institutional integrity 
ranks fourth, for in the commercial model it is highly 
unlikely that the sponsor will prize this above the other 
values which are directly related to profit-maximization. The 
health of the community ranks last, for the healthcare 
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administrator has not contracted with the community at large 
for any services. Furthermore, 
health would actually lessen the 
promoting the community's 
need for, and thus the 
financial return to, the healthcare institution. 
Three problems arise from the point of view of society 
and the social contract when conceptualizing the institution 
of profession within the commercial model, however. First, it 
is not self-evident that the free market system, left to 
itself without outside interference, is the best means to 
serve the needs of society. Furthermore, profit-maximization 
cannot be pursued completely value-free without undermining 
the very moral foundation necessary for continuance of 
successful practice in business. Second, the producer-
consumer transaction as described in the commercial model is 
not what normally takes place in the relationship between the 
professional and the client or patient. Lay people are at a 
marked disadvantage in the relationship with professionals due 
to their lack of knowledge, their urgent need for professional 
care, and their oftentimes diminished personal autonomy which 
has lead to they seeking professional service. Third, the 
nature of professional services are commonly viewed different-
ly than other commodities bought and sold in our society, in 
that professional services address basic human needs and 
sometime restore diminished autonomy. 
professional services are considered 
In other words, many 
a prerequisite for 
individuals to participate in market transactions rather than 
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being unconditionally dependent upon them. For these reasons, 
the commercial model is not an acceptable means according to 
the social contract for determining the professional obliga-
tions of healthcare administrators. 
After rejecting the attempts of the three previous models 
to describe the professional obligations of healthcare 
administrators, this dissertation argues that only the 
interactive model of profession and professional obligations, 
a model which is based on the notion of social discourse and 
on the principle of beneficence (i.e., commitment to the best 
interests of the client or patient), would be acceptable to 
the terms of the social contract that a reasonable society 
would accept for the profession of healthcare administration. 
In the interactive model, social discourse between professions 
and society, and between individual professionals and individ-
ual clients or patients, seeks a consensual agreement on the 
nature of professional obligations for healthcare administra-
tors. 
In the interactive model the professional possesses the 
expertise to address a fundamental human need or social 
concern, while the client or patient possesses the understand-
ing of his own values, goals and priorities. It is understood 
that the service provided by the professional addresses a 
valued human good, but that good must be weighed in light of 
other goods important to the client or patient. Both parties 
are then obligated to discourse so that the agreed upon 
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professional service best serves the particular client's or 
patient's understanding of the good. The professional 
practices beneficence when her service respects the autonomous 
choice of the client or patient, or, when that autonomy is 
lacking, when she promotes the valued good of the professional 
service and honors the central values of her profession to 
restore the client's or patient's autonomy. 
Applying this interactive model to the ethics of health-
care administrators, it appears that the community served by 
the healthcare institution is the healthcare administrator's 
chief client. This requires that there be continual dialogue 
so that the healthcare administrator can be aware of the 
health needs of the community and adapt the institution's 
services accordingly, while also assuring that the community 
is responsive to the institution's needs as well. It also 
requires that healthcare administrators, in light of their 
exclusive expertise and in response to their community's 
needs, adopt key advocacy roles in health policy issues and 
take a leadership role in helping society define the appropri-
ate goals and costs of healthcare. In today's healthcare 
environment, commitment to the good of the community's health 
also requires that healthcare administrators reconceptualize 
and re-engineer healthcare institutions from merely addressing 
illnesses to becoming centers of wellness and health. 
In the interactive model the primary value in the 
profession of healthcare administration is the health of the 
community. 
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This value understands healthcare institutions, 
which healthcare administrators have the unique expertise to 
operate, to be established by society as service organizations 
to provide a wide range of health-related services for their 
communities. The health of individual patients comes next, 
often paralleling the first value but trumped only if individ-
ual patients are overutilizing resources needed for the whole 
community. Institutional integrity ranks third in the 
hierarchy of values, providing that the mission and values of 
the healthcare institution are designed to promote the two 
higher values. The financial viability of the organization 
ranks low, for it is assumed that communities will support 
needed healthcare institutions and that communities will not 
value the profitability of those institutions over the 
provision of needed healthcare for the community and individu-
al patients. Likewise, effective and capable management of 
employees and good relations with the medical staff is valued 
only if this promotes the first two values in the hierarchy. 
Two concerns can be raised regarding the interactive 
model of profession, but neither weakens the case that this 
model is the most satisfactory for a reasonable society to 
contract for in determining the professional obligations of 
healthcare administrators. First, while it is theoretically 
possible that social discourse may reach an agreement in which 
beneficence is not considered a role-specific norm of profes-
sionals, given the human situation that gives rise to the need 
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for professions it is hard to imagine how beneficence would 
not be required at all in the professional-client/patient 
relationship or in public policy debate over the social 
provision for professional services. Second, though there are 
natural limitations to the ideal speech situation presupposed 
in social discourse, consensus in social discourse can be 
understood as a continual generation of reasonable agreement 
about the moral norms of professions through an open-ended 
moral conversation. An ongoing understanding of the profes-
sional obligations of healthcare administrators can be an 
actual product of an actual, even if imperfect, dialogue. It 
was proposed that this dissertation should be considered not 
only as an attempt to justify the interactive model of 
profession, but as a contribution to that ongoing understand-
ing of the professional obligations of healthcare administra-
tors. 
Some final thoughts will now be offered as observations 
which hopefully someday may be followed up on in more depth. 
First, it is striking to note that the interactive model of 
profession turns the central values of healthcare administra-
tors "on their head" in comparison to the other three models. 
The value of the health of the community ranked last in the 
guild, agent and commercial models, but is the premier value 
in the interactive model. 
On one hand, this reflects what is increasingly perceived 
to be a changing attitude toward healthcare delivery in our 
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society. For decades we took pride in, and provided mecha-
nisms to financially support, the technological advances and 
life-prolonging measures that developed in our healthcare 
institutions. Now, however, there is now a growing conviction 
that our healthcare industry does too much for too few, and 
that far too members of our society are either without basic 
healthcare coverage or find their healthcare costs escalating 
out of reach. As a result, society is calling upon healthcare 
administrators and other healthcare leaders to re-direct 
healthcare delivery to better serve the needs of all the 
members of society. 
On the other hand, it is seems that the value of the 
health of the community has risen in importance for healthcare 
administrators due to market forces. Managed care and the 
development of capitation reimbursement has changed the old 
"illness model" of healthcare institutions from being a 
revenue producer to a financial liability. In the next few 
years, it is expected that healthcare institutions increasing-
ly will be reimbursed for keeping people healthy rather than 
for treating their illnesses. This, of course, raises a 
number of ethical issues which will not be addressed in this 
paper; of note here is that healthcare administrators may be 
assisted in honoring the primary central value of their 
profession by financial considerations, which possibility, of 
course, raises issues of moral motivation as well as how this 
central value is viewed if in various ways it is not supported 
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by financial considerations. 
A second observation is that placing the health of the 
community as the primary central value of healthcare adminis-
trators now puts them at odds with physicians, who, according 
to the traditional medical morality, normally value the 
importance of the health of their individual patients above 
the health of the community. In a managed care environment, 
however, respect for autonomous patient choices regarding 
expensive treatments now comes into conflict with the increas-
ingly valued principle of fairness or proportionality of 
benefits and burdens to the whole group of patients. It 
remains to be seen if healthcare administrators will take a 
leadership role in redefining moral norms in this newly 
emerging area of ethical concern. 
A third observation is that this dissertation on the 
ethics of healthcare administrators has been written at a time 
of extreme and rather sudden upheaval in the profession. With 
hospitals dramatically downsizing and hastening to merge, form 
integrated deli very networks with other hea 1 the are facilities, 
develop healthcare alliances with former competitors, and 
increasingly focus not only on outpatient care but on extended 
care facilities and home health care, the size and nature of 
our healthcare institutions may be quite different in just a 
few years. Many healthcare administrators will not work just 
in an individual institution in one given community as in the 
past, but will exercise authority over a network or alliance 
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of many different kinds of healthcare institutions. The 
professional obligations of healthcare administrators as 
described in the interactive model of profession will remain 
the same, but examples or illustrations of these obligations 
may be far different in a few years - and apply to a lot fewer 
people. 
Last, a number of other issues pertaining to the ethics 
of healthcare administrators were put aside in this disserta-
tion. Among the unaddressed issues, which I remain interested 
in, is the issue of how to reformulate the mission and values 
of an institution when it merges or networks with other 
institutions, the question of how best to provide moral 
education to the candidates for the profession of healthcare 
administration, the concern of how to motivate healthcare 
administrators to observe their professional obligations, and 
the problem of how to integrate the professional obligations 
of healthcare administrators with personal concerns, e.g., 
facilitating a merger or an alliance with another institution 
that will negatively impact the healthcare administrator's own 
job. Hopefully these issues may be addressed in another 
format at another time. 
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